hermes-agent/website/docs/developer-guide/egress-internals.md

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14	Egress proxy internals	How the iron-proxy egress firewall integrates with Hermes — module layout, lifecycle, security invariants, and extension points

Egress proxy internals

This page covers the architecture of the egress credential-injection firewall (hermes egress / iron-proxy) from a contributor / plugin author's perspective. End-user setup + usage docs live at Egress proxy.

The threat model and high-level design are summarised on the user page; this page is about how it's wired, where the security-relevant code lives, and what invariants you have to preserve if you touch it.

Module layout

agent/proxy_sources/iron_proxy.py     Core: binary install, CA gen, config build,
                                       subprocess lifecycle, mappings I/O, PID/nonce
                                       defense.  Pure-function surface where possible.

hermes_cli/proxy_cli.py               Wizard + slash command handlers.
                                       `hermes egress {install,setup,start,stop,
                                       status,disable,config}`.  Wires the
                                       core module into argparse.

hermes_cli/main.py:_dispatch_egress   Top-level subparser dispatcher.
                                       dest='egress_command' (intentionally
                                       disjoint from the inbound OAuth
                                       `hermes proxy` subparser, which uses
                                       dest='proxy_command').

hermes_cli/config.py: proxy schema    The `proxy:` block in DEFAULT_CONFIG.
                                       Adding a knob means: add it here, add a
                                       wizard prompt or `setdefault` in
                                       proxy_cli.cmd_setup, and document it
                                       in the user-guide page.

tools/environments/docker.py
  _egress_proxy_args_for_docker()     Builds the volume_args / env_overrides /
                                       host_args triple that the Docker backend
                                       injects when `proxy.enabled: true`.

  DockerEnvironment.__init__          Docker-side merge logic: collision
                                       detection against critical egress vars,
                                       NODE_OPTIONS append-merge via the
                                       _HERMES_EGRESS_NODE_OPTIONS_APPEND
                                       sentinel, enforce_on_docker precedence.

tests/test_iron_proxy.py              Hermetic tests (~70).  Binary install
                                       path, config build, mappings I/O,
                                       subprocess lifecycle, docker arg builder,
                                       deny CIDR defaults, bind policy, CA
                                       TOCTOU, ensure_audit_log behaviour, etc.

tests/test_iron_proxy_cli.py          CLI handler unit tests (~20).  Argparse
                                       wiring, fail-loud paths, BWS refresh
                                       wire-up, dest='egress_command'
                                       regression guard.

tests/test_iron_proxy_e2e.py          Live E2E (gated on HERMES_RUN_E2E=1).
                                       Real iron-proxy binary, real curl,
                                       end-to-end token swap verified.

Lifecycle

hermes egress install
  -> agent.proxy_sources.iron_proxy.install_iron_proxy(force=...)
       Downloads pinned tarball + checksums.txt from GitHub Releases.
       SHA-256 verification before extraction.
       tarfile.extract(..., filter="data") on Python 3.12+ (PEP 706);
         falls back to plain extract on older Python with member-name
         sanitisation via _pick_tar_member.
       Stage into ~/.hermes/bin/.iron-proxy_XXXX, chmod 755, os.replace
         to ~/.hermes/bin/iron-proxy (atomic).
       _VERSION_CACHE.pop(target) so a forced reinstall re-probes
         --version on next call.

hermes egress setup [--from-bitwarden | --no-bitwarden] [--rotate-tokens]
  -> proxy_cli.cmd_setup
       Step 1. find_iron_proxy(install_if_missing=False) -> install if absent.
       Step 2. ensure_ca_cert()
                 Run openssl genrsa + req via subprocess.
                 Write CA key via os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
                   + os.replace.  Never exists on disk under default umask.
                 Write CA cert with 0o644 (public).
       Step 3. discover_provider_mappings() or pull names from BWS via
                 fetch_bitwarden_secrets() when --from-bitwarden.
                 merge_mappings(existing=load_mappings(), discovered,
                                rotate=args.rotate_tokens) preserves prior
                 tokens unless --rotate-tokens is passed.
                 discover_uncovered_providers() and surface warnings.
       Step 4. ensure_audit_log(audit_log_path)   # raises on OSError
               build_proxy_config(...) with defaults applied at the call site
                 (deny CIDRs default, bind policy from _default_http_listen).
               write_proxy_config(cfg)            # atomic via .tmp + os.replace, 0o600
               write_mappings(mappings)           # atomic, 0o600
       Step 5. proxy_cfg["enabled"] = True; credential_source preservation logic
               (do NOT silently downgrade bitwarden -> env on re-run);
               save_config(cfg).

