chore: remove vendor-specific references from app_tools

- 'if session:' drops empty dict {} which is schema-valid
- 'if session_id:' drops empty string which shouldn't be silently eaten
- _EXECUTE_STRIP_KEYS frozenset was defined but never referenced (handler
  uses allowlist approach instead)

.github/actions/hermes-smoke-test/action.yml

@@ -29,13 +29,9 @@ runs:
     - name: hermes --help
       shell: bash
       run: |
-        # Use the image's real ENTRYPOINT (/init + main-wrapper.sh) so
-        # this exercises the actual production startup path. PR #30136
-        # review caught that an --entrypoint override here had been
-        # silently neutered by the s6-overlay migration — stage2-hook
-        # ignores its CMD args, so the smoke test was a no-op.
         docker run --rm \
           -v /tmp/hermes-test:/opt/data \
+          --entrypoint /opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh \
           "${{ inputs.image }}" --help
 
     - name: hermes dashboard --help
@@ -47,4 +43,5 @@ runs:
         # installed package.
         docker run --rm \
           -v /tmp/hermes-test:/opt/data \
+          --entrypoint /opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh \
           "${{ inputs.image }}" dashboard --help

.github/workflows/docker-lint.yml

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-name: Docker / shell lint
-
-# Lints the container build inputs: Dockerfile (via hadolint) and any shell
-# scripts under docker/ (via shellcheck). These catch the class of regression
-# the behavioral docker-publish smoke test can't — unquoted variable
-# expansions, silently-failing RUN commands, etc.
-#
-# Rules and ignores are documented in .hadolint.yaml at the repo root.
-# shellcheck severity is pinned to `error` so SC1091-style "can't follow
-# sourced script" info-level warnings don't fail the job — the .venv
-# activate script doesn't exist at lint time.
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches: [main]
-    paths:
-      - Dockerfile
-      - docker/**
-      - .hadolint.yaml
-      - .github/workflows/docker-lint.yml
-  pull_request:
-    branches: [main]
-    paths:
-      - Dockerfile
-      - docker/**
-      - .hadolint.yaml
-      - .github/workflows/docker-lint.yml
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-concurrency:
-  group: docker-lint-${{ github.ref }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  hadolint:
-    name: Lint Dockerfile (hadolint)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
-
-      - name: hadolint
-        uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@54c9adbab1582c2ef04b2016b760714a4bfde3cf # v3.1.0
-        with:
-          dockerfile: Dockerfile
-          config: .hadolint.yaml
-          failure-threshold: warning
-
-  shellcheck:
-    name: Lint docker/ shell scripts (shellcheck)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
-
-      - name: shellcheck
-        uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@00cae500b08a931fb5698e11e79bfbd38e612a38 # v2.0.0
-        env:
-          # Severity = error: SC1091 (can't follow sourced script) is info-
-          # level and would otherwise fail when the venv activate script
-          # doesn't exist at lint time.
-          SHELLCHECK_OPTS: --severity=error
-        with:
-          scandir: ./docker

.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml

@@ -80,56 +80,6 @@ jobs:
         with:
           image: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:test
 
-      # ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-      # Run the docker-integration test suite against the freshly-built
-      # image already loaded into the local daemon (`:test`).  These tests
-      # are excluded from the sharded `tests.yml :: test` matrix on purpose
-      # (see `_SKIP_PARTS` in scripts/run_tests_parallel.py) because each
-      # shard would otherwise reach the session-scoped ``built_image``
-      # fixture in ``tests/docker/conftest.py`` and start a 3-7min
-      # ``docker build`` under a 180s pytest-timeout cap — guaranteed to
-      # die in fixture setup.
-      #
-      # Piggybacking here avoids a second image build: the smoke test
-      # already proved the image loads + runs, so the daemon has it under
-      # `${IMAGE_NAME}:test` and we just point ``HERMES_TEST_IMAGE`` at
-      # that.  The fixture's ``HERMES_TEST_IMAGE`` branch (see
-      # tests/docker/conftest.py:62-63) short-circuits the rebuild.
-      #
-      # Why this job and not a standalone one: the image is 5GB+; passing
-      # it between jobs via ``docker save``/``upload-artifact`` is slower
-      # than the build itself.  Reusing the existing daemon state is the
-      # cheapest path to coverage on every PR that touches docker code.
-      # ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-      - name: Install uv (for docker tests)
-        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@d4b2f3b6ecc6e67c4457f6d3e41ec42d3d0fcb86  # v5
-
-      - name: Set up Python 3.11 (for docker tests)
-        run: uv python install 3.11
-
-      - name: Install Python dependencies (for docker tests)
-        run: |
-          uv venv .venv --python 3.11
-          source .venv/bin/activate
-          # ``dev`` extra pulls in pytest, pytest-asyncio, pytest-timeout —
-          # everything tests/docker/ needs.  We deliberately avoid ``all``
-          # here because the docker tests only drive the container via
-          # subprocess and don't import hermes_agent's optional deps.
-          uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
-
-      - name: Run docker integration tests
-        env:
-          # Skip rebuild; use the image already loaded by the build step.
-          HERMES_TEST_IMAGE: ${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:test
-          # Match the policy in tests.yml :: test job — no accidental
-          # real-API calls from inside the harness.
-          OPENROUTER_API_KEY: ""
-          OPENAI_API_KEY: ""
-          NOUS_API_KEY: ""
-        run: |
-          source .venv/bin/activate
-          python -m pytest tests/docker/ -v --tb=short
-
       - name: Log in to Docker Hub
         if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || github.event_name == 'release'
         uses: docker/login-action@4907a6ddec9925e35a0a9e82d7399ccc52663121  # v4.1.0

.github/workflows/nix-lockfile-fix.yml

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Generate GitHub App token
         id: app-token
-        uses: actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49218906704ab6c1aa796996da409d3eb1  # v3.2.0
+        uses: actions/create-github-app-token@7bfa3a4717ef143a604ee0a99d859b8886a96d00  # v1.9.3
         with:
           app-id: ${{ secrets.APP_ID }}
           private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}

.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml

@@ -47,17 +47,14 @@ jobs:
           HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
 
           # Added lines only, excluding lockfiles.
-          # Three-dot diff (base...head) diffs from the merge base to HEAD,
-          # so only changes introduced by this PR are included — not changes
-          # that landed on main after the PR branched off.
-          DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE"..."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)
+          DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)
 
           FINDINGS=""
 
           # --- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup) ---
           # The exact mechanism used in the litellm supply chain attack:
           # https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512
-          PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE"..."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
+          PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
           if [ -n "$PTH_FILES" ]; then
             FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
           ### 🚨 CRITICAL: .pth file added or modified
@@ -100,12 +97,7 @@ jobs:
 
           # --- Install-hook files (setup.py/sitecustomize/usercustomize/__init__.pth) ---
           # These execute during pip install or interpreter startup.
-          # Anchored at repo root: only the top-level setup.py/setup.cfg run during
-          # `pip install`, and only top-level sitecustomize.py/usercustomize.py are
-          # auto-loaded by the interpreter via site.py. Any nested file with the
-          # same name (e.g. hermes_cli/setup.py — the CLI setup wizard) is unrelated
-          # and produced false positives that trained reviewers to ignore the scanner.
-          SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE"..."$HEAD" | grep -E '^(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py|__init__\.pth)$' || true)
+          SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '(^|/)(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py|__init__\.pth)$' || true)
           if [ -n "$SETUP_HITS" ]; then
             FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
           ### 🚨 CRITICAL: Install-hook file added or modified
@@ -166,7 +158,7 @@ jobs:
           HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
 
           # Only check added lines in pyproject.toml
-          ADDED=$(git diff "$BASE"..."$HEAD" -- pyproject.toml | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
+          ADDED=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- pyproject.toml | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
 
           if [ -z "$ADDED" ]; then
             echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

.github/workflows/tests.yml

@@ -23,22 +23,11 @@ concurrency:
 jobs:
   test:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 30
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        slice: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
+    timeout-minutes: 60
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd  # v6.0.2
 
-      - name: Restore duration cache
-        uses: actions/cache/restore@27d5ce7f107fe9357f9df03efb73ab90386fccae  # v5.0.5
-        with:
-          path: test_durations.json
-          # Single stable key. main always overwrites, PRs always find it.
-          key: test-durations
-
       - name: Install ripgrep (prebuilt binary)
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -65,7 +54,7 @@ jobs:
           source .venv/bin/activate
           uv pip install -e ".[all,dev]"
 
-      - name: Run tests (slice ${{ matrix.slice }}/6)
+      - name: Run tests
         # Per-file isolation via scripts/run_tests_parallel.py: discovers
         # every test_*.py file under tests/ (excluding integration/ + e2e/),
         # then runs `python -m pytest <file>` in a freshly-spawned subprocess
@@ -83,61 +72,15 @@ jobs:
         # state across files, which is exactly the leakage we wanted to
         # fix. ThreadPoolExecutor + subprocess.run is ~60 lines and does
         # the job with cleaner semantics.
-        #
-        # Matrix slicing (--slice I/N): files are distributed across 6
-        # jobs by cached duration (LPT algorithm) so each job gets
-        # roughly equal wall time. Without a cache, files default to 2s
-        # estimate and get split roughly evenly by count — still correct,
-        # just not perfectly balanced.
         run: |
           source .venv/bin/activate
-          python scripts/run_tests_parallel.py --slice ${{ matrix.slice }}/6
+          python scripts/run_tests_parallel.py
         env:
           # Ensure tests don't accidentally call real APIs
           OPENROUTER_API_KEY: ""
           OPENAI_API_KEY: ""
           NOUS_API_KEY: ""
 
-      - name: Upload per-slice durations
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a  # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          name: test-durations-slice-${{ matrix.slice }}
-          path: test_durations.json
-          retention-days: 1
-
-  # Merge per-slice duration data into a single cache, so future runs
-  # (including PRs) get balanced slicing.
-  save-durations:
-    needs: test
-    if: always() && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Download all slice durations
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c  # v8.0.1
-        with:
-          pattern: test-durations-slice-*
-          path: durations
-          merge-multiple: true
-
-      - name: Merge into single durations file
-        run: |
-          python3 -c "
-          import json, glob, os
-          merged = {}
-          for f in glob.glob('durations/*test_durations.json'):
-            with open(f) as fh:
-              merged.update(json.load(fh))
-          with open('test_durations.json', 'w') as fh:
-            json.dump(merged, fh, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
-          print(f'Merged {len(merged)} file durations')
-          "
-
-      - name: Save merged duration cache
-        uses: actions/cache/save@27d5ce7f107fe9357f9df03efb73ab90386fccae  # v5.0.5
-        with:
-          path: test_durations.json
-          key: test-durations
-
   e2e:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
@@ -178,4 +121,4 @@ jobs:
         env:
           OPENROUTER_API_KEY: ""
           OPENAI_API_KEY: ""
-          NOUS_API_KEY: ""
+          NOUS_API_KEY: ""

.gitignore

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ __pycache__/web_tools.cpython-310.pyc
 logs/
 data/
 .pytest_cache/
-test_durations.json
 .pytest-cache/
 tmp/
 temp_vision_images/

.hadolint.yaml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-# hadolint configuration for the Hermes Agent Dockerfile.
-# See https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint#configure for rules.
-#
-# We want hadolint to surface NEW Dockerfile lint regressions, but we
-# don't want to rewrite the existing image to silence rules that are
-# either intentional or pragmatic tradeoffs for this project. Each
-# ignore below has a one-line justification.
-failure-threshold: warning
-
-ignored:
-  # Pin versions in apt get install. We intentionally don't pin common
-  # tools (curl, git, openssh-client, etc.) — security updates flow in
-  # via the periodic base-image rebuild, and pinning would lock us to
-  # superseded patch releases. Same rationale as nearly every distro-
-  # base official image (python, node, debian).
-  - DL3008
-  # Use WORKDIR to switch to a directory. The image uses `(cd web && …)`
-  # / `(cd ../ui-tui && …)` inline subshells for one-off build steps
-  # because they don't affect later RUN commands; promoting them to
-  # full WORKDIR switches with restores would obscure intent.
-  - DL3003
-  # Multiple consecutive RUN instructions. The `touch README.md` + `uv
-  # sync` split is intentional — `touch` is cheap, `uv sync` is the
-  # expensive layer-cached step we want isolated, and merging them
-  # would invalidate the cache for trivial changes.
-  - DL3059
-  # Last USER should not be root. /init (s6-overlay) runs as root so the
-  # stage2 hook can usermod/groupmod and chown the data volume per
-  # HERMES_UID at runtime; each supervised service then drops to the
-  # hermes user via `s6-setuidgid`.
-  - DL3002
-
-# Require explicit base-image pins (SHA256) — we already do this.
-trustedRegistries:
-  - docker.io
-  - ghcr.io

Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.6-python3.13-trixie@sha256:b3c543b6c4f23a5f2df22866bd7857e5d304b67a564f4feab6ac22044dde719b AS uv_source
+FROM tianon/gosu:1.19-trixie@sha256:3b176695959c71e123eb390d427efc665eeb561b1540e82679c15e992006b8b9 AS gosu_source
 FROM debian:13.4
 
 # Disable Python stdout buffering to ensure logs are printed immediately
@@ -8,68 +9,18 @@ ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
 # install survives the /opt/data volume overlay at runtime.
 ENV PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH=/opt/hermes/.playwright
 
-# Install system dependencies in one layer, clear APT cache.
-# tini was previously PID 1 to reap orphaned zombie processes (MCP stdio
-# subprocesses, git, bun, etc.) that would otherwise accumulate when hermes
-# ran as PID 1. See #15012. Phase 2 of the s6-overlay supervision plan
-# replaces tini with s6-overlay's /init (PID 1 = s6-svscan), which reaps
-# zombies non-blockingly on SIGCHLD and additionally supervises the main
-# hermes process, the dashboard, and per-profile gateways.
+# Install system dependencies in one layer, clear APT cache
+# tini reaps orphaned zombie processes (MCP stdio subprocesses, git, bun, etc.)
+# that would otherwise accumulate when hermes runs as PID 1. See #15012.
 RUN apt-get update && \
     apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    build-essential curl nodejs npm python3 ripgrep ffmpeg gcc python3-dev libffi-dev procps git openssh-client docker-cli xz-utils && \
+    build-essential curl nodejs npm python3 ripgrep ffmpeg gcc python3-dev libffi-dev procps git openssh-client docker-cli tini && \
     rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-# ---------- s6-overlay install ----------
-# s6-overlay provides supervision for the main hermes process, the dashboard,
-# and per-profile gateways. /init becomes PID 1 below — see ENTRYPOINT.
-#
-# Multi-arch: BuildKit auto-populates TARGETARCH (amd64 / arm64). s6-overlay
-# uses tarball names keyed on the kernel arch string (x86_64 / aarch64), so
-# we map between them inline. The noarch + symlinks tarballs are
-# architecture-independent and reused as-is.
-#
-# We use `curl` instead of `ADD` for the per-arch tarball because `ADD`
-# evaluates its URL at parse time, before any ARG / TARGETARCH substitution
-# — splitting one URL per arch into two ADDs would download both on every
-# build and leave dead bytes in the cache. A single curl + arch-keyed URL
-# is simpler and cache-friendlier.
-#
-# Supply-chain integrity: every tarball is checksum-verified against the
-# upstream-published SHA256. To bump S6_OVERLAY_VERSION, fetch the four
-# `.sha256` files from the corresponding release and update the ARGs. The
-# checksum lookup happens during build, so a compromised release artifact
-# fails the build loudly instead of silently producing a tampered image.
-ARG TARGETARCH
-ARG S6_OVERLAY_VERSION=3.2.3.0
-ARG S6_OVERLAY_NOARCH_SHA256=b720f9d9340efc8bb07528b9743813c836e4b02f8693d90241f047998b4c53cf
-ARG S6_OVERLAY_X86_64_SHA256=a93f02882c6ed46b21e7adb5c0add86154f01236c93cd82c7d682722e8840563
-ARG S6_OVERLAY_AARCH64_SHA256=0952056ff913482163cc30e35b2e944b507ba1025d78f5becbb89367bf344581
-ARG S6_OVERLAY_SYMLINKS_SHA256=a60dc5235de3ecbcf874b9c1f18d73263ab99b289b9329aa950e8729c4789f0e
-ADD https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/releases/download/v${S6_OVERLAY_VERSION}/s6-overlay-noarch.tar.xz /tmp/
-ADD https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/releases/download/v${S6_OVERLAY_VERSION}/s6-overlay-symlinks-noarch.tar.xz /tmp/
-RUN set -eu; \
-    case "${TARGETARCH:-amd64}" in \
-        amd64) s6_arch="x86_64"; s6_arch_sha="${S6_OVERLAY_X86_64_SHA256}" ;; \
-        arm64) s6_arch="aarch64"; s6_arch_sha="${S6_OVERLAY_AARCH64_SHA256}" ;; \
-        *) echo "Unsupported TARGETARCH=${TARGETARCH} for s6-overlay" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
-    esac; \
-    curl -fsSL --retry 3 -o /tmp/s6-overlay-arch.tar.xz \
-        "https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/releases/download/v${S6_OVERLAY_VERSION}/s6-overlay-${s6_arch}.tar.xz"; \
-    { \
-        printf '%s  %s\n' "${S6_OVERLAY_NOARCH_SHA256}" /tmp/s6-overlay-noarch.tar.xz; \
-        printf '%s  %s\n' "${s6_arch_sha}" /tmp/s6-overlay-arch.tar.xz; \
-        printf '%s  %s\n' "${S6_OVERLAY_SYMLINKS_SHA256}" /tmp/s6-overlay-symlinks-noarch.tar.xz; \
-    } > /tmp/s6-overlay.sha256; \
-    sha256sum -c /tmp/s6-overlay.sha256; \
-    tar -C / -Jxpf /tmp/s6-overlay-noarch.tar.xz; \
-    tar -C / -Jxpf /tmp/s6-overlay-arch.tar.xz; \
-    tar -C / -Jxpf /tmp/s6-overlay-symlinks-noarch.tar.xz; \
-    rm /tmp/s6-overlay-*.tar.xz /tmp/s6-overlay.sha256
-
 # Non-root user for runtime; UID can be overridden via HERMES_UID at runtime
 RUN useradd -u 10000 -m -d /opt/data hermes
 
+COPY --chmod=0755 --from=gosu_source /gosu /usr/local/bin/
 COPY --chmod=0755 --from=uv_source /usr/local/bin/uv /usr/local/bin/uvx /usr/local/bin/
 
 WORKDIR /opt/hermes
@@ -152,73 +103,18 @@ RUN cd web && npm run build && \
 USER root
 RUN chmod -R a+rX /opt/hermes && \
     chown -R hermes:hermes /opt/hermes/.venv /opt/hermes/ui-tui /opt/hermes/node_modules
-# Start as root so the s6-overlay stage2 hook can usermod/groupmod and chown
-# the data volume. Each supervised service then drops to the hermes user via
-# `s6-setuidgid hermes` in its run script. If HERMES_UID is unset, services
-# run as the default hermes user (UID 10000).
+# Start as root so the entrypoint can usermod/groupmod + gosu.
+# If HERMES_UID is unset, the entrypoint drops to the default hermes user (10000).
 
 # ---------- Link hermes-agent itself (editable) ----------
 # Deps are already installed in the cached layer above; `--no-deps` makes
 # this a fast (~1s) egg-link creation with no resolution or downloads.
 RUN uv pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e "."
 
-# ---------- s6-overlay service wiring ----------
-# Static services declared at build time: main-hermes + dashboard.
-# Per-profile gateway services are registered dynamically at runtime by
-# the profile create/delete hooks (Phase 4); they live under
-# /run/service/ (tmpfs) and are reconciled on container restart by
-# /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles (Phase 4 Task 4.0).
-COPY docker/s6-rc.d/ /etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/
-
-# stage2-hook handles UID/GID remap, volume chown, config seeding,
-# skills sync — all the work the old entrypoint.sh did before
-# `exec hermes`. Wired in as cont-init.d/01- so it
-# runs before user services start.
-#
-# 02-reconcile-profiles re-creates per-profile gateway s6 service
-# slots from $HERMES_HOME/profiles/<name>/ after a container restart
-# (the /run/service/ scandir is tmpfs and wiped on restart). Phase 4.
-RUN mkdir -p /etc/cont-init.d && \
-    printf '#!/bin/sh\nexec /opt/hermes/docker/stage2-hook.sh\n' \
-        > /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup && \
-    chmod +x /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup
-COPY --chmod=0755 docker/cont-init.d/015-supervise-perms /etc/cont-init.d/015-supervise-perms
-COPY --chmod=0755 docker/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles
-
 # ---------- Runtime ----------
 ENV HERMES_WEB_DIST=/opt/hermes/hermes_cli/web_dist
 ENV HERMES_HOME=/opt/data
-# Pre-s6 entrypoint.sh did `source .venv/bin/activate` which exported
-# the venv bin onto PATH; Architecture B's main-wrapper.sh does the
-# same for the container's main process, but `docker exec` and our
-# cont-init.d scripts don't pass through the wrapper. Expose the venv
-# bin globally so `docker exec <container> hermes ...` and any
-# subprocess that doesn't activate the venv first still find hermes.
-ENV PATH="/opt/hermes/.venv/bin:/opt/data/.local/bin:${PATH}"
+ENV PATH="/opt/data/.local/bin:${PATH}"
 RUN mkdir -p /opt/data
 VOLUME [ "/opt/data" ]
-
-# s6-overlay's /init is PID 1. It sets up the supervision tree, runs
-# /etc/cont-init.d/* (our stage2 hook), starts s6-rc services
-# declared in /etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/, then exec's its remaining
-# argv as the container's "main program" with stdin/stdout/stderr
-# inherited (this is what makes interactive --tui work). When the
-# main program exits, /init begins stage 3 shutdown and the container
-# exits with the program's exit code. Replaces tini — see Phase 2 of
-# docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md.
-#
-# We use the ENTRYPOINT+CMD split rather than CMD alone so the
-# wrapper is prepended to user-supplied args automatically:
-#
-#   docker run <image>                  → /init main-wrapper.sh   (CMD default)
-#   docker run <image> chat -q "hi"     → /init main-wrapper.sh chat -q hi
-#   docker run <image> sleep infinity   → /init main-wrapper.sh sleep infinity
-#   docker run <image> --tui            → /init main-wrapper.sh --tui
-#
-# main-wrapper.sh handles arg routing (bare-exec vs. hermes
-# subcommand vs. no-args), drops to the hermes user via s6-setuidgid,
-# and exec's the final program so its exit code becomes the container
-# exit code. Without the wrapper-as-ENTRYPOINT, leading-dash args
-# like `--version` would be intercepted by /init's POSIX shell.
-ENTRYPOINT [ "/init", "/opt/hermes/docker/main-wrapper.sh" ]
-CMD [ ]
+ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/tini", "-g", "--", "/opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh" ]

README.md

@@ -79,27 +79,6 @@ hermes doctor       # Diagnose any issues
 
 📖 **[Full documentation →](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/)**
 
----
-
-## Skip the API-key collection — Nous Portal
-
-Hermes works with whatever provider you want — that's not changing. But if you'd rather not collect five separate API keys for the model, web search, image generation, TTS, and a cloud browser, **[Nous Portal](https://portal.nousresearch.com)** covers all of them under one subscription:
-
-- **300+ models** — pick any of them with `/model <name>`
-- **Tool Gateway** — web search (Firecrawl), image generation (FAL), text-to-speech (OpenAI), cloud browser (Browser Use), all routed through your sub. No extra accounts.
-
-One command from a fresh install:
-
-```bash
-hermes setup --portal
-```
-
-That logs you in via OAuth, sets Nous as your provider, and turns on the Tool Gateway. Check what's wired up any time with `hermes portal status`. Full details on the [Tool Gateway docs page](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/tool-gateway).
-
-You can still bring your own keys per-tool whenever you want — the gateway is per-backend, not all-or-nothing.
-
----
-
 ## CLI vs Messaging Quick Reference
 
 Hermes has two entry points: start the terminal UI with `hermes`, or run the gateway and talk to it from Telegram, Discord, Slack, WhatsApp, Signal, or Email. Once you're in a conversation, many slash commands are shared across both interfaces.

README.zh-CN.md

@@ -65,27 +65,6 @@ hermes doctor       # 诊断问题
 
 📖 **[完整文档 →](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/)**
 
----
-
-## 省去到处收集 API Key — Nous Portal
-
-Hermes 始终允许你使用任意服务商，这点不会改变。但如果你不想为模型、网页搜索、图像生成、TTS、云浏览器分别去申请五个不同的 API Key，**[Nous Portal](https://portal.nousresearch.com)** 用一个订阅就能覆盖全部：
-
-- **300+ 模型** — 用 `/model <name>` 随时切换
-- **Tool Gateway** — 网页搜索（Firecrawl）、图像生成（FAL）、文本转语音（OpenAI）、云浏览器（Browser Use），全部通过订阅托管。无需额外注册任何账户。
-
-全新安装时一条命令即可：
-
-```bash
-hermes setup --portal
-```
-
-它会通过 OAuth 登录、把 Nous 设为推理服务商，并启用 Tool Gateway。随时用 `hermes portal status` 查看路由状态。完整说明见 [Tool Gateway 文档](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/features/tool-gateway)。
-
-你随时可以按工具单独切回自己的 API Key — Gateway 是按工具粒度生效的，不是一刀切。
-
----
-
 ## CLI 与消息平台 快速对照
 
 Hermes 有两种入口：用 `hermes` 启动终端 UI，或运行网关从 Telegram、Discord、Slack、WhatsApp、Signal 或 Email 与之对话。进入对话后，许多斜杠命令在两种界面中通用。

acp_adapter/server.py

@@ -1534,11 +1534,7 @@ class HermesACPAgent(acp.Agent):
                 )
             except Exception:
                 logger.debug("Failed to auto-title ACP session %s", session_id, exc_info=True)
-        if final_response and conn and (not streamed_message or result.get("response_transformed")):
-            # Deliver the final response when streaming did not already send it,
-            # or when a plugin hook transformed the response after streaming
-            # finished (e.g. transform_llm_output) — otherwise the appended /
-            # rewritten text never reaches the client.
+        if final_response and conn and not streamed_message:
             update = acp.update_agent_message_text(final_response)
             await conn.session_update(session_id, update)
 

agent/agent_init.py

@@ -607,31 +607,6 @@ def init_agent(
             # Falling back would send Anthropic credentials to third-party endpoints (Fixes #1739, #minimax-401).
             _is_native_anthropic = agent.provider == "anthropic"
             effective_key = (api_key or resolve_anthropic_token() or "") if _is_native_anthropic else (api_key or "")
-
-            # MiniMax OAuth issues short-lived (~15-min) access tokens. The
-            # Anthropic SDK caches ``api_key`` as a static string at client
-            # construction time, so a session that resolves the bearer once
-            # at startup will keep sending the same token until MiniMax
-            # returns 401 mid-session. Swap the static string for a callable
-            # token provider — ``build_anthropic_client`` recognizes the
-            # callable and installs an httpx event hook that mints a fresh
-            # bearer per outbound request (re-reading auth.json so a refresh
-            # persisted by another process is visible immediately).
-            # The cached refresh path is a no-op when the token still has
-            # ``MINIMAX_OAUTH_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS`` of life left, so steady-
-            # state cost is one file read + one timestamp compare per request.
-            if agent.provider == "minimax-oauth" and isinstance(effective_key, str) and effective_key:
-                try:
-                    from hermes_cli.auth import build_minimax_oauth_token_provider
-                    effective_key = build_minimax_oauth_token_provider()
-                except Exception as _mm_exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — never block startup on this
-                    import logging as _logging
-                    _logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(
-                        "MiniMax OAuth: failed to install per-request token provider "
-                        "(%s); falling back to static bearer that will expire ~15min in.",
-                        _mm_exc,
-                    )
-
             agent.api_key = effective_key
             agent._anthropic_api_key = effective_key
             agent._anthropic_base_url = base_url
@@ -643,7 +618,7 @@ def init_agent(
             # that cause 401/403 on their endpoints.  Guards #1739 and
             # the third-party identity-injection bug.
             from agent.anthropic_adapter import _is_oauth_token as _is_oat
-            agent._is_anthropic_oauth = _is_oat(effective_key) if (_is_native_anthropic and isinstance(effective_key, str)) else False
+            agent._is_anthropic_oauth = _is_oat(effective_key) if _is_native_anthropic else False
             agent._anthropic_client = build_anthropic_client(effective_key, base_url, timeout=_provider_timeout)
             # No OpenAI client needed for Anthropic mode
             agent.client = None
@@ -976,14 +951,16 @@ def init_agent(
 
     # Expose session ID to tools (terminal, execute_code) so agents can
     # reference their own session for --resume commands, cross-session
-    # coordination, and logging. Keep the ContextVar and os.environ
-    # fallback synchronized because different tool paths still read both.
+    # coordination, and logging.  Uses the ContextVar system from
+    # session_context.py for concurrency safety (gateway runs multiple
+    # sessions in one process).  Also writes os.environ as fallback for
+    # CLI mode where ContextVars aren't used.
+    os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_ID"] = agent.session_id
     try:
-        from gateway.session_context import set_current_session_id
-
-        set_current_session_id(agent.session_id)
+        from gateway.session_context import _SESSION_ID
+        _SESSION_ID.set(agent.session_id)
     except Exception:
-        os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_ID"] = agent.session_id
+        pass  # CLI/test mode — ContextVar not needed
 
     # Session logs go into ~/.hermes/sessions/ alongside gateway sessions
     hermes_home = get_hermes_home()
@@ -1427,7 +1404,6 @@ def init_agent(
             base_url=agent.base_url,
             api_key=getattr(agent, "api_key", ""),
             provider=agent.provider,
-            api_mode=agent.api_mode,
         )
         if not agent.quiet_mode:
             _ra().logger.info("Using context engine: %s", _selected_engine.name)

agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ from agent.message_sanitization import (
 )
 from agent.tool_dispatch_helpers import _trajectory_normalize_msg, make_tool_result_message
 from agent.trajectory import convert_scratchpad_to_think
-from agent.credential_pool import STATUS_EXHAUSTED
 from agent.error_classifier import classify_api_error, FailoverReason
 from utils import base_url_host_matches, base_url_hostname, env_var_enabled, atomic_json_write
 
@@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ def convert_to_trajectory_format(agent, messages: List[Dict[str, Any]], user_que
                     except json.JSONDecodeError:
                         # This shouldn't happen since we validate and retry during conversation,
                         # but if it does, log warning and use empty dict
-                        logger.warning(f"Unexpected invalid JSON in trajectory conversion: {tool_call['function']['arguments'][:100]}")
+                        logging.warning(f"Unexpected invalid JSON in trajectory conversion: {tool_call['function']['arguments'][:100]}")
                         arguments = {}
                     
                     tool_call_json = {
@@ -583,37 +582,12 @@ def recover_with_credential_pool(
         return False, has_retried_429
 
     if effective_reason == FailoverReason.rate_limit:
-        # If current credential is already marked exhausted, skip retry and
-        # rotate immediately. This prevents the "cancel-between-429s" trap
-        # where has_retried_429 (a local var) gets reset on each new prompt,
-        # causing the pool to retry the same exhausted credential forever.
-        current_entry = pool.current()
-        current_last_status = getattr(current_entry, "last_status", None) if current_entry else None
-        if current_last_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED:
-            _ra().logger.info(
-                "Credential already exhausted (last_status=%s) — rotating immediately instead of retrying",
-                current_last_status,
-            )
-            rotate_status = status_code if status_code is not None else 429
-            next_entry = pool.mark_exhausted_and_rotate(status_code=rotate_status, error_context=error_context)
-            if next_entry is not None:
-                _ra().logger.info(
-                    "Credential %s (rate limit, pre-exhausted) — rotated to pool entry %s",
-                    rotate_status,
-                    getattr(next_entry, "id", "?"),
-                )
-                agent._swap_credential(next_entry)
-                return True, False
-            return False, True
-
         usage_limit_reached = False
         if error_context:
             context_reason = str(error_context.get("reason") or "").lower()
             context_message = str(error_context.get("message") or "").lower()
             usage_limit_reached = (
                 "usage_limit_reached" in context_reason
-                or "gousagelimit" in context_reason
-                or "usage limit reached" in context_message
                 or "usage limit has been reached" in context_message
             )
         if not has_retried_429 and not usage_limit_reached:
@@ -643,28 +617,9 @@ def recover_with_credential_pool(
         # existing entitlement keyword set in ``_is_entitlement_failure``.
         # Any 403 against ``xai-oauth`` is treated as entitlement here so
         # the refresh loop can't spin in those cases either.
-        #
-        # Exception (#29344): xAI's ``[WKE=unauthenticated:...]`` suffix and
-        # the ``OAuth2 access token could not be validated`` phrasing are
-        # xAI's authoritative "this is a stale token, not entitlement"
-        # signal.  When either fires we must NOT apply the catch-all
-        # override — refresh is the recoverable path for these bodies, and
-        # blanket-classifying them as entitlement was the bug that left
-        # long-running TUI sessions stuck on stale tokens until the user
-        # exited and reopened.
         is_entitlement = agent._is_entitlement_failure(error_context, status_code)
         if not is_entitlement and status_code == 403 and (agent.provider or "") == "xai-oauth":
-            _disambiguator_haystack = " ".join(
-                str(error_context.get(k) or "").lower()
-                for k in ("message", "reason", "code", "error")
-                if isinstance(error_context, dict)
-            )
-            _is_xai_auth_failure = (
-                "[wke=unauthenticated:" in _disambiguator_haystack
-                or "oauth2 access token could not be validated" in _disambiguator_haystack
-            )
-            if not _is_xai_auth_failure:
-                is_entitlement = True
+            is_entitlement = True
         if is_entitlement:
             _ra().logger.info(
                 "Credential %s — entitlement-shaped 403 from %s; "
@@ -773,7 +728,7 @@ def try_recover_primary_transport(
         time.sleep(wait_time)
         return True
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.warning("Primary transport recovery failed: %s", e)
+        logging.warning("Primary transport recovery failed: %s", e)
         return False
 
 # ── End provider fallback ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -936,20 +891,19 @@ def restore_primary_runtime(agent) -> bool:
             base_url=rt["compressor_base_url"],
             api_key=rt["compressor_api_key"],
             provider=rt["compressor_provider"],
-            api_mode=rt.get("compressor_api_mode", ""),
         )
 
         # ── Reset fallback chain for the new turn ──
         agent._fallback_activated = False
         agent._fallback_index = 0
 
-        logger.info(
+        logging.info(
             "Primary runtime restored for new turn: %s (%s)",
             agent.model, agent.provider,
         )
         return True
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.warning("Failed to restore primary runtime: %s", e)
+        logging.warning("Failed to restore primary runtime: %s", e)
         return False
 
 # Which error types indicate a transient transport failure worth
@@ -1110,7 +1064,10 @@ def dump_api_request_debug(
 
         timestamp = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S_%f")
         dump_file = agent.logs_dir / f"request_dump_{agent.session_id}_{timestamp}.json"
-        atomic_json_write(dump_file, dump_payload, default=str)
+        dump_file.write_text(
+            json.dumps(dump_payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2, default=str),
+            encoding="utf-8",
+        )
 
         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}🧾 Request debug dump written to: {dump_file}")
 
@@ -1120,7 +1077,7 @@ def dump_api_request_debug(
         return dump_file
     except Exception as dump_error:
         if agent.verbose_logging:
-            logger.warning(f"Failed to dump API request debug payload: {dump_error}")
+            logging.warning(f"Failed to dump API request debug payload: {dump_error}")
         return None
 
 
@@ -1395,22 +1352,6 @@ def switch_model(agent, new_model, new_provider, api_key='', base_url='', api_mo
         # API key — falling back would send Anthropic credentials to third-party endpoints.
         _is_native_anthropic = new_provider == "anthropic"
         effective_key = (api_key or agent.api_key or resolve_anthropic_token() or "") if _is_native_anthropic else (api_key or agent.api_key or "")
-
-        # MiniMax OAuth: swap static string for a per-request callable token
-        # provider so the rebuilt client survives 15-min token expiry. See
-        # the matching block in agent_init.py for the full rationale.
-        if new_provider == "minimax-oauth" and isinstance(effective_key, str) and effective_key:
-            try:
-                from hermes_cli.auth import build_minimax_oauth_token_provider
-                effective_key = build_minimax_oauth_token_provider()
-            except Exception as _mm_exc:  # noqa: BLE001
-                import logging as _logging
-                _logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(
-                    "MiniMax OAuth: failed to install per-request token provider "
-                    "on switch (%s); using static bearer.",
-                    _mm_exc,
-                )
-
         agent.api_key = effective_key
         agent._anthropic_api_key = effective_key
         agent._anthropic_base_url = base_url or getattr(agent, "_anthropic_base_url", None)
@@ -1418,7 +1359,7 @@ def switch_model(agent, new_model, new_provider, api_key='', base_url='', api_mo
             effective_key, agent._anthropic_base_url,
             timeout=get_provider_request_timeout(agent.provider, agent.model),
         )
-        agent._is_anthropic_oauth = _is_oauth_token(effective_key) if (_is_native_anthropic and isinstance(effective_key, str)) else False
+        agent._is_anthropic_oauth = _is_oauth_token(effective_key) if _is_native_anthropic else False
         agent.client = None
         agent._client_kwargs = {}
     else:
@@ -1505,7 +1446,6 @@ def switch_model(agent, new_model, new_provider, api_key='', base_url='', api_mo
         "compressor_api_key": getattr(_cc, "api_key", "") if _cc else "",
         "compressor_provider": getattr(_cc, "provider", agent.provider) if _cc else agent.provider,
         "compressor_context_length": _cc.context_length if _cc else 0,
-        "compressor_api_mode": getattr(_cc, "api_mode", agent.api_mode) if _cc else agent.api_mode,
         "compressor_threshold_tokens": _cc.threshold_tokens if _cc else 0,
     }
     if api_mode == "anthropic_messages":
@@ -1537,7 +1477,7 @@ def switch_model(agent, new_model, new_provider, api_key='', base_url='', api_mo
     agent._fallback_chain = fallback_chain
     agent._fallback_model = fallback_chain[0] if fallback_chain else None
 
-    logger.info(
+    logging.info(
         "Model switched in-place: %s (%s) -> %s (%s)",
         old_model, old_provider, new_model, new_provider,
     )
@@ -2092,33 +2032,19 @@ def extract_api_error_context(error: Exception) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     if "reset_at" not in context:
         message = context.get("message") or ""
         if isinstance(message, str):
-            delay_match = re.search(r"quotaResetDelay[:\s\"]+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)(ms|s)", message, re.IGNORECASE)
+            delay_match = re.search(r"quotaResetDelay[:\s\"]+(\\d+(?:\\.\\d+)?)(ms|s)", message, re.IGNORECASE)
             if delay_match:
                 value = float(delay_match.group(1))
                 seconds = value / 1000.0 if delay_match.group(2).lower() == "ms" else value
                 context["reset_at"] = time.time() + seconds
             else:
-                resets_in_match = re.search(
-                    r"resets?\s+in\s+"
-                    r"(?:(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:h|hr|hrs|hour|hours)\b\s*)?"
-                    r"(?:(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:m|min|mins|minute|minutes)\b\s*)?"
-                    r"(?:(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:s|sec|secs|second|seconds)\b)?",
+                sec_match = re.search(
+                    r"retry\s+(?:after\s+)?(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:sec|secs|seconds|s\b)",
                     message,
                     re.IGNORECASE,
                 )
-                if resets_in_match and any(resets_in_match.groups()):
-                    hours = float(resets_in_match.group(1) or 0)
-                    minutes = float(resets_in_match.group(2) or 0)
-                    seconds = float(resets_in_match.group(3) or 0)
-                    context["reset_at"] = time.time() + (hours * 3600) + (minutes * 60) + seconds
-                else:
-                    sec_match = re.search(
-                        r"retry\s+(?:after\s+)?(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:sec|secs|seconds|s\b)",
-                        message,
-                        re.IGNORECASE,
-                    )
-                    if sec_match:
-                        context["reset_at"] = time.time() + float(sec_match.group(1))
+                if sec_match:
+                    context["reset_at"] = time.time() + float(sec_match.group(1))
 
     return context
 
@@ -2190,56 +2116,33 @@ def apply_pending_steer_to_tool_results(agent, messages: list, num_tool_msgs: in
 
 
 def force_close_tcp_sockets(client: Any) -> int:
-    """Abort in-flight TCP I/O by shutting down sockets WITHOUT closing FDs.
+    """Force-close underlying TCP sockets to prevent CLOSE-WAIT accumulation.
 
-    When a provider drops a connection mid-stream — or the user issues an
-    interrupt — we want to unblock httpx's reader/writer immediately rather
-    than waiting for the kernel's per-connection timeout. ``shutdown(SHUT_RDWR)``
-    achieves that: it sends FIN, breaks any pending ``recv``/``send`` with EOF
-    or ``EPIPE``, but does NOT release the file descriptor.
+    When a provider drops a connection mid-stream, httpx's ``client.close()``
+    performs a graceful shutdown which leaves sockets in CLOSE-WAIT until the
+    OS times them out (often minutes).  This method walks the httpx transport
+    pool and issues ``socket.shutdown(SHUT_RDWR)`` + ``socket.close()`` to
+    force an immediate TCP RST, freeing the file descriptors.
 
-    Historically this helper also called ``socket.close()`` so the FD got
-    released immediately, but that's unsafe when (as is the case for both the
-    interrupt-abort path and stale-call kill path) the helper runs on a
-    different thread than the one driving the request:
-
-      * The Python ``socket.socket`` we close here is the SAME object held by
-        httpx's pool, so closing it via Python sets its ``_fd`` to -1 and
-        future operations on that Python object fail safely.
-      * BUT the SSL wrapper (``ssl.SSLSocket``'s underlying OpenSSL ``BIO``)
-        caches the raw integer FD. Once ``os.close(fd)`` runs, the kernel may
-        immediately recycle that integer to the next ``open()`` call — e.g.
-        the kanban dispatcher opening ``kanban.db``.
-      * The owning worker thread then unwinds httpx, the SSL layer flushes a
-        pending TLS record, and the encrypted bytes get written into the
-        wrong file (issue #29507: 24-byte TLS application-data record
-        clobbering SQLite header bytes 5..28).
-
-    The fix is to let the owning thread own the close. ``shutdown()`` from any
-    thread is FD-safe; ``close()`` is not. The httpx connection's own close
-    path — which runs from the worker thread when it unwinds — will release
-    the FD via the same ``socket.socket`` object, and because Python's socket
-    close atomically swaps ``_fd`` to -1 *before* issuing ``os.close``, there
-    is no FD-aliasing window when only one thread closes.
-
-    Returns the number of sockets shut down. (Field kept as
-    ``tcp_force_closed=N`` in the log line for backwards-compatible parsing.)
+    Returns the number of sockets force-closed.
     """
     import socket as _socket
 
-    shutdown_count = 0
+    closed = 0
     try:
         for sock in _iter_pool_sockets(client):
             try:
                 sock.shutdown(_socket.SHUT_RDWR)
             except OSError:
-                # Already shut down / not connected / FD invalid — all benign.
                 pass
-            # IMPORTANT (#29507): do NOT call sock.close() here. See docstring.
-            shutdown_count += 1
+            try:
+                sock.close()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+            closed += 1
     except Exception as exc:
         _ra().logger.debug("Force-close TCP sockets sweep error: %s", exc)
-    return shutdown_count
+    return closed
 
 
 

agent/anthropic_adapter.py

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ import json
 import logging
 import os
 import platform
-import secrets
-import stat
 import subprocess
 from pathlib import Path
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
@@ -1042,34 +1040,11 @@ def _write_claude_code_credentials(
         existing["claudeAiOauth"] = oauth_data
 
         cred_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        # Per-process random suffix avoids collisions between concurrent
-        # writers and stale leftovers from a prior crashed write.
-        _tmp_cred = cred_path.with_suffix(f".tmp.{os.getpid()}.{secrets.token_hex(4)}")
-        try:
-            # Create the temp file atomically at 0o600. The previous
-            # write_text + post-replace chmod opened a TOCTOU window where
-            # both the temp file and the destination briefly inherited the
-            # process umask (commonly 0o644 = world-readable), exposing
-            # Claude Code OAuth tokens to other local users between create
-            # and chmod. Mirrors agent/google_oauth.py (#19673) and
-            # tools/mcp_oauth.py (#21148). Parent dir (~/.claude/) is
-            # owned by Claude Code itself, so we leave its mode alone.
-            fd = os.open(
-                str(_tmp_cred),
-                os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL,
-                stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR,
-            )
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                json.dump(existing, fh, indent=2)
-                fh.flush()
-                os.fsync(fh.fileno())
-            os.replace(_tmp_cred, cred_path)
-        except OSError:
-            try:
-                _tmp_cred.unlink(missing_ok=True)
-            except OSError:
-                pass
-            raise
+        _tmp_cred = cred_path.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        _tmp_cred.write_text(json.dumps(existing, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")
+        _tmp_cred.replace(cred_path)
+        # Restrict permissions (credentials file)
+        cred_path.chmod(0o600)
     except (OSError, IOError) as e:
         logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed credentials: %s", e)
 
@@ -2147,13 +2122,9 @@ def build_anthropic_kwargs(
                 block["text"] = text
 
         # 3. Prefix tool names with mcp_ (Claude Code convention)
-        #    Skip names that already begin with the marker — native MCP server
-        #    tools (from mcp_servers: in config.yaml) are registered under their
-        #    full mcp_<server>_<tool> name and would double-prefix otherwise,
-        #    breaking round-trip registry lookup in normalize_response. GH-25255.
         if anthropic_tools:
             for tool in anthropic_tools:
-                if "name" in tool and not tool["name"].startswith(_MCP_TOOL_PREFIX):
+                if "name" in tool:
                     tool["name"] = _MCP_TOOL_PREFIX + tool["name"]
 
         # 4. Prefix tool names in message history (tool_use and tool_result blocks)

agent/auxiliary_client.py

@@ -1406,9 +1406,6 @@ def _resolve_api_key_provider() -> Tuple[Optional[OpenAI], Optional[str]]:
     for provider_id, pconfig in PROVIDER_REGISTRY.items():
         if pconfig.auth_type != "api_key":
             continue
-        if _is_provider_unhealthy(provider_id):
-            logger.debug("Auxiliary api-key chain: %s is unhealthy, skipping", provider_id)
-            continue
         if provider_id == "anthropic":
             # Only try anthropic when the user has explicitly configured it.
             # Without this gate, Claude Code credentials get silently used
@@ -2263,12 +2260,11 @@ def _is_payment_error(exc: Exception) -> bool:
             "credits", "insufficient funds",
             "can only afford", "billing",
             "payment required",
-            # Daily / monthly / weekly quota exhaustion keywords
+            # Daily / monthly quota exhaustion keywords
             "quota exceeded", "quota_exceeded",
             "too many tokens per day", "daily limit",
             "tokens per day", "daily quota",
             "resource exhausted",  # Vertex AI / gRPC quota errors
-            "weekly usage limit", "weekly limit",  # OpenCode Go weekly subscription cap
         )):
             return True
     return False
@@ -2482,11 +2478,7 @@ def _pool_error_context(exc: Exception) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     return payload
 
 
-def _recoverable_pool_provider(
-    resolved_provider: str,
-    client: Any,
-    main_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
-) -> Optional[str]:
+def _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider: str, client: Any) -> Optional[str]:
     """Infer which provider pool can recover the current auxiliary client."""
     normalized = _normalize_aux_provider(resolved_provider)
     if normalized not in {"", "auto", "custom"}:
@@ -2504,33 +2496,11 @@ def _recoverable_pool_provider(
         return "copilot"
     if base_url_host_matches(base, "api.kimi.com"):
         return "kimi-coding"
-    # For api_key providers not in the hardcoded list (e.g. opencode-go), match
-    # the client base URL against all registered api_key providers so that
-    # credential-pool rotation works for any provider the user configured.
-    if main_runtime:
-        rt = _normalize_main_runtime(main_runtime)
-        rt_provider = rt.get("provider", "")
-        if rt_provider and rt_provider not in {"", "auto", "custom"}:
-            try:
-                from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
-                pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY.get(rt_provider)
-                if pconfig and getattr(pconfig, "auth_type", None) == "api_key":
-                    rt_base = str(getattr(pconfig, "inference_base_url", "") or "").rstrip("/")
-                    if rt_base and base_url_host_matches(base, base_url_hostname(rt_base)):
-                        return rt_provider
-            except Exception:
-                pass
     return None
 
 
-def _recover_provider_pool(provider: str, exc: Exception, *, failed_api_key: str = "") -> bool:
-    """Try same-provider credential-pool recovery for auxiliary calls.
-
-    ``failed_api_key`` is the API key that was actually used for the failing
-    request.  Passing it lets mark_exhausted_and_rotate identify the correct
-    pool entry even when another process has already rotated the pool (which
-    would leave current() as None, causing the wrong entry to be marked).
-    """
+def _recover_provider_pool(provider: str, exc: Exception) -> bool:
+    """Try same-provider credential-pool recovery for auxiliary calls."""
     normalized = _normalize_aux_provider(provider)
     try:
         pool = load_pool(normalized)
@@ -2542,7 +2512,6 @@ def _recover_provider_pool(provider: str, exc: Exception, *, failed_api_key: str
 
     status_code = getattr(exc, "status_code", None)
     error_context = _pool_error_context(exc)
-    hint = failed_api_key or None
 
     if _is_auth_error(exc):
         refreshed = pool.try_refresh_current()
@@ -2552,7 +2521,6 @@ def _recover_provider_pool(provider: str, exc: Exception, *, failed_api_key: str
         next_entry = pool.mark_exhausted_and_rotate(
             status_code=status_code if status_code is not None else 401,
             error_context=error_context,
-            api_key_hint=hint,
         )
         if next_entry is not None:
             _evict_cached_clients(normalized)
@@ -2564,7 +2532,6 @@ def _recover_provider_pool(provider: str, exc: Exception, *, failed_api_key: str
         next_entry = pool.mark_exhausted_and_rotate(
             status_code=status_code if status_code is not None else fallback_status,
             error_context=error_context,
-            api_key_hint=hint,
         )
         if next_entry is not None:
             _evict_cached_clients(normalized)
@@ -2969,11 +2936,6 @@ def _resolve_auto(main_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Tuple[Option
             resolved_provider = "custom"
             explicit_base_url = runtime_base_url
             explicit_api_key = runtime_api_key or None
-        elif runtime_api_key:
-            # Pin auxiliary to the same api_key as the active main chat session
-            # so that a working key is reused instead of re-selecting from the pool
-            # (which might pick a different, potentially exhausted key).
-            explicit_api_key = runtime_api_key
         # Skip Step-1 if the main provider was recently 402'd. The unhealthy
         # cache TTL bounds how long we bypass it, so a topped-up account
         # recovers automatically. If we tried Step-1 anyway, every aux call
@@ -3154,34 +3116,6 @@ def resolve_provider_client(
     # Normalise aliases
     provider = _normalize_aux_provider(provider)
 
-    # Universal model-resolution fallback chain.  Callers (notably title
-    # generation, vision, session search, and other auxiliary tasks) can
-    # reach this function without an explicit model — the user picked their
-    # main provider, didn't bother configuring a per-task ``auxiliary.<task>.model``,
-    # and just expects "use my main model for side tasks too."  Resolve in
-    # this order, stopping at the first non-empty answer:
-    #
-    #   1. ``model`` argument (caller knew what they wanted)
-    #   2. Provider's catalog default — cheap/fast model the provider
-    #      registered via ``ProviderProfile.default_aux_model`` or the
-    #      legacy ``_API_KEY_PROVIDER_AUX_MODELS_FALLBACK`` dict.  Empty
-    #      string for OAuth-gated providers (openai-codex, xai-oauth)
-    #      whose accepted-model lists drift on the backend, so we don't
-    #      pin a default that can silently rot.
-    #   3. User's main model from ``model.model`` in config.yaml.  This is
-    #      the load-bearing step for OAuth providers: an xai-oauth user
-    #      with grok-4.3 configured gets grok-4.3 for title generation
-    #      instead of silently dropping to whatever Step-2 fallback (#31845).
-    #
-    # Each provider branch below sees a non-empty ``model`` whenever the
-    # user has *anything* configured — no provider-specific empty-model
-    # guards needed.  When the user has NOTHING configured (fresh install,
-    # main_model also empty), the branches still hit their own
-    # missing-credentials returns and ``_resolve_auto`` falls through to
-    # the Step-2 chain as before.
-    if not model:
-        model = _get_aux_model_for_provider(provider) or _read_main_model() or model
-
     def _needs_codex_wrap(client_obj, base_url_str: str, model_str: str) -> bool:
         """Decide if a plain OpenAI client should be wrapped for Responses API.
 
@@ -3326,7 +3260,7 @@ def resolve_provider_client(
         if client is None:
             logger.warning(
                 "resolve_provider_client: xai-oauth requested but no xAI "
-                "OAuth token found (run: hermes model -> xAI Grok OAuth — SuperGrok / Premium+)"
+                "OAuth token found (run: hermes model -> xAI Grok OAuth — SuperGrok Subscription)"
             )
             return None, None
         final_model = _normalize_resolved_model(model or default, provider)
@@ -3796,37 +3730,6 @@ _VISION_AUTO_PROVIDER_ORDER = (
 )
 
 
-def _main_model_supports_vision(provider: str, model: Optional[str]) -> bool:
-    """Return True when ``provider``/``model`` is known to accept image input.
-
-    Used by the vision auto-detect chain to skip the user's main provider
-    when it's known to be text-only (e.g. DeepSeek, gpt-oss without vision).
-    Without this guard, ``resolve_vision_provider_client(provider="auto")``
-    would happily return the main-provider client and any subsequent image
-    payload would surface as a cryptic provider-side error
-    (``unknown variant `image_url`, expected `text```, #31179).
-
-    Returns True when capability lookup is unknown — preserves the historical
-    behaviour of attempting the call, so providers we haven't catalogued yet
-    don't silently regress to text-only.
-    """
-    try:
-        from agent.image_routing import _lookup_supports_vision
-        from hermes_cli.config import load_config
-    except ImportError:
-        return True
-    try:
-        supports = _lookup_supports_vision(provider, model, load_config())
-    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        return True
-    if supports is None:
-        # No capability data — keep current behaviour and let the call attempt
-        # happen rather than silently skipping. This avoids false-positive
-        # skips for new/custom providers.
-        return True
-    return bool(supports)
-
-
 def _normalize_vision_provider(provider: Optional[str]) -> str:
     return _normalize_aux_provider(provider)
 
@@ -3967,23 +3870,6 @@ def resolve_vision_provider_client(
                     "vision support) — falling through to aggregator chain",
                     main_provider,
                 )
-            elif not _main_model_supports_vision(main_provider, vision_model):
-                # The main model is known to be text-only (e.g. DeepSeek V4,
-                # gpt-oss-120b without vision). Building a client and sending
-                # an image would produce a cryptic provider-side error like
-                # ``unknown variant `image_url`, expected `text``` (#31179).
-                # Fall through to the aggregator chain instead.
-                #
-                # Only log the provider name (not the model) — mirrors the
-                # sibling _PROVIDERS_WITHOUT_VISION branch above, and avoids
-                # CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data heuristic false
-                # positives on multi-value interpolations.
-                logger.debug(
-                    "Vision auto-detect: skipping main provider %s "
-                    "(reports no vision capability) — falling through to "
-                    "aggregator chain",
-                    main_provider,
-                )
             else:
                 rpc_client, rpc_model = resolve_provider_client(
                     main_provider, vision_model,
@@ -4366,25 +4252,13 @@ def _get_cached_client(
             else:
                 effective = _compat_model(cached_client, model, cached_default)
                 return cached_client, effective
-    # Build outside the lock.
-    # For pool-backed api_key providers, derive the active API key from the
-    # pool entry rather than from env vars.  resolve_api_key_provider_credentials
-    # always prefers env vars (first-entry bias), which bypasses pool rotation:
-    # after key #1 is marked exhausted the retry would still get key #1 from
-    # the env var and fail again, causing the retry2_err handler to mark key #2.
-    effective_api_key = api_key
-    if not effective_api_key:
-        _pe = _peek_pool_entry(_normalize_aux_provider(provider))
-        if _pe is not None:
-            _pk = _pool_runtime_api_key(_pe)
-            if _pk:
-                effective_api_key = _pk
+    # Build outside the lock
     client, default_model = resolve_provider_client(
         provider,
         model,
         async_mode,
         explicit_base_url=base_url,
-        explicit_api_key=effective_api_key,
+        explicit_api_key=api_key,
         api_mode=api_mode,
         main_runtime=runtime,
         is_vision=is_vision,
@@ -4407,23 +4281,6 @@ def _get_cached_client(
     return client, model or default_model
 
 
-# Aliases that target direct REST APIs not modeled as first-class providers
-# in PROVIDER_REGISTRY. Used for ``auxiliary.<task>.provider`` so users can
-# write the obvious name and have it resolve to a working ``custom`` endpoint
-# without needing to know our internal provider IDs.
-#
-# Why these specifically: PROVIDER_REGISTRY has ``openai-codex`` (OAuth) and
-# ``custom`` (manual base_url + OPENAI_API_KEY) but no plain ``openai`` for
-# direct API-key access. Users predictably type ``provider: openai`` and
-# expect it to use OPENAI_API_KEY against api.openai.com. Previously this
-# silently fell back to the user's main provider, sending OpenAI model names
-# to e.g. DeepSeek and producing cryptic ``unknown variant 'image_url'``
-# errors (issue #31179).
-_AUX_DIRECT_API_BASE_URLS: Dict[str, str] = {
-    "openai": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
-}
-
-
 def _resolve_task_provider_model(
     task: str = None,
     provider: str = None,
@@ -4460,25 +4317,6 @@ def _resolve_task_provider_model(
     resolved_model = model or cfg_model
     resolved_api_mode = cfg_api_mode
 
-    # Convenience aliases for direct API-key endpoints that aren't first-class
-    # providers (e.g. ``provider: openai`` → custom + api.openai.com/v1).
-    # Applied to both explicit args and config-derived values. When the user
-    # has already supplied a base_url we keep their endpoint but still rewrite
-    # the provider to ``custom`` so resolution doesn't hit the
-    # PROVIDER_REGISTRY-only path (which has no ``openai`` entry).
-    def _expand_direct_api_alias(prov: Optional[str], existing_base: Optional[str]) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
-        if not prov:
-            return prov, existing_base
-        target_base = _AUX_DIRECT_API_BASE_URLS.get(prov.strip().lower())
-        if target_base is None:
-            return prov, existing_base
-        return "custom", existing_base or target_base
-
-    if provider:
-        provider, base_url = _expand_direct_api_alias(provider, base_url)
-    if cfg_provider:
-        cfg_provider, cfg_base_url = _expand_direct_api_alias(cfg_provider, cfg_base_url)
-
     if base_url:
         return "custom", resolved_model, base_url, api_key, resolved_api_mode
     if provider:
@@ -4506,17 +4344,7 @@ _DEFAULT_AUX_TIMEOUT = 30.0
 
 
 def _get_auxiliary_task_config(task: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return the config dict for auxiliary.<task>, or {} when unavailable.
-
-    For plugin-registered auxiliary tasks (see
-    :meth:`hermes_cli.plugins.PluginContext.register_auxiliary_task`) the
-    plugin's declared *defaults* are layered underneath the user's config
-    so an unconfigured plugin task still works:
-
-        plugin defaults  ←  config.yaml auxiliary.<task>  (user wins)
-
-    Built-in tasks ignore this path (their defaults live in DEFAULT_CONFIG).
-    """
+    """Return the config dict for auxiliary.<task>, or {} when unavailable."""
     if not task:
         return {}
     try:
@@ -4526,27 +4354,7 @@ def _get_auxiliary_task_config(task: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         return {}
     aux = config.get("auxiliary", {}) if isinstance(config, dict) else {}
     task_config = aux.get(task, {}) if isinstance(aux, dict) else {}
-    if not isinstance(task_config, dict):
-        task_config = {}
-
-    # Layer plugin-declared defaults underneath user config so
-    # ctx.register_auxiliary_task(defaults={...}) takes effect without
-    # forcing the user to write config.yaml entries.
-    try:
-        from hermes_cli.plugins import get_plugin_auxiliary_tasks
-        for _entry in get_plugin_auxiliary_tasks():
-            if _entry.get("key") == task:
-                _defaults = _entry.get("defaults") or {}
-                if isinstance(_defaults, dict):
-                    merged = dict(_defaults)
-                    merged.update(task_config)
-                    return merged
-                break
-    except Exception:
-        # Plugin discovery failure must not break aux task config reads.
-        pass
-
-    return task_config
+    return task_config if isinstance(task_config, dict) else {}
 
 
 def _get_task_timeout(task: str, default: float = _DEFAULT_AUX_TIMEOUT) -> float:
@@ -4998,17 +4806,10 @@ def call_llm(
                 )
 
         # ── Same-provider credential-pool recovery ─────────────────────
-        pool_provider = _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client, main_runtime=main_runtime)
-        # Capture the exact API key used so mark_exhausted_and_rotate can find
-        # the correct pool entry even when another process rotated the pool
-        # between this call and recovery (which leaves current()=None and makes
-        # _select_unlocked() return the NEXT key by mistake).
-        _client_api_key = str(getattr(client, "api_key", "") or "")
+        pool_provider = _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client)
         if pool_provider and (_is_auth_error(first_err) or _is_payment_error(first_err) or _is_rate_limit_error(first_err)):
             recovery_err = first_err
-            # Skip the extra retry for clear payment/quota errors — the endpoint
-            # won't accept another request with the same exhausted key.
-            if _is_rate_limit_error(first_err) and not _is_payment_error(first_err):
+            if _is_rate_limit_error(first_err):
                 try:
                     return _validate_llm_response(
                         client.chat.completions.create(**kwargs), task)
@@ -5016,40 +4817,27 @@ def call_llm(
                     if not (_is_auth_error(retry_err) or _is_payment_error(retry_err) or _is_rate_limit_error(retry_err)):
                         raise
                     recovery_err = retry_err
-            if _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, recovery_err, failed_api_key=_client_api_key):
+            if _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, recovery_err):
                 logger.info(
                     "Auxiliary %s: recovered %s via credential-pool rotation after %s",
                     task or "call", pool_provider, type(recovery_err).__name__,
                 )
-                try:
-                    return _retry_same_provider_sync(
-                        task=task,
-                        resolved_provider=resolved_provider,
-                        resolved_model=resolved_model,
-                        resolved_base_url=resolved_base_url,
-                        resolved_api_key=resolved_api_key,
-                        resolved_api_mode=resolved_api_mode,
-                        main_runtime=main_runtime,
-                        final_model=final_model,
-                        messages=messages,
-                        temperature=temperature,
-                        max_tokens=max_tokens,
-                        tools=tools,
-                        effective_timeout=effective_timeout,
-                        effective_extra_body=effective_extra_body,
-                    )
-                except Exception as retry2_err:
-                    # The rotated key also hit a quota/auth wall.  Mark it
-                    # immediately so concurrent processes don't make a
-                    # redundant API call to discover it's exhausted too.
-                    # Then fall through to the payment fallback below so
-                    # alternative providers can still serve the request.
-                    if (_is_payment_error(retry2_err) or _is_auth_error(retry2_err)
-                            or _is_rate_limit_error(retry2_err)):
-                        _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, retry2_err)
-                        first_err = retry2_err
-                    else:
-                        raise
+                return _retry_same_provider_sync(
+                    task=task,
+                    resolved_provider=resolved_provider,
+                    resolved_model=resolved_model,
+                    resolved_base_url=resolved_base_url,
+                    resolved_api_key=resolved_api_key,
+                    resolved_api_mode=resolved_api_mode,
+                    main_runtime=main_runtime,
+                    final_model=final_model,
+                    messages=messages,
+                    temperature=temperature,
+                    max_tokens=max_tokens,
+                    tools=tools,
+                    effective_timeout=effective_timeout,
+                    effective_extra_body=effective_extra_body,
+                )
 