hermes egress start
  -> proxy_cli.cmd_start
       Pre-checks (refuse-start path):
         - proxy.fail_on_uncovered_providers? -> discover_blocked_providers()
         - credential_source=bitwarden? -> pre-validate access_token_env + project_id
       -> iron_proxy.start_proxy(
            refresh_secrets_from_bitwarden=...,
            bitwarden_config=...,
          )
            existing=_read_pid(); if alive, idempotent return.
            _build_proxy_subprocess_env(...):  ALLOWLIST + mapped real_env_names,
              strip HTTPS_PROXY/etc. to avoid recursion, optional BWS refresh
              (raises on missing values unless allow_env_fallback=true).
            Plant nonce: _proxy_nonce = sha256(urandom(16)); env[NONCE_ENV] = ...
            Open log_path via O_NOFOLLOW + 0o600 + st_uid check.
            Popen with stdin=DEVNULL, stdout=log_fd, stderr=STDOUT,
              start_new_session=True (POSIX).
            Close parent's log_fd in finally.
            _write_pidfile_safely(pidfile, proc.pid)
              O_EXCL + O_NOFOLLOW + uid check + persisted nonce sidecar.
              FileExistsError -> discriminate live vs stale, retry once if stale.
            Install SIGINT/SIGTERM handlers (main-thread only).
            Poll loop (do-while shape):
              while True:
                if proc.poll() is not None: tail log + unlink pidfile + raise
                if _port_listening("127.0.0.1", tunnel_port): break
                if time.time() >= deadline: break  (do-while: checked AFTER first probe)
                time.sleep(0.1)
            If not listening at exit: _kill_and_wait(proc) + unlink pidfile + raise.

hermes egress stop
  -> iron_proxy.stop_proxy
       _read_pid + _pid_alive guard.
       starttime_before = _pid_proc_starttime(pid)   # Linux only; None elsewhere
       os.kill(pid, SIGTERM)
       Wait up to 5s for graceful exit.
       After grace: re-check starttime + _pid_alive.
         If recycled (starttime drift OR _pid_alive False), DO NOT SIGKILL.
         Otherwise os.kill(pid, _KILL_SIGNAL).
       _cleanup_state_files: unlink pidfile + nonce sibling.

Security invariants

These are the load-bearing properties. If you touch the module, you must preserve them. Where there's a regression test, it's named.

Filesystem perms

Path	Mode	Test
~/.hermes/proxy/ (dir)	0o700	test_proxy_state_dir_is_0o700
ca.key	0o600	test_ca_key_created_with_0o600
ca.crt	0o644	(implicit; chmod call in ensure_ca_cert)
proxy.yaml	0o600	(chmod after atomic rename in write_proxy_config)
mappings.json	0o600	(chmod after atomic rename in write_mappings)
iron-proxy.pid	0o600	(os.open(..., 0o600) mode in _write_pidfile_safely)
iron-proxy.nonce	0o600	(os.open(..., 0o600) mode in _write_pidfile_safely)
audit.log	0o600	test_ensure_audit_log_creates_with_0o600
iron-proxy.log	0o600	(os.open(..., 0o600) + fchmod)

All write paths use os.open(O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) + os.fstat().st_uid check. shutil.copy2 + os.chmod is forbidden because it leaks a default-umask window.

Subprocess env minimisation

_build_proxy_subprocess_env MUST NOT use os.environ.copy(). The allowlist is _PROXY_SUBPROCESS_ENV_ALLOWLIST (PATH, HOME, locale, etc.) plus the env names referenced by load_mappings(). Everything else stays on the host.

Regression: test_subprocess_env_strips_unrelated_secrets, test_subprocess_env_strips_proxy_recursion_vars, test_subprocess_env_keeps_infrastructure_vars.

Bind policy

_default_http_listen returns loopback + (Linux only) the docker bridge IP. Never 0.0.0.0, never :PORT (INADDR_ANY).

_detect_docker_bridge_ip validates via ipaddress.IPv4Address and rejects is_unspecified / is_loopback / is_multicast / is_reserved / is_link_local / is_global. A hostile ip shim on PATH cannot inject 0.0.0.0.

Regression: test_default_bind_is_loopback_not_zero_zero, test_detect_docker_bridge_ip_rejects_dangerous (parametrized over 8 attack inputs).

Default deny CIDRs

_DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_DENY_CIDRS covers loopback (v4 + v6), link-local (incl. IMDS at 169.254.169.254 and the IPv4-mapped-v6 form), RFC1918, IPv6 ULA, CGNAT, and the RFC2544 benchmark range. build_proxy_config(..., upstream_deny_cidrs=None) MUST emit the default; only an explicit empty list opts out.

Regression: test_default_deny_cidrs_present_when_unspecified, test_default_deny_includes_ipv4_mapped_v6.

Audit log fail-loud

ensure_audit_log raises RuntimeError on any OSError. Swallowing the failure would let the daemon create the file under the default umask, defeating the privacy promise. cmd_setup catches the RuntimeError and surfaces a clear error to the operator.

Regression: test_ensure_audit_log_raises_on_immutable_parent.

Bitwarden mode fail-loud

When credential_source: bitwarden AND proxy.allow_env_fallback: false (default):

• Missing access token env var -> cmd_start refuses.
• Missing project_id -> cmd_start refuses.
• bws secret list returns no values for one or more mapped providers -> _build_proxy_subprocess_env raises.

Falling back to host env in BW mode reintroduces exactly the staleness bug the BW path is meant to defeat.