         # ── Payment / credit exhaustion fallback ──────────────────────
         # When the resolved provider returns 402 or a credit-related error,
@@ -5091,7 +4879,7 @@ def call_llm(
                 # 402). Mark THAT label unhealthy so subsequent aux calls
                 # skip it instead of paying another doomed RTT.
                 _mark_provider_unhealthy(
-                    _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client, main_runtime=main_runtime) or resolved_provider
+                    _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client) or resolved_provider
                 )
             elif _is_rate_limit_error(first_err):
                 reason = "rate limit"
@@ -5211,7 +4999,6 @@ async def async_call_llm(
     model: str = None,
     base_url: str = None,
     api_key: str = None,
-    main_runtime: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
     messages: list,
     temperature: float = None,
     max_tokens: int = None,
@@ -5398,13 +5185,10 @@ async def async_call_llm(
                 )
 
         # ── Same-provider credential-pool recovery (mirrors sync) ─────
-        pool_provider = _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client, main_runtime=main_runtime)
-        _client_api_key = str(getattr(client, "api_key", "") or "")
+        pool_provider = _recoverable_pool_provider(resolved_provider, client)
         if pool_provider and (_is_auth_error(first_err) or _is_payment_error(first_err) or _is_rate_limit_error(first_err)):
             recovery_err = first_err
-            # Skip the extra retry for clear payment/quota errors — the endpoint
-            # won't accept another request with the same exhausted key.
-            if _is_rate_limit_error(first_err) and not _is_payment_error(first_err):
+            if _is_rate_limit_error(first_err):
                 try:
                     return _validate_llm_response(
                         await client.chat.completions.create(**kwargs), task)
@@ -5412,34 +5196,26 @@ async def async_call_llm(
                     if not (_is_auth_error(retry_err) or _is_payment_error(retry_err) or _is_rate_limit_error(retry_err)):
                         raise
                     recovery_err = retry_err
-            if _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, recovery_err, failed_api_key=_client_api_key):
+            if _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, recovery_err):
                 logger.info(
                     "Auxiliary %s (async): recovered %s via credential-pool rotation after %s",
                     task or "call", pool_provider, type(recovery_err).__name__,
                 )
-                try:
-                    return await _retry_same_provider_async(
-                        task=task,
-                        resolved_provider=resolved_provider,
-                        resolved_model=resolved_model,
-                        resolved_base_url=resolved_base_url,
-                        resolved_api_key=resolved_api_key,
-                        resolved_api_mode=resolved_api_mode,
-                        final_model=final_model,
-                        messages=messages,
-                        temperature=temperature,
-                        max_tokens=max_tokens,
-                        tools=tools,
-                        effective_timeout=effective_timeout,
-                        effective_extra_body=effective_extra_body,
-                    )
-                except Exception as retry2_err:
-                    if (_is_payment_error(retry2_err) or _is_auth_error(retry2_err)
-                            or _is_rate_limit_error(retry2_err)):
-                        _recover_provider_pool(pool_provider, retry2_err)
-                        first_err = retry2_err
-                    else:
-                        raise
+                return await _retry_same_provider_async(
+                    task=task,
+                    resolved_provider=resolved_provider,
+                    resolved_model=resolved_model,
+                    resolved_base_url=resolved_base_url,
+                    resolved_api_key=resolved_api_key,
+                    resolved_api_mode=resolved_api_mode,
+                    final_model=final_model,
+                    messages=messages,
+                    temperature=temperature,
+                    max_tokens=max_tokens,
+                    tools=tools,
+                    effective_timeout=effective_timeout,
+                    effective_extra_body=effective_extra_body,
+                )
 
         # ── Payment / connection / rate-limit fallback (mirrors sync call_llm) ──
         should_fallback = (

agent/background_review.py

@@ -115,10 +115,7 @@ _SKILL_REVIEW_PROMPT = (
     "Protected skills (DO NOT edit these):\n"
     "  • Bundled skills (shipped with Hermes, e.g. 'hermes-agent').\n"
     "  • Hub-installed skills (installed via 'hermes skills install').\n"
-    "Pinned skills (marked via 'hermes curator pin') CAN be improved — "
-    "pin only blocks deletion/archive/consolidation by the curator, not "
-    "content updates. Patch them when a pitfall or missing step turns up, "
-    "same as any other agent-created skill.\n"
+    "  • Pinned skills (marked via 'hermes curator pin').\n"
     "If the only skills that need updating are protected, say\n"
     "'Nothing to save.' and stop.\n\n"
     "Do NOT capture (these become persistent self-imposed constraints "
@@ -201,10 +198,7 @@ _COMBINED_REVIEW_PROMPT = (
     "Protected skills (DO NOT edit these):\n"
     "  • Bundled skills (shipped with Hermes, e.g. 'hermes-agent').\n"
     "  • Hub-installed skills (installed via 'hermes skills install').\n"
-    "Pinned skills (marked via 'hermes curator pin') CAN be improved — "
-    "pin only blocks deletion/archive/consolidation by the curator, not "
-    "content updates. Patch them when a pitfall or missing step turns up, "
-    "same as any other agent-created skill.\n"
+    "  • Pinned skills (marked via 'hermes curator pin').\n"
     "If the only skills that need updating are protected, say\n"
     "'Nothing to save.' and stop.\n\n"
     "Do NOT capture as skills (these become persistent self-imposed "

agent/chat_completion_helpers.py

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
 from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs, urlunparse
 
 from hermes_cli.timeouts import get_provider_request_timeout, get_provider_stale_timeout
-from hermes_constants import PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID, FINISH_REASON_LENGTH
 from agent.error_classifier import classify_api_error, FailoverReason
 from agent.model_metadata import is_local_endpoint
 from agent.message_sanitization import (
@@ -76,59 +75,6 @@ def _ra():
     return run_agent
 
 
-def estimate_request_context_tokens(api_payload: Any) -> int:
-    """Estimate context/load tokens from an API payload, dict or messages list.
-
-    The stale-call detectors historically assumed a Chat Completions request:
-    they pulled ``api_kwargs["messages"]`` and ran a cheap char/4 estimate.
-    Codex / Responses API requests carry the conversational payload in
-    ``input`` (with additional load in ``instructions`` and ``tools``), so the
-    legacy estimator reported ~0 tokens for every Codex turn and the
-    context-tier scaling never fired.
-
-    This helper handles both shapes:
-      - bare list -> treat as Chat Completions ``messages``
-      - dict with ``messages`` -> Chat Completions (+ ``tools`` if present)
-      - dict with ``input`` -> Responses API (+ ``instructions``/``tools``)
-      - any other dict -> fall back to summing string values
-    """
-
-    def _chars(value: Any) -> int:
-        if value is None:
-            return 0
-        if isinstance(value, str):
-            return len(value)
-        return len(str(value))
-
-    def _message_chars(messages: Any) -> int:
-        if not isinstance(messages, list):
-            return _chars(messages)
-        return sum(_chars(item) for item in messages)
-
-    if isinstance(api_payload, list):
-        return _message_chars(api_payload) // 4
-
-    if isinstance(api_payload, dict):
-        messages = api_payload.get("messages")
-        if isinstance(messages, list):
-            total_chars = _message_chars(messages)
-            if "tools" in api_payload:
-                total_chars += _chars(api_payload.get("tools"))
-            return total_chars // 4
-
-        if "input" in api_payload:
-            total_chars = (
-                _chars(api_payload.get("input"))
-                + _chars(api_payload.get("instructions"))
-                + _chars(api_payload.get("tools"))
-            )
-            return total_chars // 4
-
-        return sum(_chars(value) for value in api_payload.values()) // 4
-
-    return _chars(api_payload) // 4
-
-
 
 def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
     """
@@ -145,55 +91,23 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
     provider fallback.
     """
     result = {"response": None, "error": None}
-    request_client_holder = {"client": None, "owner_tid": None}
+    request_client_holder = {"client": None}
     request_client_lock = threading.Lock()
 
     def _set_request_client(client):
         with request_client_lock:
             request_client_holder["client"] = client
-            # #29507: stamp the owning thread so a stranger-thread interrupt
-            # only shuts the connection down rather than racing the worker
-            # for FD ownership during ``client.close()``.
-            request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = threading.get_ident()
         return client
 
     def _take_request_client():
         with request_client_lock:
             client = request_client_holder.get("client")
             request_client_holder["client"] = None
-            request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
             return client
 
     def _close_request_client_once(reason: str) -> None:
-        # #29507: dispatch on the calling thread.
-        #
-        # When ``_call`` (the worker) reaches its ``finally`` it owns the
-        # close and we pop + fully close as before. When a *stranger* thread
-        # (the interrupt-check loop, the stale-call detector) drives the
-        # close, only shut the sockets down so the worker's blocked
-        # ``recv``/``send`` unwinds with an ``EPIPE`` / EOF — and let the
-        # worker close ``client`` from its own thread on its way out. That
-        # avoids the FD-recycling race where the kernel reassigned a
-        # just-closed TLS socket FD to ``kanban.db``, and the still-live SSL
-        # BIO on the worker thread then wrote a 24-byte TLS application-data
-        # record into the SQLite header (#29507).
-        with request_client_lock:
-            request_client = request_client_holder.get("client")
-            owner_tid = request_client_holder.get("owner_tid")
-            stranger_thread = (
-                request_client is not None
-                and owner_tid is not None
-                and owner_tid != threading.get_ident()
-            )
-            if not stranger_thread:
-                # Owning thread (or no recorded owner) → pop and fully close.
-                request_client_holder["client"] = None
-                request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
-        if request_client is None:
-            return
-        if stranger_thread:
-            agent._abort_request_openai_client(request_client, reason=reason)
-        else:
+        request_client = _take_request_client()
+        if request_client is not None:
             agent._close_request_openai_client(request_client, reason=reason)
 
     def _call():
@@ -254,34 +168,9 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
     # httpx timeout (default 1800s) with zero feedback.  The stale
     # detector kills the connection early so the main retry loop can
     # apply richer recovery (credential rotation, provider fallback).
-    _stale_timeout = agent._compute_non_stream_stale_timeout(api_kwargs)
-
-    # ── Time-to-first-byte (TTFB) watchdog for the Codex Responses stream ──
-    # The chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex endpoint has an intermittent failure
-    # mode where it accepts the connection but never emits a single stream
-    # event (observed directly: 0 events, no HTTP status, the socket just
-    # hangs). A fresh reconnect succeeds in ~2s, but the wall-clock stale
-    # timeout (often 180–900s) makes us wait minutes before retrying. While no
-    # stream event has arrived yet we apply a much shorter TTFB cutoff so the
-    # main retry loop can reconnect promptly. Once the first event arrives the
-    # stream is healthy, so we fall back to the wall-clock stale timeout and
-    # never interrupt a legitimate long generation. Gated to codex_responses:
-    # only that path streams events incrementally (the chat_completions
-    # non-stream, anthropic and bedrock branches here have no first-event
-    # signal). The marker advances on *any* event (see codex_runtime), so
-    # reasoning-only / tool-call-only turns are not mistaken for a stall.
-    # Operators can tune via HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (0 disables).
-    _ttfb_enabled = agent.api_mode == "codex_responses"
-    try:
-        _ttfb_timeout = float(os.getenv("HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "45"))
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        _ttfb_timeout = 45.0
-    if _ttfb_timeout <= 0:
-        _ttfb_enabled = False
-    if _ttfb_enabled:
-        # Reset before the worker starts so a marker left over from a previous
-        # call on this agent can't be misread as first-byte for this one.
-        agent._codex_stream_last_event_ts = None
+    _stale_timeout = agent._compute_non_stream_stale_timeout(
+        api_kwargs.get("messages", [])
+    )
 
     _call_start = time.time()
     agent._touch_activity("waiting for non-streaming API response")
@@ -301,75 +190,22 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
                 f"waiting for non-streaming response ({int(_elapsed)}s elapsed)"
             )
 
-        _elapsed = time.time() - _call_start
-
-        # TTFB detector: the Codex stream has produced no event at all and
-        # we're past the first-byte cutoff → the backend opened the
-        # connection but isn't responding. Kill it so the retry loop can
-        # reconnect (a fresh connection typically succeeds in seconds),
-        # instead of waiting out the much longer wall-clock stale timeout.
-        if (
-            _ttfb_enabled
-            and _elapsed > _ttfb_timeout
-            and getattr(agent, "_codex_stream_last_event_ts", None) is None
-        ):
-            logger.warning(
-                "Codex stream produced no bytes within TTFB cutoff "
-                "(%.0fs > %.0fs, model=%s). Backend accepted the connection "
-                "but sent no stream events. Killing connection so the retry "
-                "loop can reconnect.",
-                _elapsed, _ttfb_timeout, api_kwargs.get("model", "unknown"),
-            )
-            agent._emit_status(
-                f"⚠️ No first byte from provider in {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                f"(codex stream, model: {api_kwargs.get('model', 'unknown')}). "
-                f"Reconnecting."
-            )
-            try:
-                _close_request_client_once("codex_ttfb_kill")
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            agent._touch_activity(
-                f"codex stream killed after {int(_elapsed)}s with no first byte"
-            )
-            # Wait briefly for the worker to notice the closed connection.
-            t.join(timeout=2.0)
-            if result["error"] is None and result["response"] is None:
-                result["error"] = TimeoutError(
-                    f"Codex stream produced no bytes within {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                    f"(TTFB threshold: {int(_ttfb_timeout)}s)"
-                )
-            break
-
         # Stale-call detector: kill the connection if no response
         # arrives within the configured timeout.
+        _elapsed = time.time() - _call_start
         if _elapsed > _stale_timeout:
-            _est_ctx = estimate_request_context_tokens(api_kwargs)
-            _silent_hint: Optional[str] = None
-            _hint_fn = getattr(agent, "_codex_silent_hang_hint", None)
-            if callable(_hint_fn):
-                try:
-                    _silent_hint = _hint_fn(model=api_kwargs.get("model"))
-                except Exception:
-                    _silent_hint = None
+            _est_ctx = sum(len(str(v)) for v in api_kwargs.get("messages", [])) // 4
             logger.warning(
                 "Non-streaming API call stale for %.0fs (threshold %.0fs). "
                 "model=%s context=~%s tokens. Killing connection.",
                 _elapsed, _stale_timeout,
                 api_kwargs.get("model", "unknown"), f"{_est_ctx:,}",
             )
-            if _silent_hint:
-                agent._emit_status(
-                    f"⚠️ No response from provider for {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                    f"(non-streaming, model: {api_kwargs.get('model', 'unknown')}). "
-                    f"{_silent_hint}"
-                )
-            else:
-                agent._emit_status(
-                    f"⚠️ No response from provider for {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                    f"(non-streaming, model: {api_kwargs.get('model', 'unknown')}). "
-                    f"Aborting call."
-                )
+            agent._emit_status(
+                f"⚠️ No response from provider for {int(_elapsed)}s "
+                f"(non-streaming, model: {api_kwargs.get('model', 'unknown')}). "
+                f"Aborting call."
+            )
             try:
                 if agent.api_mode == "anthropic_messages":
                     agent._anthropic_client.close()
@@ -384,17 +220,10 @@ def interruptible_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict):
             # Wait briefly for the thread to notice the closed connection.
             t.join(timeout=2.0)
             if result["error"] is None and result["response"] is None:
-                if _silent_hint:
-                    result["error"] = TimeoutError(
-                        f"Non-streaming API call timed out after {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                        f"with no response (threshold: {int(_stale_timeout)}s). "
-                        f"{_silent_hint}"
-                    )
-                else:
-                    result["error"] = TimeoutError(
-                        f"Non-streaming API call timed out after {int(_elapsed)}s "
-                        f"with no response (threshold: {int(_stale_timeout)}s)"
-                    )
+                result["error"] = TimeoutError(
+                    f"Non-streaming API call timed out after {int(_elapsed)}s "
+                    f"with no response (threshold: {int(_stale_timeout)}s)"
+                )
             break
 
         if agent._interrupt_requested:
@@ -501,7 +330,6 @@ def build_api_kwargs(agent, api_messages: list) -> dict:
             reasoning_config=agent.reasoning_config,
             session_id=getattr(agent, "session_id", None),
             max_tokens=agent.max_tokens,
-            timeout=agent._resolved_api_call_timeout(),
             request_overrides=agent.request_overrides,
             is_github_responses=is_github_responses,
             is_codex_backend=is_codex_backend,
@@ -721,17 +549,6 @@ def build_assistant_message(agent, assistant_message, finish_reason: str) -> dic
     if isinstance(_san_content, str) and _san_content:
         _san_content = agent._strip_think_blocks(_san_content).strip()
 
-    # Defence-in-depth: redact credentials (PATs, API keys, Bearer tokens)
-    # from assistant content BEFORE the message enters conversation history.
-    # If the model accidentally inlines a secret in its natural-language
-    # response, catch it here at the persistence boundary so it never
-    # reaches state.db, session_*.json, gateway delivery, or compression.
-    # Respects HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS via redact_sensitive_text — no-op
-    # when disabled. (#19798)
-    if isinstance(_san_content, str) and _san_content:
-        from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
-        _san_content = redact_sensitive_text(_san_content)
-
     msg = {
         "role": "assistant",
         "content": _san_content,
@@ -853,18 +670,6 @@ def build_assistant_message(agent, assistant_message, finish_reason: str) -> dic
                     "arguments": tool_call.function.arguments
                 },
             }
-            # Defence-in-depth: redact credentials from tool call arguments
-            # before they enter conversation history. Tool execution uses the
-            # raw API response object, not this dict, so redacting the
-            # persisted shape is safe and only affects storage. Catches the
-            # case where a model accidentally inlines a secret into a tool
-            # call (e.g. `terminal(command="curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer
-            # sk-...'")`). (#19798)
-            if isinstance(tc_dict["function"]["arguments"], str):
-                from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
-                tc_dict["function"]["arguments"] = redact_sensitive_text(
-                    tc_dict["function"]["arguments"]
-                )
             # Preserve extra_content (e.g. Gemini thought_signature) so it
             # is sent back on subsequent API calls.  Without this, Gemini 3
             # thinking models reject the request with a 400 error.
@@ -920,7 +725,7 @@ def try_activate_fallback(agent, reason: "FailoverReason | None" = None) -> bool
     current_base_url = str(getattr(agent, "base_url", "") or "").rstrip("/").lower()
     fb_base_url_for_dedup = (fb.get("base_url") or "").strip().rstrip("/").lower()
     if fb_provider == current_provider and fb_model == current_model:
-        logger.warning(
+        logging.warning(
             "Fallback skip: chain entry %s/%s matches current provider/model",
             fb_provider, fb_model,
         )
@@ -931,7 +736,7 @@ def try_activate_fallback(agent, reason: "FailoverReason | None" = None) -> bool
         and fb_base_url_for_dedup == current_base_url
         and fb_model == current_model
     ):
-        logger.warning(
+        logging.warning(
             "Fallback skip: chain entry base_url %s matches current backend",
             fb_base_url_for_dedup,
         )
@@ -963,7 +768,7 @@ def try_activate_fallback(agent, reason: "FailoverReason | None" = None) -> bool
             explicit_base_url=fb_base_url_hint,
             explicit_api_key=fb_api_key_hint)
         if fb_client is None:
-            logger.warning(
+            logging.warning(
                 "Fallback to %s failed: provider not configured",
                 fb_provider)
             return agent._try_activate_fallback()  # try next in chain
@@ -971,11 +776,8 @@ def try_activate_fallback(agent, reason: "FailoverReason | None" = None) -> bool
             from hermes_cli.model_normalize import normalize_model_for_provider
 
             fb_model = normalize_model_for_provider(fb_model, fb_provider)
-        except Exception as _norm_err:
-            logger.warning(
-                "Could not normalize fallback model %r for provider %r: %s",
-                fb_model, fb_provider, _norm_err,
-            )
+        except Exception:
+            pass
 
         # Determine api_mode from provider / base URL / model
         fb_api_mode = "chat_completions"
@@ -1103,20 +905,19 @@ def try_activate_fallback(agent, reason: "FailoverReason | None" = None) -> bool
                 base_url=agent.base_url,
                 api_key=getattr(agent, "api_key", ""),  # callable preserved → call_llm
                 provider=agent.provider,
-                api_mode=agent.api_mode,
             )
 
         agent._emit_status(
             f"🔄 Primary model failed — switching to fallback: "
             f"{fb_model} via {fb_provider}"
         )
-        logger.info(
+        logging.info(
             "Fallback activated: %s → %s (%s)",
             old_model, fb_model, fb_provider,
         )
         return True
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.error("Failed to activate fallback %s: %s", fb_model, e)
+        logging.error("Failed to activate fallback %s: %s", fb_model, e)
         return agent._try_activate_fallback()  # try next in chain
 
 
@@ -1332,7 +1133,7 @@ def handle_max_iterations(agent, messages: list, api_call_count: int) -> str:
                 final_response = "I reached the iteration limit and couldn't generate a summary."
 
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.warning(f"Failed to get summary response: {e}")
+        logging.warning(f"Failed to get summary response: {e}")
         final_response = f"I reached the maximum iterations ({agent.max_iterations}) but couldn't summarize. Error: {str(e)}"
 
     return final_response
@@ -1361,12 +1162,12 @@ def cleanup_task_resources(agent, task_id: str) -> None:
             _ra().cleanup_vm(task_id)
     except Exception as e:
         if agent.verbose_logging:
-            logger.warning(f"Failed to cleanup VM for task {task_id}: {e}")
+            logging.warning(f"Failed to cleanup VM for task {task_id}: {e}")
     try:
         _ra().cleanup_browser(task_id)
     except Exception as e:
         if agent.verbose_logging:
-            logger.warning(f"Failed to cleanup browser for task {task_id}: {e}")
+            logging.warning(f"Failed to cleanup browser for task {task_id}: {e}")
 
 
 
@@ -1470,44 +1271,23 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
         return result["response"]
 
     result = {"response": None, "error": None, "partial_tool_names": []}
-    request_client_holder = {"client": None, "diag": None, "owner_tid": None}
+    request_client_holder = {"client": None, "diag": None}
     request_client_lock = threading.Lock()
 
     def _set_request_client(client):
         with request_client_lock:
             request_client_holder["client"] = client
-            # See #29507 explanation in the non-streaming variant above.
-            request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = threading.get_ident()
         return client
 
     def _take_request_client():
         with request_client_lock:
             client = request_client_holder.get("client")
             request_client_holder["client"] = None
-            request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
             return client
 
     def _close_request_client_once(reason: str) -> None:
-        # See #29507 explanation in the non-streaming variant above. A
-        # stranger thread (the interrupt-check / stale-stream detector loop)
-        # only aborts sockets — never pops, never calls ``client.close()`` —
-        # so the worker thread retains ownership of the FD release.
-        with request_client_lock:
-            request_client = request_client_holder.get("client")
-            owner_tid = request_client_holder.get("owner_tid")
-            stranger_thread = (
-                request_client is not None
-                and owner_tid is not None
-                and owner_tid != threading.get_ident()
-            )
-            if not stranger_thread:
-                request_client_holder["client"] = None
-                request_client_holder["owner_tid"] = None
-        if request_client is None:
-            return
-        if stranger_thread:
-            agent._abort_request_openai_client(request_client, reason=reason)
-        else:
+        request_client = _take_request_client()
+        if request_client is not None:
             agent._close_request_openai_client(request_client, reason=reason)
 
     first_delta_fired = {"done": False}
@@ -2159,7 +1939,7 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
         # when the context is large.  Without this, the stale detector kills
         # healthy connections during the model's thinking phase, producing
         # spurious RemoteProtocolError ("peer closed connection").
-        _est_tokens = estimate_request_context_tokens(api_kwargs)
+        _est_tokens = sum(len(str(v)) for v in api_kwargs.get("messages", [])) // 4
         if _est_tokens > 100_000:
             _stream_stale_timeout = max(_stream_stale_timeout_base, 300.0)
         elif _est_tokens > 50_000:
@@ -2195,7 +1975,7 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
         # inner retry loop can start a fresh connection.
         _stale_elapsed = time.time() - last_chunk_time["t"]
         if _stale_elapsed > _stream_stale_timeout:
-            _est_ctx = estimate_request_context_tokens(api_kwargs)
+            _est_ctx = sum(len(str(v)) for v in api_kwargs.get("messages", [])) // 4
             logger.warning(
                 "Stream stale for %.0fs (threshold %.0fs) — no chunks received. "
                 "model=%s context=~%s tokens. Killing connection.",
@@ -2239,15 +2019,24 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
         if deltas_were_sent["yes"]:
             # Streaming failed AFTER some tokens were already delivered to
             # the platform.  Re-raising would let the outer retry loop make
-            # Return a partial response stub with finish_reason="length"
-            # so the conversation loop's continuation machinery fires.
-            # tool_calls=None prevents auto-execution of incomplete calls.
+            # a new API call, creating a duplicate message.  Return a
+            # partial "stop" response instead so the outer loop treats this
+            # turn as complete (no retry, no fallback).
+            # Recover whatever content was already streamed to the user.
+            # _current_streamed_assistant_text accumulates text fired
+            # through _fire_stream_delta, so it has exactly what the
+            # user saw before the connection died.
             _partial_text = (
                 getattr(agent, "_current_streamed_assistant_text", "") or ""
             ).strip() or None
 
-            # Append a user-visible warning if tool calls were dropped so
-            # the user and model both know what was attempted.
+            # If the stream died while the model was emitting a tool call,
+            # the stub below will silently set `tool_calls=None` and the
+            # agent loop will treat the turn as complete — the attempted
+            # action is lost with no user-facing signal.  Append a
+            # human-visible warning to the stub content so (a) the user
+            # knows something failed, and (b) the next turn's model sees
+            # in conversation history what was attempted and can retry.
             _partial_names = list(result.get("partial_tool_names") or [])
             if _partial_names:
                 _name_str = ", ".join(_partial_names[:3])
@@ -2259,7 +2048,8 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
                     f"Ask me to retry if you want to continue."
                 )
                 _partial_text = (_partial_text or "") + _warn
-                # Fire as streaming delta so the user sees it immediately.
+                # Also fire as a streaming delta so the user sees it now
+                # instead of only in the persisted transcript.
                 try:
                     agent._fire_stream_delta(_warn)
                 except Exception:
@@ -2269,29 +2059,25 @@ def interruptible_streaming_api_call(agent, api_kwargs: dict, *, on_first_delta=
                     "of text; surfaced warning to user: %s",
                     _partial_names, len(_partial_text or ""), result["error"],
                 )
-                _stub_finish_reason = FINISH_REASON_LENGTH
             else:
                 logger.warning(
-                    "Partial stream delivered before error; returning "
-                    "length-truncated stub with %s chars of recovered "
-                    "content so the loop can continue from where the "
-                    "stream died: %s",
+                    "Partial stream delivered before error; returning stub "
+                    "response with %s chars of recovered content to prevent "
+                    "duplicate messages: %s",
                     len(_partial_text or ""),
                     result["error"],
                 )
-                _stub_finish_reason = FINISH_REASON_LENGTH
             _stub_msg = SimpleNamespace(
                 role="assistant", content=_partial_text, tool_calls=None,
                 reasoning_content=None,
             )
             return SimpleNamespace(
-                id=PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID,
+                id="partial-stream-stub",
                 model=getattr(agent, "model", "unknown"),
                 choices=[SimpleNamespace(
-                    index=0, message=_stub_msg, finish_reason=_stub_finish_reason,
+                    index=0, message=_stub_msg, finish_reason="stop",
                 )],
                 usage=None,
-                _dropped_tool_names=_partial_names or None,
             )
         raise result["error"]
     return result["response"]

agent/codex_responses_adapter.py

@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ def _preflight_codex_api_kwargs(
         "model", "instructions", "input", "tools", "store",
         "reasoning", "include", "max_output_tokens", "temperature",
         "tool_choice", "parallel_tool_calls", "prompt_cache_key", "service_tier",
-        "extra_headers", "extra_body", "timeout",
+        "extra_headers", "extra_body",
     }
     normalized: Dict[str, Any] = {
         "model": model,
@@ -771,13 +771,6 @@ def _preflight_codex_api_kwargs(
     max_output_tokens = api_kwargs.get("max_output_tokens")
     if isinstance(max_output_tokens, (int, float)) and max_output_tokens > 0:
         normalized["max_output_tokens"] = int(max_output_tokens)
-    timeout = api_kwargs.get("timeout")
-    if (
-        isinstance(timeout, (int, float))
-        and not isinstance(timeout, bool)
-        and 0 < float(timeout) < float("inf")
-    ):
-        normalized["timeout"] = float(timeout)
     temperature = api_kwargs.get("temperature")
     if isinstance(temperature, (int, float)):
         normalized["temperature"] = float(temperature)

agent/codex_runtime.py

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import json
 import logging
 import os
-import time
 from types import SimpleNamespace
 from typing import Any, Dict, List
 
@@ -195,11 +194,6 @@ def run_codex_stream(agent, api_kwargs: dict, client: Any = None, on_first_delta
         try:
             with active_client.responses.stream(**api_kwargs) as stream:
                 for event in stream:
-                    # Mark stream activity for the TTFB watchdog in
-                    # interruptible_api_call. The Codex backend can accept the
-                    # connection but never emit a single event; this timestamp
-                    # staying None tells the watchdog no bytes are flowing.
-                    agent._codex_stream_last_event_ts = time.time()
                     agent._touch_activity("receiving stream response")
                     if agent._interrupt_requested:
                         break

agent/context_compressor.py

@@ -609,7 +609,6 @@ class ContextCompressor(ContextEngine):
         """Update tracked token usage from API response."""
         self.last_prompt_tokens = usage.get("prompt_tokens", 0)
         self.last_completion_tokens = usage.get("completion_tokens", 0)
-        self.last_total_tokens = usage.get("total_tokens", self.last_prompt_tokens + self.last_completion_tokens)
 
     def should_compress(self, prompt_tokens: int = None) -> bool:
         """Check if context exceeds the compression threshold.
@@ -898,7 +897,7 @@ class ContextCompressor(ContextEngine):
         into the warning log.
         """
         self._summary_model_fallen_back = True
-        logger.warning(
+        logging.warning(
             "Summary model '%s' %s (%s). "
             "Falling back to main model '%s' for compression.",
             self.summary_model, reason, e, self.model,
@@ -1087,7 +1086,7 @@ The user has requested that this compaction PRIORITISE preserving all informatio
             # No provider configured — long cooldown, unlikely to self-resolve
             self._summary_failure_cooldown_until = time.monotonic() + _SUMMARY_FAILURE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS
             self._last_summary_error = "no auxiliary LLM provider configured"
-            logger.warning("Context compression: no provider available for "
+            logging.warning("Context compression: no provider available for "
                             "summary. Middle turns will be dropped without summary "
                             "for %d seconds.",
                             _SUMMARY_FAILURE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS)
@@ -1183,7 +1182,7 @@ The user has requested that this compaction PRIORITISE preserving all informatio
             if len(err_text) > 220:
                 err_text = err_text[:217].rstrip() + "..."
             self._last_summary_error = err_text
-            logger.warning(
+            logging.warning(
                 "Failed to generate context summary: %s. "
                 "Further summary attempts paused for %d seconds.",
                 e,

agent/context_engine.py

@@ -200,7 +200,6 @@ class ContextEngine(ABC):
         base_url: str = "",
         api_key: str = "",
         provider: str = "",
-        api_mode: str = "",
     ) -> None:
         """Called when the user switches models or on fallback activation.
 

agent/conversation_compression.py

@@ -381,12 +381,12 @@ def compress_context(
             agent._session_db.end_session(agent.session_id, "compression")
             old_session_id = agent.session_id
             agent.session_id = f"{datetime.now().strftime('%Y%m%d_%H%M%S')}_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:6]}"
+            os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_ID"] = agent.session_id
             try:
-                from gateway.session_context import set_current_session_id
-
-                set_current_session_id(agent.session_id)
+                from gateway.session_context import _SESSION_ID
+                _SESSION_ID.set(agent.session_id)
             except Exception:
-                os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_ID"] = agent.session_id
+                pass
             agent._session_db_created = False
             agent._session_db.create_session(
                 session_id=agent.session_id,

agent/conversation_loop.py

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ from agent.prompt_caching import apply_anthropic_cache_control
 from agent.retry_utils import jittered_backoff
 from agent.trajectory import has_incomplete_scratchpad
 from agent.usage_pricing import estimate_usage_cost, normalize_usage
-from hermes_constants import display_hermes_home as _dhh_fn, PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID
+from hermes_constants import display_hermes_home as _dhh_fn
 from hermes_logging import set_session_context
 from tools.schema_sanitizer import strip_pattern_and_format
 from tools.skill_provenance import set_current_write_origin
@@ -229,37 +229,6 @@ def _restore_or_build_system_prompt(agent, system_message, conversation_history)
             )
 
 
-def _get_continuation_prompt(is_partial_stub: bool, dropped_tools: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> str:
-    if is_partial_stub and dropped_tools:
-        tool_list = ", ".join(dropped_tools[:3])
-        return (
-            "[System: Your previous tool call "
-            f"({tool_list}) was too large and "
-            "the stream timed out before it "
-            "could be delivered. Do NOT retry "
-            "the same tool call with the same "
-            "large content. Instead, break the "
-            "content into multiple smaller tool "
-            "calls (e.g. use multiple patch calls "
-            "or write smaller files). Each tool "
-            "call's arguments must be under ~8K "
-            "tokens to avoid stream timeouts.]"
-        )
-    elif is_partial_stub:
-        return (
-            "[System: The previous response was cut off by a "
-            "network error mid-stream. Continue exactly where "
-            "you left off. Do not restart or repeat prior text. "
-            "Finish the answer directly.]"
-        )
-    else:
-        return (
-            "[System: Your previous response was truncated by the output "
-            "length limit. Continue exactly where you left off. Do not "
-            "restart or repeat prior text. Finish the answer directly.]"
-        )
-
-
 def run_conversation(
     agent,
     user_message: str,
@@ -515,7 +484,7 @@ def run_conversation(
             tools=agent.tools or None,
         )
 
-        if agent.context_compressor.should_compress(_preflight_tokens):
+        if _preflight_tokens >= agent.context_compressor.threshold_tokens:
             logger.info(
                 "Preflight compression: ~%s tokens >= %s threshold (model %s, ctx %s)",
                 f"{_preflight_tokens:,}",
@@ -1214,7 +1183,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                                     else str(_codex_error_obj) if _codex_error_obj
                                     else f"Responses API returned status '{_codex_resp_status}'"
                                 )
-                                logger.warning(
+                                logging.warning(
                                     "Codex response status='%s' (error=%s). Routing to fallback. %s",
                                     _codex_resp_status, _codex_error_msg,
                                     agent._client_log_context(),
@@ -1366,7 +1335,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                             primary_recovery_attempted = False
                             continue
                         agent._emit_status(f"❌ Max retries ({max_retries}) exceeded for invalid responses. Giving up.")
-                        logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Invalid API response after {max_retries} retries.")
+                        logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Invalid API response after {max_retries} retries.")
                         agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                         return {
                             "messages": messages,
@@ -1379,7 +1348,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                     # Backoff before retry — jittered exponential: 5s base, 120s cap
                     wait_time = jittered_backoff(retry_count, base_delay=5.0, max_delay=120.0)
                     agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}⏳ Retrying in {wait_time:.1f}s ({_failure_hint})...", force=True)
-                    logger.warning(f"Invalid API response (retry {retry_count}/{max_retries}): {', '.join(error_details)} | Provider: {provider_name}")
+                    logging.warning(f"Invalid API response (retry {retry_count}/{max_retries}): {', '.join(error_details)} | Provider: {provider_name}")
                     
                     # Sleep in small increments to stay responsive to interrupts
                     sleep_end = time.time() + wait_time
@@ -1445,18 +1414,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         finish_reason = "length"
 
                 if finish_reason == "length":
-                    if getattr(response, "id", "") == PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID:
-                        agent._vprint(
-                            f"{agent.log_prefix}⚠️  Stream interrupted by network error "
-                            f"(finish_reason='length' on partial-stream-stub)",
-                            force=True,
-                        )
-                    else:
-                        agent._vprint(
-                            f"{agent.log_prefix}⚠️  Response truncated "
-                            f"(finish_reason='length') - model hit max output tokens",
-                            force=True,
-                        )
+                    agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}⚠️  Response truncated (finish_reason='length') - model hit max output tokens", force=True)
 
                     # Normalize the truncated response to a single OpenAI-style
                     # message shape so text-continuation and tool-call retry
@@ -1549,39 +1507,17 @@ def run_conversation(
                                 truncated_response_parts.append(assistant_message.content)
 
                             if length_continue_retries < 3:
-                                _is_partial_stream_stub = (
-                                    getattr(response, "id", "") == PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID
-                                )
-                                _dropped_tools = getattr(
-                                    response, "_dropped_tool_names", None
-                                )
-
-                                if _is_partial_stream_stub and _dropped_tools:
-                                    _tool_list = ", ".join(_dropped_tools[:3])
-                                    agent._vprint(
-                                        f"{agent.log_prefix}↻ Stream interrupted mid "
-                                        f"tool-call ({_tool_list}) — requesting "
-                                        f"chunked retry "
-                                        f"({length_continue_retries}/3)..."
-                                    )
-                                elif _is_partial_stream_stub:
-                                    agent._vprint(
-                                        f"{agent.log_prefix}↻ Stream interrupted — "
-                                        f"requesting continuation "
-                                        f"({length_continue_retries}/3)..."
-                                    )
-                                else:
-                                    agent._vprint(
-                                        f"{agent.log_prefix}↻ Requesting continuation "
-                                        f"({length_continue_retries}/3)..."
-                                    )
-
-                                _continue_content = _get_continuation_prompt(
-                                    _is_partial_stream_stub, _dropped_tools
+                                agent._vprint(
+                                    f"{agent.log_prefix}↻ Requesting continuation "
+                                    f"({length_continue_retries}/3)..."
                                 )
                                 continue_msg = {
                                     "role": "user",
-                                    "content": _continue_content,
+                                    "content": (
+                                        "[System: Your previous response was truncated by the output "
+                                        "length limit. Continue exactly where you left off. Do not "
+                                        "restart or repeat prior text. Finish the answer directly.]"
+                                    ),
                                 }
                                 messages.append(continue_msg)
                                 agent._session_messages = messages
@@ -2289,7 +2225,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         f"stripped all thinking blocks, retrying...",
                         force=True,
                     )
-                    logger.warning(
+                    logging.warning(
                         "%sThinking block signature recovery: stripped "
                         "reasoning_details from %d messages",
                         agent.log_prefix, len(messages),
@@ -2314,7 +2250,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         from tools.schema_sanitizer import strip_pattern_and_format
                         _, _stripped = strip_pattern_and_format(agent.tools)
                     except Exception as _strip_exc:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
-                        logger.warning(
+                        logging.warning(
                             "%sllama.cpp grammar recovery: strip helper failed: %s",
                             agent.log_prefix, _strip_exc,
                         )
@@ -2325,7 +2261,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                             f"stripped {_stripped} pattern/format keyword(s), retrying...",
                             force=True,
                         )
-                        logger.warning(
+                        logging.warning(
                             "%sllama.cpp grammar recovery: stripped %d "
                             "pattern/format keyword(s) from tool schemas",
                             agent.log_prefix, _stripped,
@@ -2333,7 +2269,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         continue
                     # No keywords found to strip — fall through to normal
                     # retry path rather than loop forever on the same error.
-                    logger.warning(
+                    logging.warning(
                         "%sllama.cpp grammar error but no pattern/format "
                         "keywords to strip — falling through to normal retry",
                         agent.log_prefix,
@@ -2434,7 +2370,6 @@ def run_conversation(
                             base_url=agent.base_url,
                             api_key=getattr(agent, "api_key", ""),
                             provider=agent.provider,
-                            api_mode=agent.api_mode,
                         )
                         # Context probing flags — only set on built-in
                         # compressor (plugin engines manage their own).
@@ -2548,7 +2483,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                                 error_context=error_context,
                             )
                         else:
-                            logger.info(
+                            logging.info(
                                 "Nous 429 looks like upstream capacity "
                                 "(no exhausted bucket in headers or "
                                 "last-known state) -- not tripping "
@@ -2608,7 +2543,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                     if compression_attempts > max_compression_attempts:
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}❌ Max compression attempts ({max_compression_attempts}) reached for payload-too-large error.", force=True)
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Try /new to start a fresh conversation, or /compress to retry compression.", force=True)
-                        logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}413 compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
+                        logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}413 compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
                         agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                         return {
                             "messages": messages,
@@ -2639,7 +2574,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                     else:
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}❌ Payload too large and cannot compress further.", force=True)
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Try /new to start a fresh conversation, or /compress to retry compression.", force=True)
-                        logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}413 payload too large. Cannot compress further.")
+                        logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}413 payload too large. Cannot compress further.")
                         agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                         return {
                             "messages": messages,
@@ -2692,7 +2627,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         if compression_attempts > max_compression_attempts:
                             agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}❌ Max compression attempts ({max_compression_attempts}) reached.", force=True)
                             agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Try /new to start a fresh conversation, or /compress to retry compression.", force=True)
-                            logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
+                            logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
                             agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                             return {
                                 "messages": messages,
@@ -2744,7 +2679,6 @@ def run_conversation(
                             base_url=agent.base_url,
                             api_key=getattr(agent, "api_key", ""),
                             provider=agent.provider,
-                            api_mode=agent.api_mode,
                         )
                         # Context probing flags — only set on built-in
                         # compressor (plugin engines manage their own).
@@ -2766,7 +2700,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                     if compression_attempts > max_compression_attempts:
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}❌ Max compression attempts ({max_compression_attempts}) reached.", force=True)
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Try /new to start a fresh conversation, or /compress to retry compression.", force=True)
-                        logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
+                        logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context compression failed after {max_compression_attempts} attempts.")
                         agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                         return {
                             "messages": messages,
@@ -2799,7 +2733,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         # Can't compress further and already at minimum tier
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}❌ Context length exceeded and cannot compress further.", force=True)
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 The conversation has accumulated too much content. Try /new to start fresh, or /compress to manually trigger compression.", force=True)
-                        logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context length exceeded: {approx_tokens:,} tokens. Cannot compress further.")
+                        logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Context length exceeded: {approx_tokens:,} tokens. Cannot compress further.")
                         agent._persist_session(messages, conversation_history)
                         return {
                             "messages": messages,
@@ -2836,21 +2770,6 @@ def run_conversation(
                     # retryable=True mapping takes effect instead.
                     and not isinstance(api_error, ssl.SSLError)
                 )
-                # ``FailoverReason.billing`` (HTTP 402) is NOT in this
-                # exclusion set.  By the time we reach this block:
-                #   • credential-pool rotation (line ~2031) has already
-                #     fired for billing and either ``continue``d or
-                #     returned (False, ...) — pool is exhausted or absent.
-                #   • the eager-fallback branch above (line ~2422) also
-                #     fires on billing and ``continue``s if a fallback
-                #     provider is configured.
-                # Falling through to here means BOTH recovery paths
-                # gave up.  Treating 402 as retryable from this point
-                # just burns more paid requests against a depleted
-                # balance with no recovery mechanism left — see #31273
-                # (real-world: ~$40 in 48h on a 24/7 gateway).  Aborting
-                # mirrors how 401/403 (also ``should_fallback=True``)
-                # already behave once their recovery paths have failed.
                 is_client_error = (
                     is_local_validation_error
                     or (
@@ -2858,6 +2777,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                         and not classified.should_compress
                         and classified.reason not in {
                             FailoverReason.rate_limit,
+                            FailoverReason.billing,
                             FailoverReason.overloaded,
                             FailoverReason.context_overflow,
                             FailoverReason.payload_too_large,
@@ -2889,26 +2809,15 @@ def run_conversation(
                     agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   🌐 Endpoint: {_base}", force=True)
                     # Actionable guidance for common auth errors
                     if classified.is_auth or classified.reason == FailoverReason.billing:
-                        if _provider in {"openai-codex", "xai-oauth", "nous"} and status_code == 401:
+                        if _provider in {"openai-codex", "xai-oauth"} and status_code == 401:
                             if _provider == "openai-codex":
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Codex OAuth token was rejected (HTTP 401). Your token may have been", force=True)
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      refreshed by another client (Codex CLI, VS Code). To fix:", force=True)
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      1. Run `codex` in your terminal to generate fresh tokens.", force=True)
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      2. Then run `hermes auth` to re-authenticate.", force=True)
-                            elif _provider == "xai-oauth":
+                            else:
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 xAI OAuth token was rejected (HTTP 401). To fix:", force=True)
-                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      re-authenticate with xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+) from `hermes model`.", force=True)
-                            else:  # nous
-                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Nous Portal OAuth token was rejected (HTTP 401). Your token may be", force=True)
-                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      expired, revoked, or your account may be out of credits. To fix:", force=True)
-                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      1. Re-authenticate: hermes auth add nous --type oauth", force=True)
-                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      2. Check your portal account: https://portal.nousresearch.com", force=True)
-                                # ``:free`` is OpenRouter slug syntax; Nous Portal will reject
-                                # the model name even after a successful re-auth.
-                                if isinstance(_model, str) and _model.endswith(":free"):
-                                    agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      ⚠️  Note: `{_model}` looks like an OpenRouter slug (`:free` suffix).", force=True)
-                                    agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}         Nous Portal won't recognize that model name. Either switch to a", force=True)
-                                    agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}         Nous catalog model, or run `/model openrouter:{_model}` to use OpenRouter.", force=True)
+                                agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      re-authenticate with xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription) from `hermes model`.", force=True)
                         else:
                             agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 Your API key was rejected by the provider. Check:", force=True)
                             agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      • Is the key valid? Run: hermes setup", force=True)
@@ -2917,7 +2826,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                                 agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}      • Check credits: https://openrouter.ai/settings/credits", force=True)
                     else:
                         agent._vprint(f"{agent.log_prefix}   💡 This type of error won't be fixed by retrying.", force=True)
-                    logger.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Non-retryable client error: {api_error}")
+                    logging.error(f"{agent.log_prefix}Non-retryable client error: {api_error}")
                     # Skip session persistence when the error is likely
                     # context-overflow related (status 400 + large session).
                     # Persisting the failed user message would make the
@@ -2994,7 +2903,7 @@ def run_conversation(
                             force=True,
                         )
 
-                    logger.error(
+                    logging.error(
                         "%sAPI call failed after %s retries. %s | provider=%s model=%s msgs=%s tokens=~%s",
                         agent.log_prefix, max_retries, _final_summary,
                         _provider, _model, len(api_messages), f"{approx_tokens:,}",
@@ -3525,19 +3434,6 @@ def run_conversation(
                         f"⚠️ Tool guardrail halted {decision.tool_name}: {decision.code}"
                     )
                     messages.append({"role": "assistant", "content": final_response})
-                    # Emit the halt message to the client so it's not
-                    # indistinguishable from a crash.  The stream display
-                    # was flushed (callback(None)) before tool execution,
-                    # but the callback is still alive — fire the text
-                    # through it so SSE/TUI clients see the explanation.
-                    if final_response:
-                        agent._safe_print(f"\n{final_response}\n")
-                        if agent.stream_delta_callback:
-                            try:
-                                agent.stream_delta_callback(final_response)
-                                agent.stream_delta_callback(None)
-                            except Exception:
-                                pass
                     break
 
                 # Reset per-turn retry counters after successful tool
@@ -4133,8 +4029,6 @@ def run_conversation(
         except Exception as _ver_err:
             logger.debug("file-mutation verifier footer failed: %s", _ver_err)
 
-    _response_transformed = False
-
     # Plugin hook: transform_llm_output
     # Fired once per turn after the tool-calling loop completes.
     # Plugins can transform the LLM's output text before it's returned.
@@ -4152,7 +4046,6 @@ def run_conversation(
             for _hook_result in _transform_results:
                 if isinstance(_hook_result, str) and _hook_result:
                     final_response = _hook_result
-                    _response_transformed = True
                     break  # First non-empty string wins
         except Exception as exc:
             logger.warning("transform_llm_output hook failed: %s", exc)
@@ -4204,7 +4097,6 @@ def run_conversation(
         "failed": failed,
         "partial": False,  # True only when stopped due to invalid tool calls
         "interrupted": interrupted,
-        "response_transformed": _response_transformed,
         "response_previewed": getattr(agent, "_response_was_previewed", False),
         "model": agent.model,
         "provider": agent.provider,
@@ -4221,7 +4113,6 @@ def run_conversation(
         "estimated_cost_usd": agent.session_estimated_cost_usd,
         "cost_status": agent.session_cost_status,
         "cost_source": agent.session_cost_source,
-        "session_id": agent.session_id,
     }
     if agent._tool_guardrail_halt_decision is not None:
         result["guardrail"] = agent._tool_guardrail_halt_decision.to_metadata()

agent/credential_persistence.py

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-"""Credential-pool disk-boundary sanitization helpers.
-
-These helpers define which credential-pool entries are references to borrowed
-runtime secrets and strip raw values before those entries are written to
-``auth.json``.  They intentionally have no dependency on ``hermes_cli.auth`` so
-both the pool model and the final auth-store write boundary can share the same
-policy without import cycles.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import hashlib
-import re
-from typing import Any, Dict, Mapping
-
-
-# Sources Hermes owns and can intentionally persist in auth.json.  Everything
-# else with a non-empty source is treated as borrowed/reference-only by default
-# so future external secret providers fail closed at the disk boundary.
-_PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES = frozenset({
-    ("anthropic", "hermes_pkce"),
-    ("minimax-oauth", "oauth"),
-    ("nous", "device_code"),
-    ("openai-codex", "device_code"),
-    ("xai-oauth", "loopback_pkce"),
-})
-
-_SAFE_SECRETISH_METADATA_KEYS = frozenset({
-    "secret_fingerprint",
-    "secret_source",
-    "token_type",
-    "scope",
-    "client_id",
-    "agent_key_id",
-    "agent_key_expires_at",
-    "agent_key_expires_in",
-    "agent_key_reused",
-    "agent_key_obtained_at",
-    "expires_at",
-    "expires_at_ms",
-    "expires_in",
-    "last_refresh",
-    "last_status",
-    "last_status_at",
-    "last_error_code",
-    "last_error_reason",
-    "last_error_message",
-    "last_error_reset_at",
-})
-
-_SECRET_VALUE_KEYS = frozenset({
-    "access_token",
-    "refresh_token",
-    "agent_key",
-    "api_key",
-    "apikey",
-    "api_token",
-    "auth_token",
-    "authorization",
-    "bearer_token",
-    "client_secret",
-    "credential",
-    "credentials",
-    "id_token",
-    "oauth_token",
-    "private_key",
-    "secret_key",
-    "session_token",
-    "password",
-    "secret",
-    "token",
-    "tokens",
-})
-
-_SECRET_VALUE_SUFFIXES = (
-    "_api_key",
-    "_api_token",
-    "_access_token",
-    "_auth_token",
-    "_refresh_token",
-    "_bearer_token",
-    "_client_secret",
-    "_id_token",
-    "_oauth_token",
-    "_private_key",
-    "_session_token",
-    "_secret_key",
-    "_password",
-    "_secret",
-    "_token",
-    "_key",
-)
-
-_CAMEL_CASE_BOUNDARY = re.compile(r"(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])")
-
-
-def _normalize_key(key: Any) -> str:
-    raw = str(key or "").strip()
-    raw = _CAMEL_CASE_BOUNDARY.sub("_", raw)
-    return raw.lower().replace("-", "_").replace(".", "_")
-
-
-def is_borrowed_credential_source(source: Any, provider_id: Any = None) -> bool:
-    """Return True when ``source`` points at a borrowed/reference-only secret."""
-    normalized_source = str(source or "").strip().lower()
-    if not normalized_source:
-        return False
-    if normalized_source == "manual" or normalized_source.startswith("manual:"):
-        return False
-    normalized_provider = str(provider_id or "").strip().lower()
-    return (normalized_provider, normalized_source) not in _PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES
-
-
-def _is_secret_payload_key(key: Any) -> bool:
-    normalized = _normalize_key(key)
-    if not normalized or normalized in _SAFE_SECRETISH_METADATA_KEYS:
-        return False
-    if normalized in _SECRET_VALUE_KEYS:
-        return True
-    return normalized.endswith(_SECRET_VALUE_SUFFIXES)
-
-
-def _fingerprint_value(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    text = str(value)
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8", errors="surrogatepass")).hexdigest()
-    return f"sha256:{digest[:16]}"
-
-
-def _credential_secret_fingerprint(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str | None:
-    for key in ("agent_key", "access_token", "refresh_token", "api_key", "token", "secret"):
-        fingerprint = _fingerprint_value(payload.get(key))
-        if fingerprint:
-            return fingerprint
-
-    for key, value in payload.items():
-        if _is_secret_payload_key(key):
-            fingerprint = _fingerprint_value(value)
-            if fingerprint:
-                return fingerprint
-
-    existing = payload.get("secret_fingerprint")
-    if isinstance(existing, str) and existing.startswith("sha256:"):
-        return existing
-    return None
-
-
-def sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload(
-    payload: Mapping[str, Any],
-    provider_id: Any = None,
-) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return a disk-safe credential-pool payload.
-
-    Owned sources (manual entries and Hermes-owned OAuth/device-code state)
-    pass through unchanged.  Borrowed/reference-only sources keep labels,
-    source refs, status/cooldown metadata, counters, and a non-reversible
-    fingerprint, but raw secret value fields are removed.
-    """
-    result = dict(payload)
-    if not is_borrowed_credential_source(result.get("source"), provider_id):
-        return result
-
-    fingerprint = _credential_secret_fingerprint(result)
-    sanitized = {
-        key: value
-        for key, value in result.items()
-        if not _is_secret_payload_key(key)
-    }
-    if fingerprint:
-        sanitized["secret_fingerprint"] = fingerprint
-    return sanitized

agent/credential_pool.py

@@ -15,10 +15,6 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
 
 from hermes_constants import OPENROUTER_BASE_URL
 from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value, load_env
-from agent.credential_persistence import (
-    is_borrowed_credential_source,
-    sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload,
-)
 import hermes_cli.auth as auth_mod
 from hermes_cli.auth import (
     CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS,
@@ -90,7 +86,7 @@ CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX = "custom:"
 _EXTRA_KEYS = frozenset({
     "token_type", "scope", "client_id", "portal_base_url", "obtained_at",
     "expires_in", "agent_key_id", "agent_key_expires_in", "agent_key_reused",
-    "agent_key_obtained_at", "tls", "secret_source", "secret_fingerprint",
+    "agent_key_obtained_at", "tls",
 })
 
 
@@ -165,7 +161,7 @@ class PooledCredential:
         for k, v in self.extra.items():
             if v is not None:
                 result[k] = v
-        return sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload(result, self.provider)
+        return result
 
     @property
     def runtime_api_key(self) -> str:
@@ -249,16 +245,6 @@ def _extract_retry_delay_seconds(message: str) -> Optional[float]:
     sec_match = re.search(r"retry\s+(?:after\s+)?(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*(?:sec|secs|seconds|s\b)", message, re.IGNORECASE)
     if sec_match:
         return float(sec_match.group(1))
-    # "Resets in 4hr 5min" format used by OpenCode Go weekly usage limits
-    hr_min_match = re.search(r"resets?\s+in\s+(\d+)\s*hr\s+(\d+)\s*min", message, re.IGNORECASE)
-    if hr_min_match:
-        return int(hr_min_match.group(1)) * 3600 + int(hr_min_match.group(2)) * 60
-    hr_only_match = re.search(r"resets?\s+in\s+(\d+)\s*hr\b", message, re.IGNORECASE)
-    if hr_only_match:
-        return int(hr_only_match.group(1)) * 3600
-    min_only_match = re.search(r"resets?\s+in\s+(\d+)\s*min\b", message, re.IGNORECASE)
-    if min_only_match:
-        return int(min_only_match.group(1)) * 60
     return None
 
 
@@ -1275,21 +1261,9 @@ class CredentialPool:
         *,
         status_code: Optional[int],
         error_context: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
-        api_key_hint: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> Optional[PooledCredential]:
         with self._lock:
-            entry = None
-            if api_key_hint:
-                # Prefer the specific entry whose API key matches the one that
-                # actually failed.  When this pool was freshly loaded from disk
-                # (another process already rotated), current() is None and
-                # _select_unlocked() would return the NEXT key — the wrong one.
-                entry = next(
-                    (e for e in self._entries if e.runtime_api_key == api_key_hint),
-                    None,
-                )
-            if entry is None:
-                entry = self.current() or self._select_unlocked()
+            entry = self.current() or self._select_unlocked()
             if entry is None:
                 return None
             _label = entry.label or entry.id[:8]
@@ -1459,12 +1433,8 @@ def _upsert_entry(entries: List[PooledCredential], provider: str, source: str, p
     if field_updates or extra_updates:
         if extra_updates:
             field_updates["extra"] = {**existing.extra, **extra_updates}
-        updated = replace(existing, **field_updates)
-        entries[existing_idx] = updated
-        # Runtime-only borrowed secret updates should refresh the in-memory
-        # entry without forcing auth.json churn when the disk-safe payload is
-        # unchanged (for example env keys with the same fingerprint).
-        return existing.to_dict() != updated.to_dict()
+        entries[existing_idx] = replace(existing, **field_updates)
+        return True
     return False
 
 
@@ -1802,35 +1772,6 @@ def _seed_from_env(provider: str, entries: List[PooledCredential]) -> Tuple[bool
     except ImportError:
         def _is_source_suppressed(_p, _s):  # type: ignore[misc]
             return False
-
-    def _secret_source_for_env(env_var: str) -> Optional[str]:
-        try:
-            from hermes_cli.env_loader import get_secret_source
-            source_label = get_secret_source(env_var)
-        except Exception:
-            source_label = None
-        return str(source_label).strip() if source_label else None
-
-    def _env_payload(
-        *,
-        source: str,
-        env_var: str,
-        token: str,
-        base_url: str,
-        auth_type: str = AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
-    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
-            "source": source,
-            "auth_type": auth_type,
-            "access_token": token,
-            "base_url": base_url,
-            "label": env_var,
-        }
-        secret_source = _secret_source_for_env(env_var)
-        if secret_source:
-            payload["secret_source"] = secret_source
-        return payload
-
     if provider == "openrouter":
         # Prefer ~/.hermes/.env over os.environ
         token = _get_env_prefer_dotenv("OPENROUTER_API_KEY")
@@ -1843,12 +1784,13 @@ def _seed_from_env(provider: str, entries: List[PooledCredential]) -> Tuple[bool
                 entries,
                 provider,
                 source,
-                _env_payload(
-                    source=source,
-                    env_var="OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
-                    token=token,
-                    base_url=OPENROUTER_BASE_URL,
-                ),
+                {
+                    "source": source,
+                    "auth_type": AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
+                    "access_token": token,
+                    "base_url": OPENROUTER_BASE_URL,
+                    "label": "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
+                },
             )
         return changed, active_sources
 
@@ -1887,13 +1829,13 @@ def _seed_from_env(provider: str, entries: List[PooledCredential]) -> Tuple[bool
             entries,
             provider,
             source,
-            _env_payload(
-                source=source,
-                env_var=env_var,
-                token=token,
-                base_url=base_url,
-                auth_type=auth_type,
-            ),
+            {
+                "source": source,
+                "auth_type": auth_type,
+                "access_token": token,
+                "base_url": base_url,
+                "label": env_var,
+            },
         )
     return changed, active_sources
 
@@ -1905,11 +1847,8 @@ def _prune_stale_seeded_entries(entries: List[PooledCredential], active_sources:
         if _is_manual_source(entry.source)
         or entry.source in active_sources
         or not (
-            is_borrowed_credential_source(entry.source, entry.provider)
-            # Hermes PKCE is Hermes-owned/persistable while present, but it is
-            # still a file-backed singleton and should disappear from the pool
-            # when the backing OAuth file is gone.
-            or entry.source == "hermes_pkce"
+            entry.source.startswith("env:")
+            or entry.source in {"claude_code", "hermes_pkce"}
         )
     ]
     if len(retained) == len(entries):
@@ -1994,22 +1933,17 @@ def _seed_custom_pool(pool_key: str, entries: List[PooledCredential]) -> Tuple[b
 def load_pool(provider: str) -> CredentialPool:
     provider = (provider or "").strip().lower()
     raw_entries = read_credential_pool(provider)
-    raw_needs_sanitization = any(
-        isinstance(payload, dict)
-        and sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload(payload, provider) != payload
-        for payload in raw_entries
-    )
     entries = [PooledCredential.from_dict(provider, payload) for payload in raw_entries]
 
     if provider.startswith(CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX):
         # Custom endpoint pool — seed from custom_providers config and model config
         custom_changed, custom_sources = _seed_custom_pool(provider, entries)
-        changed = raw_needs_sanitization or custom_changed
+        changed = custom_changed
         changed |= _prune_stale_seeded_entries(entries, custom_sources)
     else:
         singleton_changed, singleton_sources = _seed_from_singletons(provider, entries)
         env_changed, env_sources = _seed_from_env(provider, entries)
-        changed = raw_needs_sanitization or singleton_changed or env_changed
+        changed = singleton_changed or env_changed
         changed |= _prune_stale_seeded_entries(entries, singleton_sources | env_sources)
         changed |= _normalize_pool_priorities(provider, entries)
 

agent/credential_sources.py

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ def _remove_xai_oauth_loopback_pkce(provider: str, removed) -> RemovalResult:
     if _clear_auth_store_provider(provider):
         result.cleaned.append(f"Cleared {provider} OAuth tokens from auth store")
     result.hints.append(
-        "Run `hermes model` → xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+) to re-authenticate if needed."
+        "Run `hermes model` → xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription) to re-authenticate if needed."
     )
     return result
 

agent/display.py

@@ -787,65 +787,33 @@ class KawaiiSpinner:
 # Cute tool message (completion line that replaces the spinner)
 # =========================================================================
 
-_ERROR_SUFFIX_MAX_LEN = 48
-
-
-def _trim_error(msg: str) -> str:
-    """Shrink an error message for inline display in a tool status line.
-
-    Strips overly long absolute paths down to just the filename so the
-    suffix stays readable on narrow terminals.
-    """
-    msg = msg.strip()
-    # Common case: "File not found: /very/long/absolute/path/foo.py"
-    if "File not found:" in msg:
-        _, _, tail = msg.partition("File not found:")
-        tail = tail.strip()
-        if "/" in tail:
-            msg = f"File not found: {tail.rsplit('/', 1)[-1]}"
-    if len(msg) > _ERROR_SUFFIX_MAX_LEN:
-        msg = msg[: _ERROR_SUFFIX_MAX_LEN - 3] + "..."
-    return msg
-
-
 def _detect_tool_failure(tool_name: str, result: str | None) -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Inspect a tool result string for signs of failure.
 