Regression: test_cmd_start_refuses_when_bitwarden_token_missing (CLI layer); strict-mode assertions in _build_proxy_subprocess_env (daemon layer).

docker_env collision detection

When enforce_on_docker: true, docker_env overrides on any of the egress-controlling vars (HTTPS_PROXY, SSL_CERT_FILE, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, etc.) OR any mapped real_env_name (OPENROUTER_API_KEY, etc.) raises RuntimeError BEFORE the container starts.

Regression: test_docker_env_collision_with_proxy_raises_when_enforce.

PID recycling defense

_pid_alive MUST consult either the in-process _proxy_nonce (same-process case) OR the on-disk iron-proxy.nonce (cross-CLI case) before trusting an argv[0] basename match. stop_proxy MUST re-check /proc/<pid>/stat starttime before SIGKILL and suppress the signal on starttime drift.

Regression: test_stop_proxy_suppresses_sigkill_on_pid_recycle, test_pid_proc_starttime_parses_comm_with_parens, test_persisted_nonce_roundtrip.

Token preservation on re-setup

merge_mappings(existing, discovered, rotate=False) MUST return prior tokens for providers that overlap. Re-running hermes egress setup cannot silently 401 running sandboxes. --rotate-tokens is the explicit opt-in.

Regression: test_merge_mappings_preserves_existing_tokens, test_merge_mappings_rotate_mints_fresh_tokens.

credential_source preservation

cmd_setup MUST NOT downgrade credential_source: bitwarden to env on re-run without an explicit --no-bitwarden flag. Running hermes egress setup (no flag) preserves whatever was previously configured.

Tested via the cmd_setup flow in CLI tests (the bitwarden-preservation path is exercised when --from-bitwarden is followed by a plain setup re-run).

Extension points

Adding a new bearer-token provider

_BEARER_PROVIDERS in iron_proxy.py maps env var name -> tuple of upstream hosts. Adding an entry makes it discoverable by discover_provider_mappings(); the wizard mints a token for it automatically when the env var is present.

_BEARER_PROVIDERS: Dict[str, Tuple[str, ...]] = {
    ...,
    "MY_PROVIDER_API_KEY": ("api.myprovider.com",),
}

Also update _DEFAULT_ALLOWED_HOSTS so the proxy allows the upstream by default. Run test_discover_provider_mappings_* to confirm.

Adding a new non-bearer provider

If the provider uses x-api-key / SigV4 / OAuth-from-SDK / etc., iron-proxy's secrets transform cannot swap it. Add the env var to _NON_BEARER_PROVIDERS so the wizard warns about it. If the provider is LLM-specific enough that you want fail_on_uncovered_providers: true to actually block it, also add to _LLM_SPECIFIC_NON_BEARER_PROVIDERS.

_NON_BEARER_PROVIDERS: Tuple[str, ...] = (
    ...,
    "MY_X_API_KEY_PROVIDER",
)

_LLM_SPECIFIC_NON_BEARER_PROVIDERS: Tuple[str, ...] = (
    ...,
    "MY_X_API_KEY_PROVIDER",
)

Wiring iron-proxy into a non-Docker backend

_egress_proxy_args_for_docker is Docker-specific. Backends that want similar wiring need their own analogue that:

1. Reads load_config().get("proxy", {}); returns empty args if enabled is false.
2. Calls iron_proxy.get_status(); surfaces enforce semantics on configured / pid / listening / ca_cert_path failure paths.
3. Calls iron_proxy.load_mappings(); refuses to mount if empty AND enforce_on_docker: true.
4. Sets the seven env vars (HTTPS_PROXY, NO_PROXY, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, SSL_CERT_FILE, CURL_CA_BUNDLE, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, HERMES_EGRESS_PROXY) and the per-mapping HERMES_PROXY_TOKEN_<NAME> vars.
5. Distributes the CA cert into the sandbox at a path the runtime will trust (typically /etc/ssl/certs/hermes-egress-ca.crt).
6. Implements collision detection against the user's backend-specific env config.

The Docker implementation is ~150 lines; expect similar volume for Modal / Daytona / SSH.

Subscribing to per-request audit events

iron-proxy writes line-delimited JSON to ~/.hermes/proxy/audit.log. A plugin / external watcher can tail the file and react to allowlist denials, secret swaps, or upstream errors. The schema is documented at docs.iron.sh/audit (link).

Testing

# Hermetic suite (no network, no real binary)
scripts/run_tests.sh tests/test_iron_proxy.py tests/test_iron_proxy_cli.py

# Live E2E (real binary, real curl, real CONNECT tunnel)
HERMES_RUN_E2E=1 scripts/run_tests.sh tests/test_iron_proxy_e2e.py

# Live PTY smoke against `hermes egress`
HERMES_HOME=/tmp/hermes-egress-test python3 -m hermes_cli.main egress --help
HERMES_HOME=/tmp/hermes-egress-test python3 -m hermes_cli.main egress setup --help

The CLI uses argparse, so --help is a good first probe for "did my new flag register correctly".

See also

• User-facing setup + troubleshooting: Egress proxy
• Docker backend internals: Docker
• Bitwarden Secrets Manager integration: hermes secrets bitwarden
• CLI command reference: hermes egress
• Sandbox-injected environment variables: Egress proxy (sandbox-injected)