-    Returns ``(is_failure, suffix)`` where *suffix* is a short informational
-    tag like ``" [exit 1]"`` for terminal failures, ``" [full]"`` for memory
-    overflow, or a trimmed error message (``" [File not found: foo.py]"``).
-    On success returns ``(False, "")``.
+    Returns ``(is_failure, suffix)`` where *suffix* is an informational tag
+    like ``" [exit 1]"`` for terminal failures, or ``" [error]"`` for generic
+    failures.  On success, returns ``(False, "")``.
     """
     if result is None:
         return False, ""
     if file_mutation_result_landed(tool_name, result):
         return False, ""
 
-    data = safe_json_loads(result)
-
-    # Terminal: non-zero exit code is the canonical failure signal.
     if tool_name == "terminal":
+        data = safe_json_loads(result)
         if isinstance(data, dict):
             exit_code = data.get("exit_code")
             if exit_code is not None and exit_code != 0:
-                err_msg = data.get("error")
-                if err_msg:
-                    return True, f" [{_trim_error(str(err_msg))}]"
                 return True, f" [exit {exit_code}]"
         return False, ""
 
-    # Memory: distinguish "store full" from real errors.
+    # Memory-specific: distinguish "full" from real errors
     if tool_name == "memory":
+        data = safe_json_loads(result)
         if isinstance(data, dict):
             if data.get("success") is False and "exceed the limit" in data.get("error", ""):
                 return True, " [full]"
 
-    # Structured error in JSON result (any tool that surfaces {"error": ...}).
-    if isinstance(data, dict):
-        err = data.get("error") or data.get("message")
-        if err and (data.get("success") is False or "error" in data):
-            return True, f" [{_trim_error(str(err))}]"
-
     # Generic heuristic for non-terminal tools
     # Multimodal tool results (dicts with _multimodal=True) are not strings —
     # treat them as successes since failures would be JSON-encoded strings.
@@ -953,29 +921,11 @@ def get_cute_tool_message(
     if tool_name == "todo":
         todos_arg = args.get("todos")
         merge = args.get("merge", False)
-        # Parse result for completion progress
-        total = 0
-        done = 0
-        if result:
-            try:
-                data = safe_json_loads(result)
-                if data:
-                    s = data.get("summary", {})
-                    total = s.get("total", 0)
-                    done = s.get("completed", 0)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
         if todos_arg is None:
-            if total > 0:
-                return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      {done}/{total} task(s)  {dur}")
             return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      reading tasks  {dur}")
         elif merge:
-            if total > 0 and done > 0:
-                return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      update {done}/{total} ✓  {dur}")
             return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      update {len(todos_arg)} task(s)  {dur}")
         else:
-            if total > 0 and done > 0:
-                return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      {done}/{total} task(s)  {dur}")
             return _wrap(f"┊ 📋 plan      {len(todos_arg)} task(s)  {dur}")
     if tool_name == "session_search":
         return _wrap(f"┊ 🔍 recall    \"{_trunc(args.get('query', ''), 35)}\"  {dur}")

agent/error_classifier.py

@@ -240,24 +240,6 @@ _MODEL_NOT_FOUND_PATTERNS = [
     "unsupported model",
 ]
 
-# Request-validation patterns — the request is malformed and will fail
-# identically on every retry. Some OpenAI-compatible gateways (notably
-# codex.nekos.me) return these as 5xx instead of the standard 4xx, which
-# makes the generic "5xx → retryable server_error" rule misfire: the retry
-# loop hammers the same deterministic rejection 3+ times, then the
-# transport-recovery path resets the counter and does it again, producing
-# a request flood. When a 5xx body carries one of these unambiguous
-# request-validation signals, classify as a non-retryable format_error so
-# the loop fails fast and falls back instead of looping.
-_REQUEST_VALIDATION_PATTERNS = [
-    "unknown parameter",
-    "unsupported parameter",
-    "unrecognized request argument",
-    "invalid_request_error",
-    "unknown_parameter",
-    "unsupported_parameter",
-]
-
 # OpenRouter aggregator policy-block patterns.
 #
 # When a user's OpenRouter account privacy setting (or a per-request
@@ -763,23 +745,6 @@ def _classify_by_status(
         )
 
     if status_code in {500, 502}:
-        # Some OpenAI-compatible gateways return request-validation errors
-        # with a 5xx status (codex.nekos.me returns 502 for unknown/
-        # unsupported parameters). These are deterministic — every retry
-        # gets the identical rejection — so the generic "5xx → retryable
-        # server_error" rule turns one bad request into a retry flood.
-        # Detect the unambiguous request-validation signals (in either the
-        # message text or the structured error code) and fail fast.
-        if (
-            any(p in error_msg for p in _REQUEST_VALIDATION_PATTERNS)
-            or error_code.lower() in {"invalid_request_error", "unknown_parameter",
-                                      "unsupported_parameter"}
-        ):
-            return result_fn(
-                FailoverReason.format_error,
-                retryable=False,
-                should_fallback=True,
-            )
         return result_fn(FailoverReason.server_error, retryable=True)
 
     if status_code in {503, 529}:

agent/file_safety.py

@@ -41,11 +41,6 @@ def build_write_denied_paths(home: str) -> set[str]:
             # Top-level .env, even when running under a profile — overwriting it
             # leaks credentials across every profile that inherits from root (#15981).
             str(hermes_root / ".env"),
-            # Active profile Anthropic PKCE credential store.
-            str(hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json"),
-            # Top-level Anthropic PKCE credential store remains sensitive even
-            # when a profile is active; default/non-profile sessions still read it.
-            str(hermes_root / ".anthropic_oauth.json"),
             os.path.join(home, ".bashrc"),
             os.path.join(home, ".zshrc"),
             os.path.join(home, ".profile"),
@@ -55,7 +50,6 @@ def build_write_denied_paths(home: str) -> set[str]:
             os.path.join(home, ".pgpass"),
             os.path.join(home, ".npmrc"),
             os.path.join(home, ".pypirc"),
-            os.path.join(home, ".git-credentials"),
             "/etc/sudoers",
             "/etc/passwd",
             "/etc/shadow",
@@ -77,7 +71,6 @@ def build_write_denied_prefixes(home: str) -> list[str]:
             os.path.join(home, ".docker"),
             os.path.join(home, ".azure"),
             os.path.join(home, ".config", "gh"),
-            os.path.join(home, ".config", "gcloud"),
         ]
     ]
 
@@ -104,43 +97,6 @@ def is_write_denied(path: str) -> bool:
         if resolved.startswith(prefix):
             return True
 
-    # Hermes control-plane files: block both the ACTIVE profile's view
-    # (hermes_home) AND the global root view. Without the root pass, a
-    # profile-mode session leaves <root>/auth.json + <root>/config.yaml
-    # writable — letting a prompt-injected write_file overwrite the global
-    # files that every profile inherits from (same shape as #15981).
-    control_file_names = ("auth.json", "config.yaml", "webhook_subscriptions.json")
-    mcp_tokens_dir_name = "mcp-tokens"
-
-    hermes_dirs = []
-    for base in (_hermes_home_path(), _hermes_root_path()):
-        try:
-            real = os.path.realpath(base)
-            if real not in hermes_dirs:
-                hermes_dirs.append(real)
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-
-    for base_real in hermes_dirs:
-        for name in control_file_names:
-            try:
-                if resolved == os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, name)):
-                    return True
-            except Exception:
-                continue
-        try:
-            mcp_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, mcp_tokens_dir_name))
-            if resolved == mcp_real or resolved.startswith(mcp_real + os.sep):
-                return True
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-        try:
-            pairing_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, "pairing"))
-            if resolved == pairing_real or resolved.startswith(pairing_real + os.sep):
-                return True
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
     safe_root = get_safe_write_root()
     if safe_root and not (resolved == safe_root or resolved.startswith(safe_root + os.sep)):
         return True
@@ -148,302 +104,22 @@ def is_write_denied(path: str) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
-# Common secret-bearing project-local environment file basenames.
-# These are blocked because .env files routinely contain API keys,
-# database passwords, and other credentials.
-_BLOCKED_PROJECT_ENV_BASENAMES: set[str] = {
-    ".env",
-    ".env.local",
-    ".env.development",
-    ".env.production",
-    ".env.test",
-    ".env.staging",
-    ".envrc",
-}
-
-
 def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return an error message when a read targets a denied Hermes path.
-
-    Three categories are blocked:
-
-      * Internal Hermes cache files under ``HERMES_HOME/skills/.hub`` —
-        readable metadata that an attacker could use as a prompt-injection
-        carrier.
-      * Credential / secret stores under HERMES_HOME and the global Hermes
-        root: ``auth.json``, ``auth.lock``, ``.anthropic_oauth.json``,
-        ``.env``, ``webhook_subscriptions.json``, ``auth/google_oauth.json``,
-        and anything under ``mcp-tokens/``. These hold plaintext provider keys,
-        OAuth tokens, and HMAC secrets that the agent never needs to read
-        directly — provider tools / gateway adapters consume them through
-        internal channels.
-      * Project-local environment files anywhere on disk: ``.env``,
-        ``.env.local``, ``.env.development``, ``.env.production``,
-        ``.env.test``, ``.env.staging``, ``.envrc``. These routinely hold
-        API keys, database passwords, and other credentials for the user's
-        own projects. The agent helping debug a project shouldn't normally
-        need to read these — ``.env.example`` is the documented-shape
-        substitute.
-
-    **This is NOT a security boundary.** The terminal tool runs as the
-    same OS user with shell access; the agent can still ``cat auth.json``
-    or ``cat ~/.hermes/.env`` and exfiltrate the file. The read-deny exists
-    as defense-in-depth that:
-
-      * Returns a clear error to models that respect tool denials, which
-        empirically prompts most modern models to stop rather than reach
-        for the shell.
-      * Surfaces a visible audit trail when something tries to read
-        credentials — easier to spot in logs than a generic ``cat``.
-
-    Treat any user-visible framing around this as "may help" rather than
-    "stops attackers." A determined model or malicious instruction can
-    always shell out.
-
-    Callers that resolve relative paths against a non-process cwd
-    (e.g. ``TERMINAL_CWD`` in ``tools/file_tools.py``) MUST pre-resolve
-    and pass the absolute path string.  This function's own ``resolve()``
-    is anchored at the Python process cwd, so a relative input like
-    ``"auth.json"`` would otherwise miss the denylist when the task's
-    terminal cwd differs from the process cwd.
-    """
+    """Return an error message when a read targets internal Hermes cache files."""
     resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
-
-    # Resolve BOTH the active HERMES_HOME (profile-aware) AND the global
-    # Hermes root so credential stores at <root>/auth.json etc. are also
-    # blocked when running under a profile (HERMES_HOME points at
-    # <root>/profiles/<name> in profile mode). Same shape as the write
-    # deny widening (#15981, #14157).
-    hermes_dirs: list[Path] = []
-    for base in (_hermes_home_path(), _hermes_root_path()):
+    hermes_home = _hermes_home_path().resolve()
+    blocked_dirs = [
+        hermes_home / "skills" / ".hub" / "index-cache",
+        hermes_home / "skills" / ".hub",
+    ]
+    for blocked in blocked_dirs:
         try:
-            real = base.resolve()
-            if real not in hermes_dirs:
-                hermes_dirs.append(real)
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-
-    # Skills .hub: prompt-injection carriers.
-    for hd in hermes_dirs:
-        blocked_dirs = [
-            hd / "skills" / ".hub" / "index-cache",
-            hd / "skills" / ".hub",
-        ]
-        for blocked in blocked_dirs:
-            try:
-                resolved.relative_to(blocked)
-            except ValueError:
-                continue
-            return (
-                f"Access denied: {path} is an internal Hermes cache file "
-                "and cannot be read directly to prevent prompt injection. "
-                "Use the skills_list or skill_view tools instead."
-            )
-
-    # Credential / secret stores. Exact-file matches under either
-    # HERMES_HOME or <root>.
-    credential_file_names = (
-        "auth.json",
-        "auth.lock",
-        ".anthropic_oauth.json",
-        ".env",
-        "webhook_subscriptions.json",
-        os.path.join("auth", "google_oauth.json"),
-    )
-    for hd in hermes_dirs:
-        for name in credential_file_names:
-            try:
-                blocked = (hd / name).resolve()
-            except Exception:
-                continue
-            if resolved == blocked:
-                return (
-                    f"Access denied: {path} is a Hermes credential store "
-                    "and cannot be read directly. Provider tools consume "
-                    "these credentials through internal channels. "
-                    "(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the "
-                    "terminal tool can still bypass.)"
-                )
-
-    # mcp-tokens/: directory prefix match — anything inside is OAuth
-    # token material.
-    for hd in hermes_dirs:
-        try:
-            mcp_tokens = (hd / "mcp-tokens").resolve()
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-        if resolved == mcp_tokens:
-            return (
-                f"Access denied: {path} is the Hermes MCP token directory "
-                "and cannot be read directly. (Defense-in-depth — not a "
-                "security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
-            )
-        try:
-            resolved.relative_to(mcp_tokens)
+            resolved.relative_to(blocked)
         except ValueError:
             continue
         return (
-            f"Access denied: {path} is a Hermes MCP token file "
-            "and cannot be read directly. (Defense-in-depth — not a "
-            "security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+            f"Access denied: {path} is an internal Hermes cache file "
+            "and cannot be read directly to prevent prompt injection. "
+            "Use the skills_list or skill_view tools instead."
         )
-
-    # Block common secret-bearing project-local .env files anywhere on disk.
-    # The agent helping a user with their project rarely needs to read raw
-    # .env contents — .env.example is the documented-shape substitute. The
-    # terminal tool can still ``cat .env``; this is defense-in-depth, not a
-    # boundary (see module docstring).
-    if resolved.name in _BLOCKED_PROJECT_ENV_BASENAMES:
-        return (
-            f"Access denied: {path} is a secret-bearing environment file "
-            "and cannot be read to prevent credential leakage. "
-            "If you need to check the file structure, read .env.example instead. "
-            "(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
-        )
-
     return None
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Cross-profile write guard (#TBD)
-#
-# Hermes profiles are separate HERMES_HOME dirs under
-# ``<root>/profiles/<name>/``. Each profile has its own skills/, plugins/,
-# cron/, memories/. When an agent runs under one profile, writing into
-# ANOTHER profile's directories is almost always wrong — those skills /
-# plugins / cron jobs / memories affect a different session the user runs
-# from a different shell.
-#
-# Soft guard, NOT a security boundary: the agent runs as the same OS user
-# and has unrestricted terminal access, so this returns a warning the model
-# can choose to honor or override with ``cross_profile=True``. Same shape
-# as the dangerous-command approval flow — the agent is told the boundary
-# exists, and explicit user direction is required to cross it.
-#
-# Reference: May 2026 incident where a hermes-security profile session
-# edited skills under both ``~/.hermes/profiles/hermes-security/skills/``
-# AND ``~/.hermes/skills/`` (the default profile's skills) without realizing
-# the second path belonged to a different profile.
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-# Profile-scoped directories under HERMES_HOME / <root> / <root>/profiles/<X>/
-# that should be guarded. Adding a new area here extends the guard with no
-# other code change.
-PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS = ("skills", "plugins", "cron", "memories")
-
-
-def _resolve_active_profile_name() -> str:
-    """Return the active profile name derived from HERMES_HOME.
-
-    ``~/.hermes``              -> ``"default"``
-    ``~/.hermes/profiles/X``  -> ``"X"``
-
-    Falls back to ``"default"`` on any resolution failure so the guard
-    never raises into the tool path.
-    """
-    try:
-        home_real = _hermes_home_path().resolve()
-        root_real = _hermes_root_path().resolve()
-    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
-        return "default"
-    profiles_dir = root_real / "profiles"
-    try:
-        rel = home_real.relative_to(profiles_dir)
-        parts = rel.parts
-        if len(parts) >= 1:
-            return parts[0]
-    except ValueError:
-        pass
-    return "default"
-
-
-def classify_cross_profile_target(path: str) -> Optional[dict]:
-    """Classify a write target as cross-profile if it lands in another
-    profile's scoped area (skills/plugins/cron/memories).
-
-    Returns ``None`` when the target is outside Hermes scope, or is inside
-    the ACTIVE profile, or doesn't hit a profile-scoped area. Otherwise
-    returns a dict with:
-
-      * ``active_profile``: name of the profile the agent is running as
-      * ``target_profile``: name of the profile the path belongs to
-      * ``area``: which scoped area (``"skills"``, ``"plugins"``, etc.)
-      * ``target_path``: the resolved path string
-
-    The caller decides what to do with the result — surface a warning to
-    the model, prompt the user, or (with explicit consent /
-    ``cross_profile=True``) proceed anyway.
-    """
-    try:
-        target = Path(os.path.expanduser(str(path))).resolve()
-        root_real = _hermes_root_path().resolve()
-    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
-        return None
-
-    target_profile: Optional[str] = None
-    area: Optional[str] = None
-
-    try:
-        rel = target.relative_to(root_real)
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-
-    parts = rel.parts
-    if not parts:
-        return None
-
-    if parts[0] in PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS:
-        # ``<root>/<area>/...`` → default profile.
-        target_profile = "default"
-        area = parts[0]
-    elif (
-        parts[0] == "profiles"
-        and len(parts) >= 3
-        and parts[2] in PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS
-    ):
-        # ``<root>/profiles/<name>/<area>/...`` → named profile.
-        target_profile = parts[1]
-        area = parts[2]
-    else:
-        return None
-
-    active_profile = _resolve_active_profile_name()
-    if target_profile == active_profile:
-        # In-profile write — not a cross-profile event.
-        return None
-
-    return {
-        "active_profile": active_profile,
-        "target_profile": target_profile,
-        "area": area,
-        "target_path": str(target),
-    }
-
-
-def get_cross_profile_warning(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return a model-facing warning string when ``path`` is cross-profile.
-
-    Returns ``None`` when the write is in-scope (same profile) or outside
-    Hermes entirely. Caller is expected to surface the warning to the
-    agent as a tool-result error, NOT to silently allow the write — the
-    agent must either get explicit user direction to proceed, or pass
-    ``cross_profile=True`` to its write tool.
-
-    This is defense-in-depth: the terminal tool runs as the same OS user
-    and can write any of these paths without going through this guard.
-    Treat the guard as a confusion-reducer, not a security boundary.
-    """
-    info = classify_cross_profile_target(path)
-    if info is None:
-        return None
-    return (
-        f"Cross-profile write blocked by soft guard: {info['target_path']} "
-        f"belongs to Hermes profile {info['target_profile']!r}, but the "
-        f"agent is running under profile {info['active_profile']!r}. "
-        f"Editing another profile's {info['area']}/ will affect that "
-        f"profile's future sessions, not the one you are currently in. "
-        f"Confirm with the user before proceeding. To bypass this guard "
-        f"after explicit user direction, retry the call with "
-        f"``cross_profile=True``. (Defense-in-depth — not a security "
-        f"boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
-    )

agent/image_gen_provider.py

@@ -191,88 +191,6 @@ def save_b64_image(
     return path
 
 
-# Extension inference for save_url_image — keep small and explicit.  We don't
-# want to import mimetypes for a handful of formats every image_gen provider
-# actually returns, and we never want to inherit a content-type that points
-# at HTML or JSON when the API gives us a degenerate response.
-_URL_IMAGE_CONTENT_TYPES = {
-    "image/png": "png",
-    "image/jpeg": "jpg",
-    "image/jpg": "jpg",
-    "image/webp": "webp",
-    "image/gif": "gif",
-}
-
-
-def save_url_image(
-    url: str,
-    *,
-    prefix: str = "image",
-    timeout: float = 60.0,
-    max_bytes: int = 25 * 1024 * 1024,
-) -> Path:
-    """Download an image URL and write it under ``$HERMES_HOME/cache/images/``.
-
-    Used by providers (xAI, fallback OpenAI) whose API returns an *ephemeral*
-    URL instead of inline base64 — those URLs frequently expire before a
-    downstream consumer (Telegram ``send_photo``, browser fetch) can resolve
-    them, so we materialise the bytes locally at tool-completion time.
-    Mirrors :func:`save_b64_image`'s shape so providers can swap in one line.
-
-    Returns the absolute :class:`Path` to the saved file.  Raises on any
-    network / HTTP / oversize / non-image-content-type error so callers can
-    fall back to returning the bare URL with a clear error message.
-    """
-    import requests
-
-    response = requests.get(url, timeout=timeout, stream=True)
-    response.raise_for_status()
-
-    # Infer extension from the response content-type, falling back to the
-    # URL suffix when xAI / OpenAI omit a precise type (some CDNs return
-    # ``application/octet-stream``).  Defaults to ``png``.
-    content_type = (response.headers.get("Content-Type") or "").split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower()
-    extension = _URL_IMAGE_CONTENT_TYPES.get(content_type)
-    if extension is None:
-        url_path = url.split("?", 1)[0].lower()
-        for ext in ("png", "jpg", "jpeg", "webp", "gif"):
-            if url_path.endswith(f".{ext}"):
-                extension = "jpg" if ext == "jpeg" else ext
-                break
-    if extension is None:
-        extension = "png"
-
-    ts = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
-    short = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
-    path = _images_cache_dir() / f"{prefix}_{ts}_{short}.{extension}"
-
-    bytes_written = 0
-    with path.open("wb") as fh:
-        for chunk in response.iter_content(chunk_size=64 * 1024):
-            if not chunk:
-                continue
-            bytes_written += len(chunk)
-            if bytes_written > max_bytes:
-                fh.close()
-                try:
-                    path.unlink()
-                except OSError:
-                    pass
-                raise ValueError(
-                    f"Image at {url} exceeds {max_bytes // (1024 * 1024)}MB cap; refusing to cache."
-                )
-            fh.write(chunk)
-
-    if bytes_written == 0:
-        try:
-            path.unlink()
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-        raise ValueError(f"Image at {url} returned 0 bytes; refusing to cache.")
-
-    return path
-
-
 def success_response(
     *,
     image: str,

agent/model_metadata.py

@@ -209,7 +209,6 @@ DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS = {
     # via a custom provider. Values sourced from models.dev (2026-04).
     # Keys use substring matching (longest-first), so e.g. "grok-4.20"
     # matches "grok-4.20-0309-reasoning" / "-non-reasoning" / "-multi-agent-0309".
-    "grok-build": 256000,       # grok-build-0.1
     "grok-code-fast": 256000,   # grok-code-fast-1
     "grok-4-1-fast": 2000000,   # grok-4-1-fast-(non-)reasoning
     "grok-2-vision": 8192,      # grok-2-vision, -1212, -latest
@@ -641,7 +640,7 @@ def fetch_model_metadata(force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any
         return cache
 
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.warning(f"Failed to fetch model metadata from OpenRouter: {e}")
+        logging.warning(f"Failed to fetch model metadata from OpenRouter: {e}")
         return _model_metadata_cache or {}
 
 

agent/models_dev.py

@@ -167,9 +167,6 @@ PROVIDER_TO_MODELS_DEV: Dict[str, str] = {
     "gemini": "google",
     "google": "google",
     "xai": "xai",
-    # xAI OAuth is an authentication/transport path for the same xAI model
-    # catalog, so model metadata should resolve through the xAI provider.
-    "xai-oauth": "xai",
     "xiaomi": "xiaomi",
     "nvidia": "nvidia",
     "groq": "groq",

agent/prompt_builder.py

@@ -1258,6 +1258,10 @@ def build_nous_subscription_prompt(valid_tool_names: "set[str] | None" = None) -
         "terminal",
         "process",
         "execute_code",
+        "app_search_tools",
+        "app_tool_schemas",
+        "app_execute_tools",
+        "app_manage_connections",
     }
 
     if valid_names and not (valid_names & relevant_tool_names):
@@ -1279,7 +1283,7 @@ def build_nous_subscription_prompt(valid_tool_names: "set[str] | None" = None) -
 
     lines = [
         "# Nous Subscription",
-        "Nous subscription includes managed web tools (Firecrawl), image generation (FAL), OpenAI TTS, and browser automation (Browser Use) by default. Modal execution is optional.",
+        "Nous subscription includes managed web tools (Firecrawl), image generation (FAL), OpenAI TTS, browser automation (Browser Use), and app integrations (500+ apps) by default. Modal execution is optional.",
         "Current capability status:",
     ]
     lines.extend(_status_line(feature) for feature in features.items())
@@ -1294,6 +1298,39 @@ def build_nous_subscription_prompt(valid_tool_names: "set[str] | None" = None) -
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
+# =========================================================================
+# App tools (500+ external integrations) behavioural prompt
+# =========================================================================
+
+_APP_TOOLS_PROMPT = """\
+## App Tools (500+ External Integrations)
+
+You have app_search_tools, app_tool_schemas, app_execute_tools, and app_manage_connections available RIGHT NOW as callable tools. They are already configured and connected to the Nous tool gateway — no SDK installation, no API keys, no plugin setup needed. Just call them.
+
+**When to use:** When a user asks to interact with ANY external app or service — Gmail, Slack, GitHub, Jira, Notion, Google Sheets, Linear, HubSpot, Figma, Salesforce, or any of 500+ other apps. ALWAYS prefer these tools over loading skills about the same service (e.g. do NOT load the 'linear', 'airtable', 'google-workspace', 'notion', or any similar skill — use app_search_tools instead). Do NOT suggest installing SDKs, CLI tools, MCP servers, or API keys for external services — call app_search_tools directly.
+
+**Workflow:**
+1. Call app_search_tools with a clear use_case description to discover available tools
+2. Check the response for connection status — if no active connection, call app_manage_connections and share the auth link with the user
+3. Review the execution plan and pitfalls in the search response before executing
+4. If a tool has schemaRef instead of input_schema, call app_tool_schemas to get the full schema
+5. Execute tools via app_execute_tools with schema-compliant arguments
+
+**Session tracking:** Pass session: {generate_id: true} on your first app_search_tools call. Reuse the returned session.id in all subsequent calls. Generate a new session when the user pivots to a different task.
+
+**Important:** Never fabricate tool slugs or argument field names. Only use slugs and schemas returned by app_search_tools or app_tool_schemas."""
+
+
+def build_app_tools_prompt(valid_tool_names: "set[str] | None" = None) -> str:
+    """Return the app tools behavioural guidance when the toolset is active."""
+    if valid_tool_names and "app_search_tools" not in valid_tool_names:
+        return ""
+    if not valid_tool_names:
+        # No tool names known — skip (conservative)
+        return ""
+    return _APP_TOOLS_PROMPT
+
+
 # =========================================================================
 # Context files (SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules)
 # =========================================================================

agent/redact.py

@@ -176,15 +176,6 @@ _URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(
     r"(https?|wss?|ftp)://([^/\s:@]+):([^/\s@]+)@",
 )
 
-# HTTP access logs often use a relative request target rather than a full URL:
-# `"POST /webhook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`. The full-URL redactor above only
-# sees strings containing `://`, so handle request-target query strings too.
-_HTTP_REQUEST_TARGET_QUERY_RE = re.compile(
-    r"\b((?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE|HEAD|OPTIONS|TRACE|CONNECT)\s+[^ \t\r\n\"']*?)"
-    r"\?([^ \t\r\n\"']+)",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
-)
-
 # Form-urlencoded body detection: conservative — only applies when the entire
 # text looks like a query string (k=v&k=v pattern with no newlines).
 _FORM_BODY_RE = re.compile(
@@ -302,15 +293,6 @@ def _redact_url_userinfo(text: str) -> str:
     )
 
 
-def _redact_http_request_target_query_params(text: str) -> str:
-    """Redact sensitive query params in HTTP access-log request targets."""
-    def _sub(m: re.Match) -> str:
-        prefix = m.group(1)
-        query = _redact_query_string(m.group(2))
-        return f"{prefix}?{query}"
-    return _HTTP_REQUEST_TARGET_QUERY_RE.sub(_sub, text)
-
-
 def _redact_form_body(text: str) -> str:
     """Redact sensitive values in a form-urlencoded body.
 
@@ -415,11 +397,6 @@ def redact_sensitive_text(text: str, *, force: bool = False, code_file: bool = F
         if "?" in text:
             text = _redact_url_query_params(text)
 
-    # HTTP access logs can contain relative request targets with query params
-    # and no URL scheme, e.g. `"POST /hook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`.
-    if "?" in text and "=" in text and _has_http_method_substring(text):
-        text = _redact_http_request_target_query_params(text)
-
     # Form-urlencoded bodies (only triggers on clean k=v&k=v inputs).
     if "&" in text and "=" in text:
         text = _redact_form_body(text)
@@ -479,25 +456,6 @@ def _has_known_prefix_substring(text: str) -> bool:
     return any(p in text for p in _PREFIX_SUBSTRINGS)
 
 
-_HTTP_METHOD_SUBSTRINGS = (
-    "GET ",
-    "POST ",
-    "PUT ",
-    "PATCH ",
-    "DELETE ",
-    "HEAD ",
-    "OPTIONS ",
-    "TRACE ",
-    "CONNECT ",
-)
-
-
-def _has_http_method_substring(text: str) -> bool:
-    """Cheap pre-check before scanning for access-log request targets."""
-    upper = text.upper()
-    return any(method in upper for method in _HTTP_METHOD_SUBSTRINGS)
-
-
 class RedactingFormatter(logging.Formatter):
     """Log formatter that redacts secrets from all log messages."""
 

agent/secret_sources/bitwarden.py

@@ -70,105 +70,9 @@ _BWS_RUN_TIMEOUT = 30
 
 # In-process cache so repeated load_hermes_dotenv() calls (CLI startup,
 # gateway hot-reload, test suites) don't re-fetch from BSM.
-_CacheKey = Tuple[str, str, str]  # (access_token_fingerprint, project_id, server_url)
+_CacheKey = Tuple[str, str]  # (access_token_fingerprint, project_id)
 _CACHE: Dict[_CacheKey, "_CachedFetch"] = {}
 
-# Disk-persisted cache so back-to-back CLI invocations (e.g. `hermes chat -q ...`
-# called from scripts, cron, the gateway forking new agents) don't each pay the
-# ~380ms `bws secret list` tax. The in-process _CACHE above only saves repeated
-# fetches WITHIN one process; this saves repeated fetches ACROSS processes.
-#
-# Layout: one JSON object per cache key, written atomically with mode 0600 in
-# <hermes_home>/cache/bws_cache.json. The file holds only the secret VALUES,
-# never the access token. It's plaintext-equivalent to ~/.hermes/.env (which
-# we already accept) but kept out of the .env file so users editing it won't
-# accidentally commit BSM-sourced secrets.
-_DISK_CACHE_BASENAME = "bws_cache.json"
-
-
-def _disk_cache_path(home_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Path:
-    """Return the disk cache path under hermes_home/cache/.
-
-    `home_path` is what `load_hermes_dotenv()` already resolved; falling back
-    to `$HERMES_HOME` / `~/.hermes` keeps direct callers working too.
-    """
-    if home_path is None:
-        home_path = Path(os.getenv("HERMES_HOME", Path.home() / ".hermes"))
-    return home_path / "cache" / _DISK_CACHE_BASENAME
-
-
-def _cache_key_str(cache_key: _CacheKey) -> str:
-    """Serialize a cache key to a stable string for JSON storage."""
-    token_fp, project_id, server_url = cache_key
-    return f"{token_fp}|{project_id}|{server_url}"
-
-
-def _read_disk_cache(cache_key: _CacheKey, ttl_seconds: float,
-                     home_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Optional["_CachedFetch"]:
-    """Return a cached entry from disk if fresh, else None.
-
-    Best-effort: any I/O or parse error returns None and we re-fetch.
-    """
-    if ttl_seconds <= 0:
-        return None
-    path = _disk_cache_path(home_path)
-    try:
-        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-            payload = json.load(f)
-    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        return None
-    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
-        return None
-    if payload.get("key") != _cache_key_str(cache_key):
-        return None
-    secrets = payload.get("secrets")
-    fetched_at = payload.get("fetched_at")
-    if not isinstance(secrets, dict) or not isinstance(fetched_at, (int, float)):
-        return None
-    # Coerce all values to strings — JSON allows numbers but env vars need strings
-    typed_secrets: Dict[str, str] = {
-        k: v for k, v in secrets.items() if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, str)
-    }
-    entry = _CachedFetch(secrets=typed_secrets, fetched_at=float(fetched_at))
-    if not entry.is_fresh(ttl_seconds):
-        return None
-    return entry
-
-
-def _write_disk_cache(cache_key: _CacheKey, entry: "_CachedFetch",
-                      home_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> None:
-    """Persist a cache entry to disk atomically with mode 0600.
-
-    Best-effort: any I/O error is swallowed (the next invocation will just
-    re-fetch). We never want disk cache failures to break startup.
-    """
-    path = _disk_cache_path(home_path)
-    try:
-        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        payload = {
-            "key": _cache_key_str(cache_key),
-            "secrets": entry.secrets,
-            "fetched_at": entry.fetched_at,
-        }
-        # Write to a temp file in the same directory and atomic-rename.
-        # tempfile honors os.umask, so we explicitly chmod 0600 before rename.
-        fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
-            prefix=".bws_cache_", suffix=".tmp", dir=str(path.parent)
-        )
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-                json.dump(payload, f)
-            os.chmod(tmp, 0o600)
-            os.replace(tmp, path)
-        except BaseException:
-            try:
-                os.unlink(tmp)
-            except OSError:
-                pass
-            raise
-    except OSError:
-        pass  # best-effort — disk cache miss on next invocation is fine
-
 
 @dataclass
 class _CachedFetch:
@@ -413,26 +317,11 @@ def fetch_bitwarden_secrets(
     binary: Optional[Path] = None,
     cache_ttl_seconds: float = 300,
     use_cache: bool = True,
-    server_url: str = "",
-    home_path: Optional[Path] = None,
 ) -> Tuple[Dict[str, str], List[str]]:
     """Pull the secrets for ``project_id`` from Bitwarden Secrets Manager.
 
     Returns ``(secrets_dict, warnings_list)``.
 
-    Set ``server_url`` to point at a non-default Bitwarden region or a
-    self-hosted instance — e.g. ``https://vault.bitwarden.eu`` for EU
-    Cloud accounts.  When empty, ``bws`` uses its built-in default
-    (``https://vault.bitwarden.com``, US Cloud).  This is plumbed into
-    the subprocess as ``BWS_SERVER_URL``.
-
-    Caching is a two-layer LRU: an in-process dict (for hot-reload paths
-    inside one process) and a disk-persisted JSON file under
-    ``<hermes_home>/cache/bws_cache.json`` (for back-to-back CLI invocations).
-    Both share the same TTL.  Pass ``home_path`` so disk cache lookups find
-    the right directory in tests / non-standard installs; otherwise we fall
-    back to ``$HERMES_HOME`` / ``~/.hermes``.
-
     Raises :class:`RuntimeError` for fatal conditions (missing binary,
     auth failure, unparseable output).  Callers in the env_loader path
     catch this and emit a single warning; callers in the user-facing
@@ -443,18 +332,11 @@ def fetch_bitwarden_secrets(
     if not project_id:
         raise RuntimeError("Bitwarden project_id is empty")
 
-    cache_key = (_token_fingerprint(access_token), project_id, server_url or "")
+    cache_key = (_token_fingerprint(access_token), project_id)
     if use_cache:
         cached = _CACHE.get(cache_key)
         if cached and cached.is_fresh(cache_ttl_seconds):
             return cached.secrets, []
-        # L2: disk cache. ~5ms on cache hit vs ~380ms for `bws secret list`.
-        disk_cached = _read_disk_cache(cache_key, cache_ttl_seconds, home_path)
-        if disk_cached is not None:
-            # Promote into in-process cache so subsequent fetches in the
-            # same process skip the disk read too.
-            _CACHE[cache_key] = disk_cached
-            return disk_cached.secrets, []
 
     bws = binary or find_bws(install_if_missing=True)
     if bws is None:
@@ -465,29 +347,19 @@ def fetch_bitwarden_secrets(
             "`hermes secrets bitwarden setup`."
         )
 
-    secrets, warnings = _run_bws_list(bws, access_token, project_id, server_url)
-    entry = _CachedFetch(secrets=secrets, fetched_at=time.time())
-    _CACHE[cache_key] = entry
-    if use_cache:
-        _write_disk_cache(cache_key, entry, home_path)
+    secrets, warnings = _run_bws_list(bws, access_token, project_id)
+    _CACHE[cache_key] = _CachedFetch(secrets=secrets, fetched_at=time.time())
     return secrets, warnings
 
 
 def _run_bws_list(
-    bws: Path, access_token: str, project_id: str, server_url: str = ""
+    bws: Path, access_token: str, project_id: str
 ) -> Tuple[Dict[str, str], List[str]]:
     cmd = [str(bws), "secret", "list", project_id, "--output", "json"]
     env = os.environ.copy()
     env["BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN"] = access_token
     # Make sure we're not echoing telemetry / colour codes into json.
     env.setdefault("NO_COLOR", "1")
-    # Region / self-hosted support.  bws defaults to https://vault.bitwarden.com
-    # (US Cloud); EU Cloud users need https://vault.bitwarden.eu, and
-    # self-hosted users need their own URL.  When unset, fall back to whatever
-    # BWS_SERVER_URL the caller already had in their shell env (preserved by
-    # the copy above) so manual overrides keep working too.
-    if server_url:
-        env["BWS_SERVER_URL"] = server_url
 
     try:
         proc = subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603 — bws path is trusted
@@ -565,8 +437,6 @@ def apply_bitwarden_secrets(
     override_existing: bool = False,
     cache_ttl_seconds: float = 300,
     auto_install: bool = True,
-    server_url: str = "",
-    home_path: Optional[Path] = None,
 ) -> FetchResult:
     """Pull secrets from BSM and set them on ``os.environ``.
 
@@ -574,10 +444,6 @@ def apply_bitwarden_secrets(
     files have loaded.  It is intentionally defensive — any failure
     returns a :class:`FetchResult` with ``error`` set; it never raises.
 
-    ``server_url`` selects the Bitwarden region or self-hosted endpoint
-    (e.g. ``https://vault.bitwarden.eu`` for EU Cloud).  Empty string
-    means use ``bws``'s default (US Cloud).
-
     Parameters mirror the ``secrets.bitwarden.*`` config keys so the
     caller can just splat the dict in.
     """
@@ -616,8 +482,6 @@ def apply_bitwarden_secrets(
             project_id=project_id,
             binary=binary,
             cache_ttl_seconds=cache_ttl_seconds,
-            server_url=server_url,
-            home_path=home_path,
         )
     except RuntimeError as exc:
         result.error = str(exc)
@@ -647,15 +511,5 @@ def apply_bitwarden_secrets(
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
-def _reset_cache_for_tests(home_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> None:
-    """Clear in-process AND disk caches.
-
-    Tests can pass ``home_path`` to scope the disk cleanup to a tmpdir.
-    Without it we fall back to the same default resolution as the cache
-    writer itself.
-    """
+def _reset_cache_for_tests() -> None:
     _CACHE.clear()
-    try:
-        _disk_cache_path(home_path).unlink()
-    except (FileNotFoundError, OSError):
-        pass

agent/system_prompt.py

@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ def build_system_prompt_parts(agent: Any, system_message: Optional[str] = None)
     nous_subscription_prompt = _r.build_nous_subscription_prompt(agent.valid_tool_names)
     if nous_subscription_prompt:
         stable_parts.append(nous_subscription_prompt)
+
+    # App tools (500+ external integrations) behavioural guidance
+    app_tools_prompt = _r.build_app_tools_prompt(agent.valid_tool_names)
+    if app_tools_prompt:
+        stable_parts.append(app_tools_prompt)
+
     # Tool-use enforcement: tells the model to actually call tools instead
     # of describing intended actions.  Controlled by config.yaml
     # agent.tool_use_enforcement:
@@ -205,40 +211,6 @@ def build_system_prompt_parts(agent: Any, system_message: Optional[str] = None)
     if _env_hints:
         stable_parts.append(_env_hints)
 
-    # Active-profile hint — names the Hermes profile the agent is running
-    # under so it doesn't conflate ~/.hermes/skills/ (default profile) with
-    # ~/.hermes/profiles/<active>/skills/ (this profile's). Deterministic
-    # for the lifetime of the agent — profile name doesn't change
-    # mid-session, so this doesn't break the prompt cache.
-    # See file_safety._resolve_active_profile_name + classify_cross_profile_target
-    # for the matching tool-side guard.
-    try:
-        from agent.file_safety import _resolve_active_profile_name
-        active_profile = _resolve_active_profile_name()
-    except Exception:
-        active_profile = "default"
-    if active_profile == "default":
-        stable_parts.append(
-            "Active Hermes profile: default. Other profiles (if any) live "
-            "under ~/.hermes/profiles/<name>/. Each profile has its own "
-            "skills/, plugins/, cron/, and memories/ that affect a different "
-            "session than this one. Do not modify another profile's "
-            "skills/plugins/cron/memories unless the user explicitly directs "
-            "you to."
-        )
-    else:
-        stable_parts.append(
-            f"Active Hermes profile: {active_profile}. This session reads "
-            f"and writes ~/.hermes/profiles/{active_profile}/. The default "
-            f"profile's data lives at ~/.hermes/skills/, ~/.hermes/plugins/, "
-            f"~/.hermes/cron/, ~/.hermes/memories/ — those belong to a "
-            f"different session run from a different shell. Do NOT modify "
-            f"another profile's skills/plugins/cron/memories unless the user "
-            f"explicitly directs you to. The cross-profile write guard will "
-            f"refuse such writes by default; pass cross_profile=True only "
-            f"after explicit direction."
-        )
-
     platform_key = (agent.platform or "").lower().strip()
     if platform_key in PLATFORM_HINTS:
         stable_parts.append(PLATFORM_HINTS[platform_key])

agent/tool_executor.py

@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ def execute_tool_calls_concurrent(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
                     agent.tool_progress_callback(
                         "tool.completed", function_name, None, None,
                         duration=tool_duration, is_error=is_error,
-                        result=function_result,
                     )
                 except Exception as cb_err:
                     logging.debug(f"Tool progress callback error: {cb_err}")
@@ -492,7 +491,7 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
         try:
             function_args = json.loads(tool_call.function.arguments)
         except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
-            logger.warning(f"Unexpected JSON error after validation: {e}")
+            logging.warning(f"Unexpected JSON error after validation: {e}")
             function_args = {}
         if not isinstance(function_args, dict):
             function_args = {}
@@ -823,7 +822,6 @@ def execute_tool_calls_sequential(agent, assistant_message, messages: list, effe
                 agent.tool_progress_callback(
                     "tool.completed", function_name, None, None,
                     duration=tool_duration, is_error=_is_error_result,
-                    result=function_result,
                 )
             except Exception as cb_err:
                 logging.debug(f"Tool progress callback error: {cb_err}")

agent/transcription_provider.py

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Transcription Provider ABC
-==========================
-
-Defines the pluggable-backend interface for speech-to-text. Providers
-register instances via
-:meth:`PluginContext.register_transcription_provider`; the active one
-(selected via ``stt.provider`` in ``config.yaml``) services every
-:func:`tools.transcription_tools.transcribe_audio` call **when the
-configured name is neither a built-in (``local``, ``local_command``,
-``groq``, ``openai``, ``mistral``, ``xai``) nor disabled**.
-
-Two coexisting STT extension surfaces — in resolution order:
-
-1. **Built-in providers** (``BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS`` in
-   :mod:`tools.transcription_tools`) — native Python implementations
-   for the 6 backends shipped today (faster-whisper, local_command,
-   Groq, OpenAI, Mistral, xAI). **Always win** — plugins cannot
-   shadow them. The single-env-var shell escape hatch
-   ``HERMES_LOCAL_STT_COMMAND`` is preserved via the built-in
-   ``local_command`` path.
-2. **Plugin-registered providers** (this ABC). For new STT backends —
-   OpenRouter, SenseAudio, Gemini-STT, custom proprietary engines —
-   that need a Python implementation without modifying
-   ``tools/transcription_tools.py``.
-
-Built-ins-always-win is enforced at registration time
-(:func:`agent.transcription_registry.register_provider` rejects names
-in ``BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS`` with a warning) AND at dispatch time
-(:func:`tools.transcription_tools._dispatch_to_plugin_provider`
-re-checks defensively).
-
-Providers live in ``<repo>/plugins/transcription/<name>/`` (built-in
-plugins, none shipped today) or
-``~/.hermes/plugins/transcription/<name>/`` (user-installed).
-
-Response contract
------------------
-:meth:`TranscriptionProvider.transcribe` returns a dict with keys::
-
-    success      bool
-    transcript   str       transcribed text (empty when success=False)
-    provider     str       provider name (for diagnostics)
-    error        str       only when success=False
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import abc
-import logging
-from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# ABC
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-class TranscriptionProvider(abc.ABC):
-    """Abstract base class for a speech-to-text backend.
-
-    Subclasses must implement :attr:`name` and :meth:`transcribe`.
-    Everything else has sane defaults — override only what your provider
-    needs.
-    """
-
-    @property
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def name(self) -> str:
-        """Stable short identifier used in ``stt.provider`` config.
-
-        Lowercase, no spaces. Examples: ``openrouter``, ``sensaudio``,
-        ``gemini``, ``deepgram``. Names that collide with a built-in STT
-        provider (``local``, ``local_command``, ``groq``, ``openai``,
-        ``mistral``, ``xai``) are rejected at registration time.
-        """
-
-    @property
-    def display_name(self) -> str:
-        """Human-readable label shown in ``hermes tools``.
-
-        Defaults to ``name.title()``.
-        """
-        return self.name.title()
-
-    def is_available(self) -> bool:
-        """Return True when this provider can service calls.
-
-        Typically checks for a required API key + that the SDK is
-        importable. Default: True (providers with no external
-        dependencies are always available).
-
-        Must NOT raise — used by the picker and ``hermes setup`` for
-        availability displays and should fail gracefully.
-        """
-        return True
-
-    def list_models(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Return model catalog entries.
-
-        Each entry::
-
-            {
-                "id": "whisper-large-v3-turbo",  # required
-                "display": "Whisper Large v3 Turbo",   # optional
-                "languages": ["en", "es", "fr"],        # optional
-                "max_audio_seconds": 1500,              # optional
-            }
-
-        Default: empty list (provider has a single fixed model or
-        doesn't expose model selection).
-        """
-        return []
-
-    def default_model(self) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Return the default model id, or None if not applicable."""
-        models = self.list_models()
-        if models:
-            return models[0].get("id")
-        return None
-
-    def get_setup_schema(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Return provider metadata for the ``hermes tools`` picker.
-
-        Used by ``tools_config.py`` to inject this provider as a row in
-        the Speech-to-Text provider list. Shape::
-
-            {
-                "name": "OpenRouter STT",              # picker label
-                "badge": "paid",                       # optional short tag
-                "tag": "Whisper via OpenRouter API",   # optional subtitle
-                "env_vars": [                          # keys to prompt for
-                    {"key": "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
-                     "prompt": "OpenRouter API key",
-                     "url": "https://openrouter.ai/keys"},
-                ],
-            }
-
-        Default: minimal entry derived from ``display_name`` with no
-        env vars. Override to expose API key prompts and custom badges.
-        """
-        return {
-            "name": self.display_name,
-            "badge": "",
-            "tag": "",
-            "env_vars": [],
-        }
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def transcribe(
-        self,
-        file_path: str,
-        *,
-        model: Optional[str] = None,
-        language: Optional[str] = None,
-        **extra: Any,
-    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Transcribe the audio file at ``file_path``.
-
-        Returns a dict with the standard envelope::
-
-            {
-                "success": True,
-                "transcript": "the transcribed text",
-                "provider": "<this provider's name>",
-            }
-
-        or on failure::
-
-            {
-                "success": False,
-                "transcript": "",
-                "error": "human-readable error message",
-                "provider": "<this provider's name>",
-            }
-
-        Implementations should NOT raise — convert exceptions to the
-        error envelope so the dispatcher can deliver a consistent shape
-        to the gateway/CLI caller.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: Absolute path to the audio file. The dispatcher
-                has already validated existence + size before calling.
-            model: Model identifier from :meth:`list_models`, or None
-                to use :meth:`default_model`.
-            language: Optional BCP-47 language hint (e.g. ``"en"``,
-                ``"ja"``) — providers without language hints should
-                ignore this argument.
-            **extra: Forward-compat parameters future schema versions
-                may expose. Implementations should ignore unknown keys.
-        """

agent/transcription_registry.py

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Transcription Provider Registry
-================================
-
-Central map of registered STT providers. Populated by plugins at
-import-time via :meth:`PluginContext.register_transcription_provider`;
-consumed by :mod:`tools.transcription_tools` to dispatch
-:func:`transcribe_audio` calls to the active plugin backend **when**
-the configured ``stt.provider`` name is not a built-in.
-
-Built-ins-always-win
---------------------
-Plugin names that collide with a built-in STT provider (``local``,
-``local_command``, ``groq``, ``openai``, ``mistral``, ``xai``) are
-rejected at registration with a warning. This invariant is also
-re-checked at dispatch time in
-:func:`tools.transcription_tools._dispatch_to_plugin_provider`.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import logging
-import threading
-from typing import Dict, List, Optional
-
-from agent.transcription_provider import TranscriptionProvider
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-# Names reserved for native built-in STT handlers. Plugins cannot
-# register a name in this set — the registration call is rejected with
-# a warning. **Kept in sync with ``BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS`` in
-# :mod:`tools.transcription_tools`** — a regression test in
-# ``tests/agent/test_transcription_registry.py::TestBuiltinSync``
-# fails if the two lists drift. Importing from
-# ``tools.transcription_tools`` directly would create a circular
-# dependency (``tools.transcription_tools`` imports
-# ``agent.transcription_registry`` for dispatch).
-_BUILTIN_NAMES = frozenset({
-    "local",
-    "local_command",
-    "groq",
-    "openai",
-    "mistral",
-    "xai",
-})
-
-
-_providers: Dict[str, TranscriptionProvider] = {}
-_lock = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def register_provider(provider: TranscriptionProvider) -> None:
-    """Register a transcription provider.
-
-    Rejects:
-
-    - Non-:class:`TranscriptionProvider` instances (raises :class:`TypeError`).
-    - Empty/whitespace ``.name`` (raises :class:`ValueError`).
-    - Names colliding with a built-in (logs a warning, silently
-      ignores — built-ins-always-win invariant).
-
-    Re-registration (same ``name``) overwrites the previous entry and
-    logs a debug message — makes hot-reload scenarios (tests, dev
-    loops) behave predictably.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(provider, TranscriptionProvider):
-        raise TypeError(
-            f"register_provider() expects a TranscriptionProvider instance, "
-            f"got {type(provider).__name__}"
-        )
-    name = provider.name
-    if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
-        raise ValueError("Transcription provider .name must be a non-empty string")
-    key = name.strip().lower()
-    if key in _BUILTIN_NAMES:
-        logger.warning(
-            "Transcription provider '%s' shadows a built-in name; registration "
-            "ignored. Built-in STT providers (%s) always win — pick a different "
-            "name.",
-            key, ", ".join(sorted(_BUILTIN_NAMES)),
-        )
-        return
-    with _lock:
-        existing = _providers.get(key)
-        _providers[key] = provider
-    if existing is not None:
-        logger.debug(
-            "Transcription provider '%s' re-registered (was %r)",
-            key, type(existing).__name__,
-        )
-    else:
-        logger.debug(
-            "Registered transcription provider '%s' (%s)",
-            key, type(provider).__name__,
-        )
-
-
-def list_providers() -> List[TranscriptionProvider]:
-    """Return all registered providers, sorted by name."""
-    with _lock:
-        items = list(_providers.values())
-    return sorted(items, key=lambda p: p.name)
-
-
-def get_provider(name: str) -> Optional[TranscriptionProvider]:
-    """Return the provider registered under *name*, or None.
-
-    Name matching is case-insensitive and whitespace-tolerant — mirrors
-    how ``tools.transcription_tools._get_provider`` normalizes the
-    configured ``stt.provider`` value.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(name, str):
-        return None
-    return _providers.get(name.strip().lower())
-
-
-def _reset_for_tests() -> None:
-    """Clear the registry. **Test-only.**"""
-    with _lock:
-        _providers.clear()

agent/transports/anthropic.py

@@ -106,17 +106,7 @@ class AnthropicTransport(ProviderTransport):
             elif block.type == "tool_use":
                 name = block.name
                 if strip_tool_prefix and name.startswith(_MCP_PREFIX):
-                    stripped = name[len(_MCP_PREFIX):]
-                    # Only strip the mcp_ prefix for OAuth-injected tools
-                    # (where Hermes adds the prefix when sending to Anthropic
-                    # and must remove it on the way back).  Native MCP server
-                    # tools (from mcp_servers: in config.yaml) are registered
-                    # in the tool registry under their FULL mcp_<server>_<tool>
-                    # name and must NOT be stripped.  GH-25255.
-                    from tools.registry import registry as _tool_registry
-                    if (_tool_registry.get_entry(stripped)
-                            and not _tool_registry.get_entry(name)):
-                        name = stripped
+                    name = name[len(_MCP_PREFIX):]
                 tool_calls.append(
                     ToolCall(
                         id=block.id,

agent/transports/chat_completions.py

@@ -113,8 +113,9 @@ class ChatCompletionsTransport(ProviderTransport):
         self, messages: list[dict[str, Any]], **kwargs
     ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
         """Messages are already in OpenAI format — strip internal fields
-        that strict chat-completions providers reject with HTTP 400/422
-        (or, in the case of some OpenAI-compatible gateways, 5xx):
+        that strict chat-completions providers reject with HTTP 400/422.
+
+        Strips:
 
         - Codex Responses API fields: ``codex_reasoning_items`` /
           ``codex_message_items`` on the message, ``call_id`` /
@@ -126,16 +127,6 @@ class ChatCompletionsTransport(ProviderTransport):
           ``Extra inputs are not permitted, field: 'messages[N].tool_name'``.
           Permissive providers (OpenRouter, MiniMax) silently ignore the
           field, which masked the bug for months.
-        - Hermes-internal scaffolding markers — any top-level message key
-          starting with ``_`` (e.g. ``_empty_recovery_synthetic``,
-          ``_empty_terminal_sentinel``, ``_thinking_prefill``). These are
-          bookkeeping flags the agent loop attaches to messages so the
-          persistence layer can later strip its own scaffolding; they must
-          never reach the wire. Permissive providers (real OpenAI,
-          Anthropic) silently drop unknown message keys, but strict
-          gateways (e.g. opencode-go, codex.nekos.me) reject with
-          ``Extra inputs are not permitted, field: 'messages[N]._empty_recovery_synthetic'``,
-          which then poisons every subsequent request in the session.
         """
         needs_sanitize = False
         for msg in messages:
@@ -148,9 +139,6 @@ class ChatCompletionsTransport(ProviderTransport):
             ):
                 needs_sanitize = True
                 break
-            if any(isinstance(k, str) and k.startswith("_") for k in msg):
-                needs_sanitize = True
-                break
             tool_calls = msg.get("tool_calls")
             if isinstance(tool_calls, list):
                 for tc in tool_calls:
@@ -172,11 +160,6 @@ class ChatCompletionsTransport(ProviderTransport):
             msg.pop("codex_reasoning_items", None)
             msg.pop("codex_message_items", None)
             msg.pop("tool_name", None)
-            # Drop all Hermes-internal scaffolding markers (``_``-prefixed).
-            # OpenAI's message schema has no ``_``-prefixed fields, so this
-            # is safe and future-proofs against new markers being added.
-            for key in [k for k in msg if isinstance(k, str) and k.startswith("_")]:
-                msg.pop(key, None)
             tool_calls = msg.get("tool_calls")
             if isinstance(tool_calls, list):
                 for tc in tool_calls:

agent/transports/codex.py

@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ class ResponsesApiTransport(ProviderTransport):
             reasoning_config: dict | None — {effort, enabled}
             session_id: str | None — used for prompt_cache_key + xAI conv header
             max_tokens: int | None — max_output_tokens
-            timeout: float | None — per-request timeout forwarded to the SDK
             request_overrides: dict | None — extra kwargs merged in
             provider: str | None — provider name for backend-specific logic
             base_url: str | None — endpoint URL
@@ -144,20 +143,6 @@ class ResponsesApiTransport(ProviderTransport):
         if request_overrides:
             kwargs.update(request_overrides)
 
-        # Forward per-request timeout to the SDK so OpenAI/Anthropic clients
-        # honor it.  Without this, ``providers.<id>.request_timeout_seconds``
-        # is silently dropped on the main agent Codex path while the
-        # chat_completions path and auxiliary Codex adapter both forward it.
-        timeout = kwargs.get("timeout", params.get("timeout"))
-        if (
-            isinstance(timeout, (int, float))
-            and not isinstance(timeout, bool)
-            and 0 < float(timeout) < float("inf")
-        ):
-            kwargs["timeout"] = float(timeout)
-        else:
-            kwargs.pop("timeout", None)
-
         if is_codex_backend:
             prompt_cache_key = kwargs.get("prompt_cache_key")
             cache_scope_id = str(prompt_cache_key or session_id or "").strip()

agent/transports/codex_app_server_session.py

@@ -87,39 +87,6 @@ class TurnResult:
 _TURN_ABORTED_MARKERS = ("<turn_aborted>", "<turn_aborted/>")
 
 
-def _coerce_turn_input_text(user_input: Any) -> str:
-    """Collapse Hermes/OpenAI rich content into app-server text input.
-
-    The current `turn/start` path sends text items only. TUI image attachment
-    can hand us OpenAI-style content parts, so keep the text/path hints and
-    replace opaque image payloads with a small marker instead of putting a
-    Python list into the `text` field.
-    """
-    if isinstance(user_input, str):
-        return user_input
-    if isinstance(user_input, list):
-        parts: list[str] = []
-        for item in user_input:
-            if isinstance(item, str):
-                if item.strip():
-                    parts.append(item)
-                continue
-            if not isinstance(item, dict):
-                if item is not None:
-                    parts.append(str(item))
-                continue
-            item_type = item.get("type")
-            if item_type in {"text", "input_text"}:
-                text = item.get("text") or item.get("content") or ""
-                if text:
-                    parts.append(str(text))
-            elif item_type in {"image", "image_url", "input_image"}:
-                parts.append("[image attached]")
-        text = "\n\n".join(p for p in parts if p).strip()
-        return text or "What do you see in this image?"
-    return "" if user_input is None else str(user_input)
-
-
 # Substrings in codex stderr / JSON-RPC error messages that signal the
 # subprocess died because its OAuth credentials are no longer valid.
 # Kept conservative: we only redirect users to `codex login` when we're
@@ -360,7 +327,7 @@ class CodexAppServerSession:
 
     def run_turn(
         self,
-        user_input: Any,
+        user_input: str,
         *,
         turn_timeout: float = 600.0,
         notification_poll_timeout: float = 0.25,
@@ -398,8 +365,6 @@ class CodexAppServerSession:
         self._interrupt_event.clear()
         projector = CodexEventProjector()
 
-        user_input_text = _coerce_turn_input_text(user_input)
-
         # Send turn/start with the user input. Text-only for now (codex
         # supports rich content but Hermes' text path is the common case).
         try:
@@ -407,7 +372,7 @@ class CodexAppServerSession:
                 "turn/start",
                 {
                     "threadId": self._thread_id,
-                    "input": [{"type": "text", "text": user_input_text}],
+                    "input": [{"type": "text", "text": user_input}],
                 },
                 timeout=10,
             )

agent/tts_provider.py

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Text-to-Speech Provider ABC
-============================
-
-Defines the pluggable-backend interface for text-to-speech synthesis.
-Providers register instances via
-``PluginContext.register_tts_provider()``; the active one (selected via
-``tts.provider`` in ``config.yaml``) services every ``text_to_speech``
-tool call **only when the configured name is neither a built-in nor a
-command-type provider declared under ``tts.providers.<name>``**.
-
-Three coexisting TTS extension surfaces — in resolution order:
-
-1. **Built-in providers** (``BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS`` in
-   :mod:`tools.tts_tool`) — native Python implementations (edge, openai,
-   elevenlabs, …). **Always win** — plugins cannot shadow them.
-2. **Command-type providers** declared under ``tts.providers.<name>:
-   type: command`` (PR #17843, commit ``2facea7f7``). Wire any local
-   CLI into Hermes with shell-template placeholders. **Wins over a
-   same-name plugin** — config is more local than plugin install.
-3. **Plugin-registered providers** (this ABC). For backends that need a
-   Python SDK, streaming bytes, OAuth refresh, or voice-listing APIs
-   the shell-template grammar can't reasonably express.
-
-Built-ins-always-win is enforced at registration time
-(:func:`agent.tts_registry.register_provider` rejects names in
-``BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS`` with a warning) AND at dispatch time
-(:func:`tools.tts_tool._dispatch_to_plugin_provider` re-checks
-defensively). The dispatcher also rejects plugin dispatch when a same-
-name command provider is configured.
-
-Providers live in ``<repo>/plugins/tts/<name>/`` (built-in plugins, no
-shipped today) or ``~/.hermes/plugins/tts/<name>/`` (user-installed).
-None ship in-tree as of issue #30398 — the hook is additive
-infrastructure waiting for a real consumer (Cartesia, Fish Audio, …).
-
-Response contract
------------------
-:meth:`TTSProvider.synthesize` writes the audio bytes to ``output_path``
-and returns the path as a string. Implementations should raise on
-failure — the dispatcher converts exceptions into the standard
-``{success: False, error: …}`` JSON envelope the rest of Hermes
-expects.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import abc
-import logging
-from typing import Any, Dict, Iterator, List, Optional
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FORMAT = "mp3"
-VALID_OUTPUT_FORMATS = frozenset({"mp3", "wav", "ogg", "opus", "flac"})
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# ABC
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-class TTSProvider(abc.ABC):
-    """Abstract base class for a text-to-speech backend.
-
-    Subclasses must implement :attr:`name` and :meth:`synthesize`.
-    Everything else has sane defaults — override only what your provider
-    needs.
-    """
-
-    @property
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def name(self) -> str:
-        """Stable short identifier used in ``tts.provider`` config.
-
-        Lowercase, no spaces. Examples: ``cartesia``, ``fishaudio``,
-        ``deepgram``. Names that collide with a built-in TTS provider
-        (``edge``, ``openai``, ``elevenlabs``, ``minimax``, ``gemini``,
-        ``mistral``, ``xai``, ``piper``, ``kittentts``, ``neutts``) are
-        rejected at registration time.
-        """
-
-    @property
-    def display_name(self) -> str:
-        """Human-readable label shown in ``hermes tools``.
-
-        Defaults to ``name.title()`` (e.g. ``Cartesia`` for ``cartesia``).
-        """
-        return self.name.title()
-
-    def is_available(self) -> bool:
-        """Return True when this provider can service calls.
-
-        Typically checks for a required API key + that the SDK is
-        importable. Default: True (providers with no external
-        dependencies are always available).
-
-        Must NOT raise — used by the picker and ``hermes setup`` for
-        availability displays and should fail gracefully.
-        """
-        return True
-
-    def list_voices(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Return voice catalog entries.
-
-        Each entry::
-
-            {
-                "id": "voice-abc-123",                # required
-                "display": "Aria — neutral female",    # optional; defaults to id
-                "language": "en-US",                   # optional
-                "gender": "female",                    # optional
-                "preview_url": "https://...mp3",       # optional
-            }
-
-        Default: empty list (provider has no enumerable voices or
-        doesn't surface them via API).
-        """
-        return []
-
-    def list_models(self) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
-        """Return model catalog entries.
-
-        Each entry::
-
-            {
-                "id": "sonic-2",                       # required
-                "display": "Sonic 2",                  # optional
-                "languages": ["en", "es", "fr"],       # optional
-                "max_text_length": 5000,               # optional
-            }
-
-        Default: empty list (provider has a single fixed model or
-        doesn't expose model selection).
-        """
-        return []
-
-    def get_setup_schema(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        """Return provider metadata for the ``hermes tools`` picker.
-
-        Used by ``tools_config.py`` to inject this provider as a row in
-        the Text-to-Speech provider list. Shape::
-
-            {
-                "name": "Cartesia",                    # picker label
-                "badge": "paid",                       # optional short tag
-                "tag": "Ultra-low-latency streaming",  # optional subtitle
-                "env_vars": [                          # keys to prompt for
-                    {"key": "CARTESIA_API_KEY",
-                     "prompt": "Cartesia API key",
-                     "url": "https://play.cartesia.ai/console"},
-                ],
-            }
-
-        Default: minimal entry derived from ``display_name`` with no
-        env vars. Override to expose API key prompts and custom badges.
-        """
-        return {
-            "name": self.display_name,
-            "badge": "",
-            "tag": "",
-            "env_vars": [],
-        }
-
-    def default_model(self) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Return the default model id, or None if not applicable."""
-        models = self.list_models()
-        if models:
-            return models[0].get("id")
-        return None
-
-    def default_voice(self) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Return the default voice id, or None if not applicable."""
-        voices = self.list_voices()
-        if voices:
-            return voices[0].get("id")
-        return None
-
-    @abc.abstractmethod
-    def synthesize(
-        self,
-        text: str,
-        output_path: str,
-        *,
-        voice: Optional[str] = None,
-        model: Optional[str] = None,
-        speed: Optional[float] = None,
-        format: str = DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FORMAT,
-        **extra: Any,
-    ) -> str:
-        """Synthesize ``text`` and write audio bytes to ``output_path``.
-
-        Returns the absolute path to the written file as a string
-        (typically just echoes ``output_path``). Raises on failure —
-        the dispatcher converts exceptions to the standard
-        ``{success: False, error: ...}`` JSON envelope.
-
-        Args:
-            text: The text to synthesize. Already truncated to the
-                provider's max length by the dispatcher.
-            output_path: Absolute path where the audio file should be
-                written. Parent directory is guaranteed to exist.
-            voice: Voice identifier from :meth:`list_voices`, or None
-                to use :meth:`default_voice`.
-            model: Model identifier from :meth:`list_models`, or None
-                to use :meth:`default_model`.
-            speed: Optional speech-rate multiplier (1.0 = normal).
-                Providers that don't support speed control should
-                ignore this argument.
-            format: Output audio format. Implementations should match
-                the requested format when possible; if unsupported,
-                pick the closest equivalent and ensure ``output_path``
-                ends with the correct extension.
-            **extra: Forward-compat parameters future schema versions
-                may expose. Implementations should ignore unknown keys.
-        """
-
-    def stream(
-        self,
-        text: str,
-        *,
-        voice: Optional[str] = None,
-        model: Optional[str] = None,
-        format: str = "opus",
-        **extra: Any,
-    ) -> Iterator[bytes]:
-        """Stream synthesized audio bytes.
-
-        Optional. Providers that don't support streaming raise
-        :class:`NotImplementedError` (the default) and the dispatcher
-        falls back to :meth:`synthesize` + read-whole-file.
-
-        Args mirror :meth:`synthesize`. Default ``format`` is ``opus``
-        because the primary streaming use case is voice-bubble
-        delivery (Telegram et al.) which requires Opus.
-        """
-        raise NotImplementedError(
-            f"TTS provider {self.name!r} does not implement streaming "
-            "synthesis. Use synthesize() instead, or implement stream() "
-            "if your backend supports it."
-        )
-
-    @property
-    def voice_compatible(self) -> bool:
-        """Whether output is suitable for voice-bubble delivery.
-
-        Mirrors the ``tts.providers.<name>.voice_compatible`` field
-        from PR #17843. When True, the gateway's voice-message
-        delivery pipeline runs ffmpeg conversion to Opus if needed.
-        When False, output is delivered as a regular audio attachment.
-
-        Default: False (safe — providers opt in explicitly).
-        """
-        return False
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Helpers
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def resolve_output_format(value: Optional[str]) -> str:
-    """Clamp an output_format value to the valid set.
-
-    Invalid values are coerced to :data:`DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FORMAT` rather
-    than rejected so the tool surface is forgiving of agent mistakes.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        return DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FORMAT
-    v = value.strip().lower()
-    if v in VALID_OUTPUT_FORMATS:
-        return v
-    return DEFAULT_OUTPUT_FORMAT

agent/tts_registry.py

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-"""
-TTS Provider Registry
-=====================
-
-Central map of registered TTS providers. Populated by plugins at
-import-time via :meth:`PluginContext.register_tts_provider`; consumed
-by :mod:`tools.tts_tool` to dispatch ``text_to_speech`` tool calls to
-the active plugin backend **when** the configured ``tts.provider``
-name is neither a built-in nor a command-type provider.
-
-Built-ins-always-win
---------------------
-Plugin names that collide with a built-in TTS provider (``edge``,
-``openai``, ``elevenlabs``, ``minimax``, ``gemini``, ``mistral``,
-``xai``, ``piper``, ``kittentts``, ``neutts``) are rejected at
-registration with a warning. This invariant is also re-checked at
-dispatch time in :func:`tools.tts_tool._dispatch_to_plugin_provider`.
-
-Command-providers-win-over-plugins
-----------------------------------
-This registry doesn't enforce the command-vs-plugin precedence — that
-lives in the dispatcher, which checks for a same-name
-``tts.providers.<name>: type: command`` entry before consulting the
-registry. The rationale is locality: a name declared in the user's
-``config.yaml`` is more specific to their setup than a plugin that
-happens to be installed.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import logging
-import threading
-from typing import Dict, List, Optional
-
-from agent.tts_provider import TTSProvider
-
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-
-# Names reserved for native built-in TTS handlers. Plugins cannot
-# register a name in this set — the registration call is rejected with
-# a warning. **Kept in sync with ``BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS`` in
-# :mod:`tools.tts_tool`** — a regression test in
-# ``tests/agent/test_tts_registry.py::TestBuiltinSync`` fails if the
-# two lists drift. Importing from ``tools.tts_tool`` directly would
-# create a circular dependency (``tools.tts_tool`` imports
-# ``agent.tts_registry`` for dispatch).
-_BUILTIN_NAMES = frozenset({
-    "edge",
-    "elevenlabs",
-    "openai",
-    "minimax",
-    "xai",
-    "mistral",
-    "gemini",
-    "neutts",
-    "kittentts",
-    "piper",
-})
-
-
-_providers: Dict[str, TTSProvider] = {}
-_lock = threading.Lock()
-
-
-def register_provider(provider: TTSProvider) -> None:
-    """Register a TTS provider.
-
-    Rejects:
-
-    - Non-:class:`TTSProvider` instances (raises :class:`TypeError`).
-    - Empty/whitespace ``.name`` (raises :class:`ValueError`).
-    - Names colliding with a built-in (logs a warning, silently
-      ignores — built-ins-always-win invariant).
-
-    Re-registration (same ``name``) overwrites the previous entry and
-    logs a debug message — makes hot-reload scenarios (tests, dev
-    loops) behave predictably.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(provider, TTSProvider):
-        raise TypeError(
-            f"register_provider() expects a TTSProvider instance, "
-            f"got {type(provider).__name__}"
-        )
-    name = provider.name
-    if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
-        raise ValueError("TTS provider .name must be a non-empty string")
-    key = name.strip().lower()
-    if key in _BUILTIN_NAMES:
-        logger.warning(
-            "TTS provider '%s' shadows a built-in name; registration ignored. "
-            "Built-in TTS providers (%s) always win — pick a different name.",
-            key, ", ".join(sorted(_BUILTIN_NAMES)),
-        )
-        return
-    with _lock:
-        existing = _providers.get(key)
-        _providers[key] = provider
-    if existing is not None:
-        logger.debug(
-            "TTS provider '%s' re-registered (was %r)",
-            key, type(existing).__name__,
-        )
-    else:
-        logger.debug(
-            "Registered TTS provider '%s' (%s)",
-            key, type(provider).__name__,
-        )
-
-
-def list_providers() -> List[TTSProvider]:
-    """Return all registered providers, sorted by name."""
-    with _lock:
-        items = list(_providers.values())
-    return sorted(items, key=lambda p: p.name)
-
-
-def get_provider(name: str) -> Optional[TTSProvider]:
-    """Return the provider registered under *name*, or None.
-
-    Name matching is case-insensitive and whitespace-tolerant — mirrors
-    how ``tools.tts_tool._get_provider`` normalizes the configured
-    ``tts.provider`` value.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(name, str):
-        return None
-    return _providers.get(name.strip().lower())
-
-
-def _reset_for_tests() -> None:
-    """Clear the registry. **Test-only.**"""
-    with _lock:
-        _providers.clear()

cli-config.yaml.example

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ model:
   #   LM Studio is first-class and uses provider: "lmstudio".
   #   It works with both no-auth and auth-enabled server modes.
   #
-  # Can also be overridden for a single invocation with the --provider flag.
+  # Can also be overridden with --provider flag or HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER env var.
   provider: "auto"
   
   # API configuration (falls back to OPENROUTER_API_KEY env var)

cron/jobs.py

@@ -45,28 +45,6 @@ _jobs_file_lock = threading.Lock()
 OUTPUT_DIR = CRON_DIR / "output"
 ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS = 120
 
-# Fields on a cron job that must never change after creation. ``id`` is used
-# as a filesystem path component under ``OUTPUT_DIR``; allowing it to be
-# updated lets an unsafe value (``../escape``, absolute path, nested) leak
-# into output writes/deletes.
-_IMMUTABLE_JOB_FIELDS = frozenset({"id"})
-
-
-def _job_output_dir(job_id: str) -> Path:
-    """Resolve a job's output directory, rejecting any path-escape attempt.
-
-    Job IDs are filesystem path components under ``OUTPUT_DIR``. A legacy or
-    crafted ID containing ``..``, absolute paths, or nested separators would
-    allow output writes/deletes to escape the cron output sandbox. Reject
-    anything that isn't a single safe path component.
-    """
-    text = str(job_id or "").strip()
-    if not text or text in {".", ".."} or "/" in text or "\\" in text:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid cron job id for output path: {job_id!r}")
-    if Path(text).is_absolute() or Path(text).drive:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid cron job id for output path: {job_id!r}")
-    return OUTPUT_DIR / text
-
 
 def _normalize_skill_list(skill: Optional[str] = None, skills: Optional[Any] = None) -> List[str]:
     """Normalize legacy/single-skill and multi-skill inputs into a unique ordered list."""
@@ -750,15 +728,6 @@ def list_jobs(include_disabled: bool = False) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
 
 def update_job(job_id: str, updates: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Update a job by ID, refreshing derived schedule fields when needed."""
-    # Block mutation of immutable fields. ``id`` in particular is a filesystem
-    # path component under OUTPUT_DIR — letting an update change it leaks
-    # path-escape values into output writes/deletes.
-    bad_fields = _IMMUTABLE_JOB_FIELDS.intersection(updates or {})
-    if bad_fields:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"Cron job field(s) cannot be updated: {', '.join(sorted(bad_fields))}"
-        )
-
     jobs = load_jobs()
     for i, job in enumerate(jobs):
         if job["id"] != job_id:
@@ -876,12 +845,9 @@ def remove_job(job_id: str) -> bool:
     original_len = len(jobs)
     jobs = [j for j in jobs if j["id"] != canonical_id]
     if len(jobs) < original_len:
-        # Resolve the output dir BEFORE saving so a legacy unsafe ID (e.g.
-        # left over from before the create-time guard) fails closed without
-        # half-applying the removal.
-        job_output_dir = _job_output_dir(canonical_id)
         save_jobs(jobs)
         # Clean up output directory to prevent orphaned dirs accumulating
+        job_output_dir = OUTPUT_DIR / canonical_id
         if job_output_dir.exists():
             shutil.rmtree(job_output_dir)
         return True
@@ -1095,7 +1061,7 @@ def _get_due_jobs_locked() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
 def save_job_output(job_id: str, output: str):
     """Save job output to file."""
     ensure_dirs()
-    job_output_dir = _job_output_dir(job_id)
+    job_output_dir = OUTPUT_DIR / job_id
     job_output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     _secure_dir(job_output_dir)
     

cron/scheduler.py

@@ -57,29 +57,6 @@ class CronPromptInjectionBlocked(Exception):
     """
 
 
-def _resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets(cfg: dict) -> list[str]:
-    """Toolsets a cron-spawned agent must never receive.
-
-    Three protected toolsets are always disabled in cron context:
-      - ``cronjob`` — would let a cron-spawned agent schedule more cron jobs
-      - ``messaging`` — interactive, needs a live gateway session
-      - ``clarify`` — interactive, blocks waiting for user input
-
-    User-level ``agent.disabled_toolsets`` from config.yaml is layered on top
-    so per-job ``enabled_toolsets`` cannot bypass policy that applies to
-    ordinary agent runs (#25752 — LLM-supplied enabled_toolsets was widening
-    past config.yaml's denylist).
-    """
-    disabled = ["cronjob", "messaging", "clarify"]
-    agent_cfg = (cfg or {}).get("agent") or {}
-    user_disabled = agent_cfg.get("disabled_toolsets") or []
-    for name in user_disabled:
-        name = str(name).strip()
-        if name and name not in disabled:
-            disabled.append(name)
-    return disabled
-
-
 def _resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets(job: dict, cfg: dict) -> list[str] | None:
     """Resolve the toolset list for a cron job.
 
@@ -257,30 +234,6 @@ def _resolve_origin(job: dict) -> Optional[dict]:
     return None
 
 
-def _cron_job_origin_log_suffix(job: dict) -> str:
-    """Return safe provenance details for security warnings about a cron job.
-
-    The scheduler normally has no live HTTP request object when it detects a
-    bad stored ``context_from`` reference. Including the job's saved origin
-    makes future probe logs actionable without exposing secrets: platform/chat
-    metadata for gateway-created jobs, and optional source-IP fields for API
-    surfaces that persist them in origin metadata.
-    """
-    origin = job.get("origin")
-    if not isinstance(origin, dict):
-        return ""
-
-    fields = []
-    for key in ("platform", "chat_id", "thread_id", "source_ip", "remote", "forwarded_for"):
-        value = origin.get(key)
-        if value is None:
-            continue
-        text = str(value).replace("\r", " ").replace("\n", " ").strip()
-        if text:
-            fields.append(f"origin_{key}={text[:200]!r}")
-    return " " + " ".join(fields) if fields else ""
-
-
 def _plugin_cron_env_var(platform_name: str) -> str:
     """Return the cron home-channel env var registered by a plugin platform.
 
@@ -576,9 +529,7 @@ def _send_media_via_adapter(
     """
     from pathlib import Path
 
-    from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter, should_send_media_as_audio
-
-    media_files = BasePlatformAdapter.filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files)
+    from gateway.platforms.base import should_send_media_as_audio
 
     for media_path, _is_voice in media_files:
         try:
@@ -663,7 +614,6 @@ def _deliver_result(job: dict, content: str, adapters=None, loop=None) -> Option
     # Extract MEDIA: tags so attachments are forwarded as files, not raw text
     from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter
     media_files, cleaned_delivery_content = BasePlatformAdapter.extract_media(delivery_content)
-    media_files = BasePlatformAdapter.filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files)
 
     try:
         config = load_gateway_config()
@@ -1051,13 +1001,7 @@ def _build_job_prompt(job: dict, prerun_script: Optional[tuple] = None) -> str:
         for source_job_id in context_from:
             # Guard against path traversal — valid job IDs are 12-char hex strings
             if not source_job_id or not all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in source_job_id):
-                logger.warning(
-                    "context_from: skipping invalid job_id %r for job_id=%r name=%r%s",
-                    source_job_id,
-                    job.get("id"),
-                    job.get("name"),
-                    _cron_job_origin_log_suffix(job),
-                )
+                logger.warning("context_from: skipping invalid job_id %r", source_job_id)
                 continue
             try:
                 job_output_dir = OUTPUT_DIR / source_job_id
@@ -1627,7 +1571,7 @@ def _run_job_impl(job: dict) -> tuple[bool, str, str, Optional[str]]:
             provider_sort=pr.get("sort"),
             openrouter_min_coding_score=(_cfg.get("openrouter") or {}).get("min_coding_score"),
             enabled_toolsets=_resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets(job, _cfg),
-            disabled_toolsets=_resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets(_cfg),
+            disabled_toolsets=["cronjob", "messaging", "clarify"],
             quiet_mode=True,
             # Cron jobs should always inherit the user's SOUL.md identity from
             # HERMES_HOME. When a workdir is configured, also inject project

docker-compose.yml

@@ -6,22 +6,17 @@
 #
 # Set HERMES_UID / HERMES_GID to the host user that owns ~/.hermes so
 # files created inside the container stay readable/writable on the host.
-# The s6-overlay stage2 hook remaps the internal `hermes` user to these
-# values via usermod/groupmod; each supervised service then drops to that
-# user via `s6-setuidgid`.
+# The entrypoint remaps the internal `hermes` user to these values via
+# usermod/groupmod + gosu.
 #
 # Security notes:
 #   - The dashboard service binds to 127.0.0.1 by default. It stores API
 #     keys; exposing it on LAN without auth is unsafe. If you want remote
 #     access, use an SSH tunnel or put it behind a reverse proxy that
 #     adds authentication — do NOT pass --insecure --host 0.0.0.0.
-#   - If you override entrypoint, keep `/init` as the first command in
-#     the chain (or let docker use the image's default ENTRYPOINT,
-#     which is `["/init", "/opt/hermes/docker/main-wrapper.sh"]`).
-#     `/init` is s6-overlay's PID 1 — it runs the cont-init.d scripts
-#     (chown, profile reconcile, dashboard toggle) and sets up the
-#     supervision tree before any service starts. Bypassing it skips
-#     all of that setup and the gateway will not work correctly.
+#   - If you override entrypoint, keep /opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh in
+#     the command chain. It drops root to the hermes user before gateway
+#     files such as gateway.lock are created.
 #   - The gateway's API server is off unless you uncomment API_SERVER_KEY
 #     and API_SERVER_HOST. See docs/user-guide/api-server.md before doing
 #     this on an internet-facing host.

docker/cont-init.d/015-supervise-perms

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-#!/command/with-contenv sh
-# shellcheck shell=sh
-# Make supervise/ trees for ALL declared s6 services queryable and
-# controllable by the unprivileged hermes user (UID 10000).
-#
-# Background (PR #30136 review item I4): the entire s6 lifecycle
-# (s6-svc, s6-svstat, s6-svwait) is dispatched as the hermes user
-# inside the container (every Hermes runtime path runs under
-# ``s6-setuidgid hermes``). But s6-supervise creates each service's
-# ``supervise/`` and top-level ``event/`` directory with mode 0700
-# owned by its effective UID — which is root, because s6-supervise
-# is spawned by s6-svscan running as PID 1. So unprivileged clients
-# get EACCES on every probe / control call against the slot.
-#
-# Two fixes, one in each registration path:
-#
-# 1. For RUNTIME-registered profile gateways (created via the s6
-#    runtime register hooks in profiles.py): the Python helper
-#    ``_seed_supervise_skeleton`` pre-creates supervise/ + event/ +
-#    supervise/control owned by hermes BEFORE s6-svscanctl -a fires.
-#    s6-supervise's mkdir/mkfifo are EEXIST-safe, so it inherits our
-#    ownership and never tries to chown back to root.
-#
-# 2. For STATIC s6-rc services (dashboard, main-hermes) declared at
-#    image-build time under /etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/*: these are
-#    compiled by s6-rc at boot, and s6-supervise spawns BEFORE
-#    cont-init.d gets to run — so by the time we're here, the
-#    supervise/ tree is already there as root:root 0700. We chown
-#    it here. s6-supervise will keep using the same files; it never
-#    re-asserts ownership on a running service.
-#
-# This script runs as root after 01-hermes-setup but before
-# 02-reconcile-profiles, so the chowns are settled before the
-# Python reconciler walks the scandir. Lexicographic ordering
-# guarantees this — the suffix is unusual because we want to slot
-# in between 01 and the existing 02-reconcile-profiles without
-# renumbering both (which would be a churn-noise patch on its own).
-
-set -eu
-
-# /run/s6-rc/servicedirs holds the live, compiled service directories
-# for every static (s6-rc) service. Symlinks under /run/service/*
-# point here. Per-service supervise/ + event/ both need hermes
-# ownership for s6-svstat etc. to work as hermes.
-SVC_ROOT=/run/s6-rc/servicedirs
-
-if [ ! -d "$SVC_ROOT" ]; then
-    echo "[supervise-perms] $SVC_ROOT not present; skipping"
-    exit 0
-fi
-
-for svc in "$SVC_ROOT"/*; do
-    [ -d "$svc" ] || continue
-    name=$(basename "$svc")
-
-    # Skip s6-overlay-internal services (they need to stay root-only;
-    # the s6rc-* helpers manage the supervision tree itself).
-    case "$name" in
-        s6rc-*|s6-linux-*)
-            continue
-            ;;
-    esac
-
-    # supervise/ tree — needed by s6-svstat / s6-svc.
-    if [ -d "$svc/supervise" ]; then
-        chown -R hermes:hermes "$svc/supervise" 2>/dev/null || \
-            echo "[supervise-perms] could not chown $svc/supervise"
-        # 0710 = group searchable. ``s6-svstat`` only needs to openat
-        # status, not list the dir, but giving the hermes group +x is
-        # the minimum that lets group members access the contents.
-        chmod 0710 "$svc/supervise" 2>/dev/null || true
-        # supervise/control is a FIFO that s6-svc writes commands
-        # into; the hermes user needs +w. Owner is already hermes
-        # after the recursive chown above; widen perms to 0660 so
-        # ``s6-svc`` works for any member of the hermes group too.
-        if [ -p "$svc/supervise/control" ]; then
-            chmod 0660 "$svc/supervise/control" 2>/dev/null || true
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    # Top-level event/ dir — s6-svlisten1 / s6-svwait subscribe here.
-    if [ -d "$svc/event" ]; then
-        chown hermes:hermes "$svc/event" 2>/dev/null || \
-            echo "[supervise-perms] could not chown $svc/event"
-        # Preserve s6's 03730 mode (setgid + g+rwx + sticky).
-        chmod 03730 "$svc/event" 2>/dev/null || true
-    fi
-done
-
-echo "[supervise-perms] chowned supervise/ trees for static s6-rc services"

docker/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-#!/command/with-contenv sh
-# shellcheck shell=sh
-# Container-boot reconciliation of per-profile gateway s6 services.
-#
-# Runs as root after 01-hermes-setup (the stage2 hook) has chowned
-# the volume and seeded $HERMES_HOME, but before s6-rc starts user
-# services. /etc/cont-init.d/* scripts run in lexicographic order,
-# so the `02-` prefix guarantees ordering.
-#
-# Service directories under /run/service/ live on tmpfs and are
-# wiped on every container restart. Profile directories under
-# $HERMES_HOME/profiles/ live on the persistent VOLUME. This script
-# walks the persistent profiles, recreates the s6 service slots,
-# and auto-starts only those whose last recorded state was
-# `running` — see hermes_cli/container_boot.py.
-#
-# Phase 4 also needs hermes-user writes to /run/service/ (so the
-# profile create/delete hooks can register/unregister at runtime),
-# so we chown the scandir before invoking the reconciler. We
-# additionally chown the s6-svscan control FIFO so the hermes user
-# can send rescan signals via ``s6-svscanctl -a``; without this the
-# entire runtime-registration path is inert under UID 10000 (the
-# Python wrapper catches the resulting EACCES, prints a warning,
-# and swallows the failure).
-set -e
-
-# Make the dynamic scandir hermes-writable. The directory itself
-# starts root-owned by s6-overlay.
-chown hermes:hermes /run/service 2>/dev/null || true
-
-# Make the svscan control FIFO hermes-writable so s6-svscanctl -a
-# / -an work for the hermes user. The FIFO is created by s6-svscan
-# at PID-1 startup, so by the time this cont-init.d script runs it
-# already exists. Both ``control`` and ``lock`` need to be writable
-# for the various svscanctl operations; the directory itself stays
-# root-owned (we only need to touch the two FIFOs/locks inside).
-if [ -d /run/service/.s6-svscan ]; then
-    for entry in control lock; do
-        if [ -e "/run/service/.s6-svscan/$entry" ]; then
-            chown hermes:hermes "/run/service/.s6-svscan/$entry" 2>/dev/null || true
-        fi
-    done
-fi
-
-exec s6-setuidgid hermes /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python -m hermes_cli.container_boot
-

docker/entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,27 +1,160 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# s6-overlay shim. The real logic lives in docker/stage2-hook.sh, invoked
-# by /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup (installed by the Dockerfile). This
-# file exists so external references to docker/entrypoint.sh still work,
-# but it's no longer the ENTRYPOINT — /init is.
+#!/bin/bash
+# Docker/Podman entrypoint: bootstrap config files into the mounted volume, then run hermes.
+set -e
+
+HERMES_HOME="${HERMES_HOME:-/opt/data}"
+INSTALL_DIR="/opt/hermes"
+
+# --- Privilege dropping via gosu ---
+# When started as root (the default for Docker, or fakeroot in rootless Podman),
+# optionally remap the hermes user/group to match host-side ownership, fix volume
+# permissions, then re-exec as hermes.
+if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
+    if [ -n "$HERMES_UID" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
+        echo "Changing hermes UID to $HERMES_UID"
+        usermod -u "$HERMES_UID" hermes
+    fi
+
+    if [ -n "$HERMES_GID" ] && [ "$HERMES_GID" != "$(id -g hermes)" ]; then
+        echo "Changing hermes GID to $HERMES_GID"
+        # -o allows non-unique GID (e.g. macOS GID 20 "staff" may already exist
+        # as "dialout" in the Debian-based container image)
+        groupmod -o -g "$HERMES_GID" hermes 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+
+    # Fix ownership of the data volume. When HERMES_UID remaps the hermes user,
+    # files created by previous runs (under the old UID) become inaccessible.
+    # Always chown -R when UID was remapped; otherwise only if top-level is wrong.
+    actual_hermes_uid=$(id -u hermes)
+    needs_chown=false
+    if [ -n "$HERMES_UID" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "10000" ]; then
+        needs_chown=true
+    elif [ "$(stat -c %u "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null)" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
+        needs_chown=true
+    fi
+    if [ "$needs_chown" = true ]; then
+        echo "Fixing ownership of $HERMES_HOME to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
+        # In rootless Podman the container's "root" is mapped to an unprivileged
+        # host UID — chown will fail.  That's fine: the volume is already owned
+        # by the mapped user on the host side.
+        chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null || \
+            echo "Warning: chown failed (rootless container?) — continuing anyway"
+        # The .venv must also be re-chowned when UID is remapped, otherwise
+        # lazy_deps.py cannot install platform packages (discord.py, etc.).
+        chown -R hermes:hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" 2>/dev/null || \
+            echo "Warning: chown .venv failed (rootless container?) — continuing anyway"
+    fi
+
+    # Ensure config.yaml is readable by the hermes runtime user even if it was
+    # edited on the host after initial ownership setup. Must run here (as root)
+    # rather than after the gosu drop, otherwise a non-root caller like
+    # `docker run -u $(id -u):$(id -g)` hits "Operation not permitted" (#15865).
+    if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
+        chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
+        chmod 640 "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+
+    echo "Dropping root privileges"
+    exec gosu hermes "$0" "$@"
+fi
+
+# --- Running as hermes from here ---
+source "${INSTALL_DIR}/.venv/bin/activate"
+
+# Stamp install method for detect_install_method()
+echo "docker" > "${HERMES_HOME:=/opt/data}/.install_method" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# Create essential directory structure.  Cache and platform directories
+# (cache/images, cache/audio, platforms/whatsapp, etc.) are created on
+# demand by the application — don't pre-create them here so new installs
+# get the consolidated layout from get_hermes_dir().
+# The "home/" subdirectory is a per-profile HOME for subprocesses (git,
+# ssh, gh, npm …).  Without it those tools write to /root which is
+# ephemeral and shared across profiles.  See issue #4426.
+mkdir -p "$HERMES_HOME"/{cron,sessions,logs,hooks,memories,skills,skins,plans,workspace,home}
+
+# .env
+if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/.env" ]; then
+    cp "$INSTALL_DIR/.env.example" "$HERMES_HOME/.env"
+fi
+
+# config.yaml
+if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
+    cp "$INSTALL_DIR/cli-config.yaml.example" "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml"
+fi
+
+# SOUL.md
+if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/SOUL.md" ]; then
+    cp "$INSTALL_DIR/docker/SOUL.md" "$HERMES_HOME/SOUL.md"
+fi
+
+# auth.json: bootstrap from env on first boot only.  Used by orchestrators
+# (e.g. provisioning a Hermes VPS from an account-management service) that
+# need to seed the OAuth refresh credential non-interactively, instead of
+# walking the user through `hermes setup` + the device-flow login dance.
+# Subsequent token rotations write back to the same file, which lives on a
+# persistent volume — so this env var is consumed exactly once at first
+# boot.  The `[ ! -f ... ]` guard is critical: without it, a container
+# restart would clobber a rotated refresh token with the now-stale value
+# the orchestrator originally seeded.
+if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" ] && [ -n "$HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP" ]; then
+    printf '%s' "$HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP" > "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
+    chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
+fi
+
+# Sync bundled skills (manifest-based so user edits are preserved)
+if [ -d "$INSTALL_DIR/skills" ]; then
+    python3 "$INSTALL_DIR/tools/skills_sync.py"
+fi
+
+# Optionally start `hermes dashboard` as a side-process.
 #
-# When called directly (e.g. by an old wrapper script that hard-coded
-# docker/entrypoint.sh as the container ENTRYPOINT, or by an external
-# orchestration script that invokes it inside the container), forward to
-# the stage2 hook for parity with the pre-s6 entrypoint behavior. The
-# stage2 hook only handles cont-init bootstrap (UID remap, chown, config
-# seed, skills sync); it does NOT exec the CMD. Callers that depended
-# on the pre-s6 contract "entrypoint.sh sets up state then execs hermes"
-# will see the bootstrap happen but the CMD will not run from this shim.
+# Toggled by HERMES_DASHBOARD=1 (also accepts "true"/"yes", case-insensitive).
+# Host/port/TUI can be overridden via:
+#   HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST  (default 0.0.0.0 — exposed outside the container)
+#   HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT  (default 9119, matches `hermes dashboard` default)
+#   HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI   (already honored by `hermes dashboard` itself)
 #
-# Deprecation: this shim is preserved for one release cycle to give
-# downstream users time to migrate their wrappers to the image's real
-# ENTRYPOINT (`/init`). It will be removed in a future major release.
-# Surface a warning to stderr so anyone still invoking this path
-# sees the migration notice in their logs.
-echo "[hermes] WARNING: docker/entrypoint.sh is a deprecated shim under " \
-    "s6-overlay. The container's real ENTRYPOINT is /init + " \
-    "main-wrapper.sh; this script only runs the stage2 cont-init hook " \
-    "and does NOT exec the CMD. If you hard-coded docker/entrypoint.sh " \
-    "as your ENTRYPOINT, drop the override — docker will use the image's " \
-    "default ENTRYPOINT (/init), which handles bootstrap AND CMD." >&2
-exec /opt/hermes/docker/stage2-hook.sh "$@"
+# The dashboard is a long-lived server.  We background it *before* the final
+# `exec hermes "$@"` so the user's chosen foreground command (chat, gateway,
+# sleep infinity, …) remains PID-of-interest for the container runtime.  When
+# the container stops the whole process tree is torn down, so no explicit
+# cleanup is needed.
+case "${HERMES_DASHBOARD:-}" in
+    1|true|TRUE|True|yes|YES|Yes)
+        dash_host="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST:-0.0.0.0}"
+        dash_port="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT:-9119}"
+        dash_args=(--host "$dash_host" --port "$dash_port" --no-open)
+        # Binding to anything other than localhost requires --insecure — the
+        # dashboard refuses otherwise because it exposes API keys.  Inside a
+        # container this is the expected deployment (host reaches it via
+        # published port), so opt in automatically.
+        if [ "$dash_host" != "127.0.0.1" ] && [ "$dash_host" != "localhost" ]; then
+            dash_args+=(--insecure)
+        fi
+        echo "Starting hermes dashboard on ${dash_host}:${dash_port} (background)"
+        # Prefix dashboard output so it's distinguishable from the main
+        # process in `docker logs`.  stdbuf keeps the pipe line-buffered.
+        (
+            stdbuf -oL -eL hermes dashboard "${dash_args[@]}" 2>&1 \
+                | sed -u 's/^/[dashboard] /'
+        ) &
+        ;;
+esac
+
+# Final exec: two supported invocation patterns.
+#
+#   docker run <image>                 -> exec `hermes` with no args (legacy default)
+#   docker run <image> chat -q "..."   -> exec `hermes chat -q "..."` (legacy wrap)
+#   docker run <image> sleep infinity  -> exec `sleep infinity` directly
+#   docker run <image> bash            -> exec `bash` directly
+#
+# If the first positional arg resolves to an executable on PATH, we assume the
+# caller wants to run it directly (needed by the launcher which runs long-lived
+# `sleep infinity` sandbox containers — see tools/environments/docker.py).
+# Otherwise we treat the args as a hermes subcommand and wrap with `hermes`,
+# preserving the documented `docker run <image> <subcommand>` behavior.
+if [ $# -gt 0 ] && command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    exec "$@"
+fi
+exec hermes "$@"

docker/main-wrapper.sh

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# /opt/hermes/docker/main-wrapper.sh — wraps the container's CMD with
-# the same argument-routing logic the pre-s6 entrypoint.sh used. Runs
-# as /init's "main program" (Docker CMD) so it inherits stdin/stdout/
-# stderr from the container.
-#
-# Routing:
-#   no args                       → exec `hermes` (the default)
-#   first arg is an executable    → exec it directly (sleep, bash, sh, …)
-#   first arg is anything else    → exec `hermes <args>` (subcommand passthrough)
-#
-# We drop to the hermes user via `s6-setuidgid` so the supervised
-# workload runs unprivileged (UID 10000 by default).
-set -e
-
-cd /opt/data
-# shellcheck disable=SC1091
-. /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/activate
-
-if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
-    exec s6-setuidgid hermes hermes
-fi
-
-if command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    # Bare executable — pass through directly.
-    exec s6-setuidgid hermes "$@"
-fi
-
-# Hermes subcommand pass-through.
-exec s6-setuidgid hermes hermes "$@"

docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/finish

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#!/command/with-contenv sh
-# shellcheck shell=sh
-# Dashboard finish script. Companion to ./run.
-#
-# When HERMES_DASHBOARD is unset (or falsy), ./run exits 0 immediately.
-# Without this finish script, s6-supervise would just restart the run
-# script in a tight loop. By exiting 125 here, we tell s6-supervise
-# "this service has permanently failed; do not restart" — equivalent
-# to `s6-svc -O`. The supervise slot reports as down, matching reality
-# (no dashboard process is running).
-#
-# When HERMES_DASHBOARD IS enabled and the run script later exits or
-# is killed, we want s6-supervise to restart it (the whole point of
-# supervised lifecycle). So we exit non-125 in that case.
-
-# Arguments passed to a finish script: $1=run-exit-code, $2=signal-num,
-# $3=service-dir-name, $4=run-pgid. See servicedir(7).
-
-case "${HERMES_DASHBOARD:-}" in
-    1|true|TRUE|True|yes|YES|Yes)
-        # Dashboard was enabled — let s6-supervise restart on crash by
-        # exiting non-125. (Pass-through any sensible default.)
-        exit 0
-        ;;
-    *)
-        # Dashboard disabled — permanent-failure marker so s6-supervise
-        # leaves the slot in 'down' state and s6-svstat reflects that.
-        exit 125
-        ;;
-esac

docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/run

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-#!/command/with-contenv sh
-# shellcheck shell=sh
-# Dashboard service. Always declared so s6 has a supervised slot; if
-# HERMES_DASHBOARD isn't truthy the run script exits cleanly and the
-# companion finish script returns 125 (s6's "permanent failure, do
-# not restart" marker), so s6-svstat reports the slot as down. See
-# also docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/finish.
-
-case "${HERMES_DASHBOARD:-}" in
-    1|true|TRUE|True|yes|YES|Yes) ;;
-    *)
-        # Exit 0; the finish script will exit 125 → s6-supervise won't
-        # restart us and the slot reports down. Using a clean exit
-        # (rather than `exec sleep infinity`) means s6-svstat reflects
-        # reality: when HERMES_DASHBOARD is unset, the service is NOT
-        # running, just supervised-with-permanent-failure. See PR
-        # #30136 review item I3.
-        exit 0
-        ;;
-esac
-
-cd /opt/data
-# shellcheck disable=SC1091
-. /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/activate
-
-dash_host="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST:-0.0.0.0}"
-dash_port="${HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT:-9119}"
-
-# Binding to anything other than localhost requires --insecure — the
-# dashboard refuses otherwise because it exposes API keys. Inside a
-# container this is the expected deployment.
-insecure=""
-case "$dash_host" in
-    127.0.0.1|localhost) ;;
-    *) insecure="--insecure" ;;
-esac
-
-# shellcheck disable=SC2086  # word-splitting of $insecure is intentional
-exec s6-setuidgid hermes hermes dashboard \
-    --host "$dash_host" --port "$dash_port" --no-open $insecure

docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/type

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-longrun

docker/s6-rc.d/main-hermes/run

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-#!/command/with-contenv sh
-# shellcheck shell=sh
-# Main hermes service.
-#
-# IMPORTANT — this is NOT how the user's CMD runs.
-#
-# We chose Architecture B from the plan: the container's CMD (the bare
-# command the user passes to `docker run <image> …`) runs as /init's
-# "main program" via Docker's CMD mechanism, NOT as an s6-supervised
-# service. This is the canonical s6-overlay pattern for "container
-# exits when the program exits" semantics, and it lets us preserve
-# every pre-s6 invocation contract (chat passthrough, sleep infinity,
-# bash, --tui) without re-implementing argument routing through
-# /run/s6/container_environment.
-#
-# So why does this service exist at all? Two reasons:
-#   1. s6-rc requires at least one user service for the "user" bundle
-#      to be valid. We can't ship an empty bundle.
-#   2. Future work may want to supervise a long-lived hermes process
-#      (e.g. for gateway-server containers); having the slot already
-#      wired in keeps that change small.
-#
-# For now this service is a no-op: it sleeps forever, doing nothing.
-# The dashboard runs as a real s6 service alongside it (see
-# ../dashboard/run) and per-profile gateways register dynamically via
-# /run/service/ at runtime (Phase 4).
-exec sleep infinity

docker/s6-rc.d/main-hermes/type

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-longrun

docker/stage2-hook.sh

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# s6-overlay stage2 hook — runs as root after the supervision tree is
-# up but before user services start. Handles UID/GID remap, volume
-# chown, config seeding, and skills sync.
-#
-# Per-service privilege drop happens inside each service's `run` script
-# (and in main-wrapper.sh) via s6-setuidgid, not here.
-#
-# Wired into the image as /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup by the
-# Dockerfile. The shim at docker/entrypoint.sh forwards to this script
-# so external references to docker/entrypoint.sh still work.
-#
-# NB: cont-init.d scripts run with no arguments — the user's CMD args
-# are NOT visible here. That's fine: we use Architecture B (s6-overlay
-# main-program model), so main-wrapper.sh runs the CMD with full
-# stdin/stdout/stderr access and handles arg parsing there.
-
-set -eu
-
-HERMES_HOME="${HERMES_HOME:-/opt/data}"
-INSTALL_DIR="/opt/hermes"
-
-# --- UID/GID remap ---
-if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
-    echo "[stage2] Changing hermes UID to $HERMES_UID"
-    usermod -u "$HERMES_UID" hermes
-fi
-if [ -n "${HERMES_GID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_GID" != "$(id -g hermes)" ]; then
-    echo "[stage2] Changing hermes GID to $HERMES_GID"
-    # -o allows non-unique GID (e.g. macOS GID 20 "staff" may already
-    # exist as "dialout" in the Debian-based container image).
-    groupmod -o -g "$HERMES_GID" hermes 2>/dev/null || true
-fi
-
-# --- Fix ownership of data volume ---
-actual_hermes_uid=$(id -u hermes)
-needs_chown=false
-if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "10000" ]; then
-    needs_chown=true
-elif [ "$(stat -c %u "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null)" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
-    needs_chown=true
-fi
-if [ "$needs_chown" = true ]; then
-    echo "[stage2] Fixing ownership of $HERMES_HOME to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
-    # In rootless Podman the container's "root" is mapped to an
-    # unprivileged host UID — chown will fail. That's fine: the volume
-    # is already owned by the mapped user on the host side.
-    chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null || \
-        echo "[stage2] Warning: chown failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
-    # The .venv must also be re-chowned when UID is remapped, otherwise
-    # lazy_deps.py cannot install platform packages (discord.py, etc.).
-    chown -R hermes:hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" 2>/dev/null || \
-        echo "[stage2] Warning: chown .venv failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
-fi
-
-# Always reset ownership of $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
-# boot. Profile dirs and files can land owned by root when commands
-# are invoked via `docker exec <container> hermes …` (which defaults
-# to root unless `-u` is passed), and that breaks the cont-init
-# reconciler (02-reconcile-profiles) which runs as hermes and walks
-# the profiles dir. Idempotent; skipped on rootless containers where
-# chown would fail.
-if [ -d "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" ]; then
-    chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" 2>/dev/null || true
-fi
-
-# --- config.yaml permissions ---
-# Ensure config.yaml is readable by the hermes runtime user even if it
-# was edited on the host after initial ownership setup.
-if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
-    chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
-    chmod 640 "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
-fi
-
-# --- Seed directory structure as hermes user ---
-# Run as hermes via s6-setuidgid so dirs end up owned correctly (matters
-# under rootless Podman where chown back to root would fail).
-#
-# Use direct `mkdir -p` invocation (no `sh -c "..."` wrapper) so the
-# shell isn't a second interpreter — defends against $HERMES_HOME values
-# containing shell metacharacters. PR #30136 review item O2.
-s6-setuidgid hermes mkdir -p \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/cron" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/sessions" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/logs" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/hooks" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/memories" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/skills" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/skins" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/plans" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/workspace" \
-    "$HERMES_HOME/home"
-
-# --- Install-method stamp (read by detect_install_method() in hermes status) ---
-# Preserved from the tini-era entrypoint (PR #27843). Must be written as
-# the hermes user so ownership matches the file's documented owner.
-# tee is invoked directly via s6-setuidgid (no `sh -c` wrapper) for the
-# same shell-metacharacter safety described above.
-printf 'docker\n' | s6-setuidgid hermes tee "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" >/dev/null \
-    || true
-
-# --- Seed config files (only on first boot) ---
-seed_one() {
-    dest=$1
-    src=$2
-    if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/$dest" ] && [ -f "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" ]; then
-        s6-setuidgid hermes cp "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" "$HERMES_HOME/$dest"
-    fi
-}
-seed_one ".env" ".env.example"
-seed_one "config.yaml" "cli-config.yaml.example"
-seed_one "SOUL.md" "docker/SOUL.md"
-
-# .env holds API keys and secrets — restrict to owner-only access. Applied
-# unconditionally (not only on first-seed) so a host-mounted .env that was
-# created with a permissive umask gets tightened on every container start.
-if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/.env" ]; then
-    chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
-    chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
-fi
-
-# auth.json: bootstrap from env on first boot only. Same semantics as the
-# pre-s6 entrypoint — the [ ! -f ] guard is critical to avoid clobbering
-# rotated refresh tokens on container restart.
-if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" ] && [ -n "${HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP:-}" ]; then
-    printf '%s' "$HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP" > "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
-    chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" 2>/dev/null || true
-    chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
-fi
-
-# --- Sync bundled skills ---
-# Invoke the venv's python by absolute path so we don't need a `sh -c`
-# wrapper to source the activate script. This is safe because
-# skills_sync.py doesn't depend on any environment exports beyond what
-# the python binary's own bin-stub already sets up (sys.path is rooted
-# at the venv's site-packages by virtue of running .venv/bin/python).
-if [ -d "$INSTALL_DIR/skills" ]; then
-    s6-setuidgid hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv/bin/python" "$INSTALL_DIR/tools/skills_sync.py" \
-        || echo "[stage2] Warning: skills_sync.py failed; continuing"
-fi
-
-echo "[stage2] Setup complete; starting user services"

docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-# s6-overlay Supervision for Per-Profile Gateways in Docker — Implementation Plan
-
-> **Status: shipped.** Phases 0–5 landed via PR
-> [NousResearch/hermes-agent#30136](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/30136)
-> in May 2026. This document is preserved as a post-implementation reference
-> for the architecture and the resolved design questions. The phase-by-phase
-> TDD walkthrough (≈2,800 lines) and the v2/v3 re-validation preambles have
-> been removed — the canonical implementation history is the PR commit log
-> (`git log --oneline a957ef083..a6f7171a5 -- 'docker/*' 'hermes_cli/service_manager.py' …`).
-> Open Questions are collapsed into a single Decision Log table; full
-> deliberations live in PR review comments.
-
-**Goal:** Replace `tini` with s6-overlay as PID 1 in the Hermes Docker image so
-that the main hermes process, the dashboard, and dynamically-created
-per-profile gateways all run as supervised services (auto-restart on crash,
-clean shutdown, signal forwarding, zombie reaping). Preserve every existing
-`docker run …` invocation pattern — including interactive TUI.
-
-**Architecture:** s6-overlay's `/init` is the container ENTRYPOINT, running
-s6-svscan as PID 1. Main hermes and the dashboard are declared as static
-s6-rc services at image build time. Per-profile gateways — which users create
-*after* the image is built (`hermes profile create coder` →
-`coder gateway start`) — are registered dynamically by writing service
-directories under a scandir watched by s6-svscan. A `ServiceManager` protocol
-abstracts the install/start/stop/restart surface across the init systems we
-care about (systemd on Linux host, launchd on macOS host, Scheduled Tasks on
-native Windows host, s6 inside container) and adds a second tier for runtime
-service registration that only s6 implements.
-
-**Tech Stack:**
-
-- [s6-overlay](https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay) v3.2.3.0
-  (noarch + per-arch tarballs ~15 MB). SHA256-pinned via build ARGs;
-  multi-arch via `TARGETARCH` (amd64 → `x86_64`, arm64 → `aarch64`).
-- Debian 13.4 base image (unchanged).
-- [hadolint](https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint) for the Dockerfile +
-  [shellcheck](https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck) for entrypoint scripts.
-- Python subprocess wrappers for `s6-svc`, `s6-svstat`, `s6-svscanctl`.
-- Existing systemd/launchd/windows surface in `hermes_cli/gateway.py` and
-  `hermes_cli/gateway_windows.py`.
-
-**Scope:**
-
-- Container-only (host-side systemd/launchd/windows behavior is preserved,
-  not modified).
-- s6-overlay only (no pure-Python fallback).
-- Architecture A (s6 owns PID 1; tini is removed).
-- Interactive TUI must keep working:
-  `docker run -it --rm nousresearch/hermes-agent:latest --tui`.
-- Dynamic registration is limited to per-profile gateways — one service per
-  profile, created when a profile is created, torn down when deleted. A
-  `gateway-default` slot is always registered for the root HERMES_HOME
-  profile so `hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) has somewhere to land.
-
-**Out of scope:**
-
-- Host-side dynamic supervision (systemd-run / launchd transient plists) —
-  not needed.
-- Pure-Python supervisor fallback — not needed.
-- Arbitrary user-defined supervised processes inside the container — only
-  profile gateways.
-- Migration of existing per-profile systemd unit generation to s6 on the
-  host side.
-- Non-Docker container runtimes (Podman rootless validated reactively).
-- UX polish around in-container profile lifecycle (e.g. a nice status view
-  of all supervised profile gateways) — deferred to follow-up.
-
----
-
-## Background From The Codebase
-
-> **Note on line numbers:** This section refers to functions and structures
-> by name only. Use `grep -n 'def <name>' <file>` to locate anything below
-> if you need the current line.
-
-### Pre-s6 container init (what we replaced)
-
-The original `Dockerfile` declared
-`ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/tini", "-g", "--", "/opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh" ]`.
-tini was PID 1, reaped zombies, forwarded SIGTERM to the process group. The
-old `docker/entrypoint.sh`:
-
-1. `gosu` privilege drop from root → `hermes` UID.
-2. Copied `.env.example`, `cli-config.yaml.example`, `SOUL.md` into
-   `$HERMES_HOME` if missing.
-3. Synced bundled skills via `tools/skills_sync.py`.
-4. Optionally backgrounded `hermes dashboard` in a subshell when
-   `HERMES_DASHBOARD=1` — **not supervised**, no restart.
-5. `exec hermes "$@"` — tini's sole direct child.
-
-Known limitations: dashboard crash → stays dead; dashboard fails at startup →
-silent; gateway crash → dashboard dies too. The May 4, 2026 decision was
-"leave as is" because nothing in the container needed supervision then.
-Adding per-profile gateway supervision changed that.
-
-### ServiceManager surface (what we wrapped, not refactored)
-
-All init-system logic lives in **`hermes_cli/gateway.py`** (~5,400 LOC at
-re-validation). The systemd/launchd code is ~1,500 lines of that, plus a
-separate **`hermes_cli/gateway_windows.py`** (~690 LOC) for Windows
-Scheduled Tasks.
-
-| Layer | Systemd functions | Launchd functions | Windows functions |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| **Detection** | `supports_systemd_services()`, `_systemd_operational()`, `_wsl_systemd_operational()`, `_container_systemd_operational()` | `is_macos()` | `is_windows()`, `gateway_windows.is_installed()` |
-| **Paths** | `get_systemd_unit_path(system)`, `get_service_name()` | `get_launchd_plist_path()`, `get_launchd_label()` | `gateway_windows.get_task_name()`, `get_task_script_path()`, `get_startup_entry_path()` |
-| **Install/lifecycle** | `systemd_install(force, system, run_as_user)`, `systemd_uninstall(system)`, `systemd_start/stop/restart(system)` | `launchd_install(force)`, `launchd_uninstall/start/stop/restart` | `gateway_windows.install/uninstall/start/stop/restart` |
-| **Probes** | `_probe_systemd_service_running(system)`, `_read_systemd_unit_properties(system)`, `_wait_for_systemd_service_restart`, `_recover_pending_systemd_restart` | `_probe_launchd_service_running()` | `gateway_windows.is_task_registered()`, `_pid_exists` helper |
-| **D-Bus plumbing** | `_ensure_user_systemd_env`, `_user_systemd_socket_ready`, `_user_systemd_private_socket_path`, `get_systemd_linger_status` | — | — |
-| **Unit/plist generation** | `generate_systemd_unit(system, run_as_user)`, `systemd_unit_is_current`, `refresh_systemd_unit_if_needed` | plist templating in `launchd_install` | `_build_gateway_cmd_script`, `_build_startup_launcher`, `_write_task_script` |
-
-Container-relevant callers outside `gateway.py`:
-
-- `hermes_cli/status.py` — gained an `s6` branch for in-container runs.
-- `hermes_cli/profiles.py` — `create_profile` / `delete_profile` register and
-  unregister with s6 inside the container (no-op on host).
-- `hermes_cli/doctor.py` — `_check_gateway_service_linger` skips on s6, and a
-  new "Service Supervisor" section reports main-hermes / dashboard /
-  profile-gateway counts via the ServiceManager.
-- `hermes_cli/gateway.py::gateway_command` — the
-  `elif is_container():` rejection arms that refused gateway lifecycle
-  operations were removed; the `_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6` helper
-  intercepts start/stop/restart and routes them through s6.
-
-### Per-profile gateway spawning
-
-`hermes gateway start`, `coder gateway start` (profile alias), and
-`hermes -p <profile> gateway start` all spawn a gateway process scoped to a
-given profile. See
-[Profiles: Running Gateways](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/profiles#running-gateways).
-On host, lifecycle is managed via per-profile systemd units
-(`hermes-gateway-<profile>.service`); inside the container, an s6 service at
-`/run/service/gateway-<name>/` is registered when the profile is created and
-torn down when it's deleted.
-
-**Persistence across container restart:** `/run/service/` is tmpfs —
-service registrations are wiped when the container restarts. Profile
-directories at `/opt/data/profiles/<name>/` live on the persistent VOLUME,
-and each one records its gateway's last state in `gateway_state.json`.
-`/etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles` walks the persistent profiles on
-every container boot, recreates the s6 service slots via
-`hermes_cli/container_boot.py`, and auto-starts those whose last recorded
-state was `running`. Profiles whose last state was `stopped`,
-`startup_failed`, `starting`, or absent get their slot recreated in the
-`down` state and wait for explicit user action. `docker restart` is therefore
-invisible to a user with running profile gateways: they come back up;
-stopped ones stay stopped.
-
-### s6-overlay constraints
-
-- **Root/non-root model:** `/init` runs as root to set up the supervision
-  tree, install signal handlers, and run the stage2 hook that does
-  `usermod`/`chown`. Each supervised service drops to UID 10000 via
-  `s6-setuidgid hermes` in its `run` script. The per-service `s6-supervise`
-  monitor stays root so it can signal its child regardless of UID. Net
-  effect: hermes and all its subprocesses run as UID 10000 exactly as
-  before; only the supervision tree itself runs as root.
-- v3.2.3.0 has limited non-root support for running `/init` itself as
-  non-root — some tools (`fix-attrs`, `logutil-service`) assume root. We
-  don't hit this because `/init` runs as root.
-- Scandir hard cap: `services_max` default 1000, configurable to 160,000.
-- `/command/with-contenv` sources `/run/s6/container_environment/*` into
-  service env — convenient for passing `HERMES_HOME` etc.
-- s6 signal semantics: service crash triggers `s6-supervise` restart after
-  1s; override with a `finish` script.
-- Zombie reaping: PID 1 (s6-svscan) reaps all zombies non-blockingly on
-  SIGCHLD. Any subagent subprocess spawned by the main hermes process is
-  reaped automatically.
-
----
-
-## Key Design Decisions
-
-### D1. s6-overlay replaces tini entirely
-
-Container ENTRYPOINT is `/init`, PID 1 is s6-svscan. The main hermes
-process, the dashboard, and every per-profile gateway run as supervised
-services. This is a single breaking change to the container contract.
-
-### D2. Main hermes is an s6 service with container-exit semantics
-
-The contract "container exits when `hermes` exits" is preserved via a
-service `finish` script that writes to
-`/run/s6-linux-init-container-results/exitcode` and calls
-`/run/s6/basedir/bin/halt`. All five supported invocations work:
-
-| `docker run <image> …` | Behavior |
-|---|---|
-| (no args) | `hermes` with no args, container exits when hermes exits |
-| `chat -q "..."` | `hermes chat -q "..."`, container exits with hermes exit code |
-| `sleep infinity` | `sleep infinity` directly (long-lived sandbox mode) |
-| `bash` | interactive `bash` directly |
-| `docker run -it … --tui` | interactive Ink TUI with real TTY — see D9 |
-
-`docker/main-wrapper.sh` detects whether `$1` is an executable on PATH and
-routes either to "run this as a one-shot main service" or "wrap with
-hermes".
-
-### D3. Static services at build time; dynamic (per-profile) services at runtime
-
-s6 offers two mechanisms:
-
-- **s6-rc** (declarative, compile-then-swap): used for main hermes and the
-  dashboard — they're known at image build time.
-- **scandir** (drop a directory + `s6-svscanctl -a`): used for per-profile
-  gateways — profiles are user-created after the image is built.
-
-Per-profile gateway service dirs live at `/run/service/gateway-<profile>/`
-(tmpfs, hermes-writable). s6-svscan picks them up on rescan.
-
-### D4. ServiceManager protocol with two methods for runtime registration
-
-Host paths (systemd, launchd, Windows Scheduled Tasks) need only
-install/start/stop/restart of pre-declared services. Inside the container,
-we additionally need to register services at runtime when a profile is
-created. The protocol exposes this directly:
-
-```python
-class ServiceManager(Protocol):
-    kind: ServiceManagerKind  # "systemd" | "launchd" | "windows" | "s6" | "none"
-
-    # Lifecycle of an already-declared service
-    def start(self, name: str) -> None: ...
-    def stop(self, name: str) -> None: ...
-    def restart(self, name: str) -> None: ...
-    def is_running(self, name: str) -> bool: ...
-
-    # Runtime registration (container-only; hosts raise NotImplementedError)
-    def supports_runtime_registration(self) -> bool: ...
-    def register_profile_gateway(
-        self, profile: str, *,
-        extra_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    ) -> None: ...
-    def unregister_profile_gateway(self, profile: str) -> None: ...
-    def list_profile_gateways(self) -> list[str]: ...
-```
-
-Systemd, launchd, and Windows backends raise `NotImplementedError` on the
-registration methods. Only the s6 backend implements them. Callers check
-`supports_runtime_registration()` before calling.
-
-The scope is intentionally narrow: it's specifically "register/unregister a
-profile gateway," not a general-purpose process-management API.
-
-### D5. Per-profile gateway service spec is fixed, not user-provided
-
-Every profile gateway has the same command shape
-(`hermes -p <profile> gateway run`, or `hermes gateway run` for the default
-profile). The s6 backend generates the `run` script from a fixed template
-given the profile name — no arbitrary command list. This keeps the API
-surface tight and prevents callers from accidentally registering
-non-gateway services.
-
-Port selection is governed by the profile's `config.yaml`
-(`[gateway] port = …`) — the single source of truth. (The original plan
-proposed a Python-side SHA-256 port allocator with a 600-port range; it was
-retired during PR review because it was dead code through the entire stack.)
-
-### D6. Add detect_service_manager() alongside supports_systemd_services()
-
-`supports_systemd_services()` stays as-is (host code paths unchanged). A new
-`detect_service_manager() -> Literal["systemd", "launchd", "windows", "s6", "none"]`
-composes existing detection functions (`is_macos()`, `is_windows()`,
-`supports_systemd_services()`, `is_container()` + `_s6_running()`) and adds
-an s6 branch for container detection. Host call sites continue to use the
-existing functions; container-only code (the profile hooks) uses the new one.
-
-`_s6_running()` probes `/proc/1/comm` (world-readable) and
-`/run/s6/basedir`. The earlier `/proc/1/exe` probe was root-only readable
-and silently failed for the unprivileged hermes user (UID 10000), making
-the entire runtime-registration path inert in production — caught in PR
-review.
-
-### D7. Wrap existing systemd/launchd/windows functions, don't rewrite them
-
-`SystemdServiceManager` / `LaunchdServiceManager` / `WindowsServiceManager`
-are thin adapters over the existing `systemd_*` / `launchd_*` module-level
-functions in `hermes_cli/gateway.py` and the
-`gateway_windows.install/uninstall/start/stop/restart/is_installed`
-functions in `hermes_cli/gateway_windows.py`. We get the abstraction
-without rewriting ~2,200 LOC of working code.
-
-### D8. Profile create/delete hooks register/unregister the s6 service
-
-When `hermes profile create <name>` runs inside the container, the
-profile-creation code path calls
-`ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway(<name>)` if
-`supports_runtime_registration()` is True. When `hermes profile delete
-<name>` runs, it calls `unregister_profile_gateway(<name>)`. On host, both
-calls are no-ops (registration not supported; existing systemd unit
-generation continues to handle install/uninstall).
-
-Existing per-profile `hermes -p <profile> gateway start/stop/restart` CLI
-commands continue to work — in the container they dispatch to
-`ServiceManager.start/stop/restart("gateway-<profile>")`, which translates
-to `s6-svc -u`/`-d`/`-t` on the service dir.
-
-`hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) targets a special `gateway-default` slot
-that's always registered by the cont-init reconciler. Its run script omits
-the `-p` flag and runs against the root `$HERMES_HOME` profile.
-
-`--all` lifecycle (`hermes gateway stop --all`, `... restart --all`)
-iterates `mgr.list_profile_gateways()` through s6 so s6's `want up`/`want
-down` flips correctly. Without this, `--all` fell through to `pkill`
-followed by s6-supervise auto-restart — net effect: kick instead of stop.
-
-### D9. Interactive TUI bypasses s6 service-mode and runs as CMD for TTY passthrough
-
-`docker run -it --rm <image> --tui` needs a real TTY connected to container
-stdin/stdout for Ink raw-mode keyboard input, cursor control, and SIGWINCH.
-Running the TUI as a normal s6 service fails because s6-supervise
-disconnects service stdio from the container TTY (documented:
-[s6-overlay#230](https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/issues/230)).
-
-**The pattern:** s6-overlay's `/init` execs a CMD as the container's "main
-program" after the supervision tree is up. The CMD inherits
-stdin/stdout/stderr from `/init` — which in `-it` mode is the container
-TTY. The stage2 hook detects the TUI case and short-circuits the
-main-hermes service so the hermes CMD becomes that main program.
-
-```sh
-# In docker/stage2-hook.sh
-_is_tui_invocation() {
-    for arg in "$@"; do
-        case "$arg" in --tui|-T) return 0 ;; esac
-    done
-    case "${HERMES_TUI:-}" in 1|true|TRUE|yes) return 0 ;; esac
-    if [ -t 0 ] && [ $# -eq 0 ]; then return 0; fi
-    return 1
-}
-```
-
-And in `docker/s6-rc.d/main-hermes/run`:
-
-```sh
-if [ -f /var/run/s6/container_environment/HERMES_TUI_MODE ]; then
-    exec sleep infinity   # s6-overlay will exec CMD as the TTY-connected main
-fi
-exec s6-setuidgid hermes hermes ${HERMES_ARGS:-}
-```
-
-In TUI mode main hermes is effectively unsupervised (same as the pre-s6
-behavior with tini — acceptable because the user is interactively
-present). Dashboard and profile gateways still get full s6 supervision via
-their separate services.
-
-The integration test `test_tty_passthrough_to_container` uses `tput cols`
-and `COLUMNS=123` as the probe.
-
----
-
-## Risk Register
-
-| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| Phase 2 breaks a downstream user's Dockerfile that `FROM`s ours | Medium | Medium | Release notes call out ENTRYPOINT change; the test harness (`tests/docker/`) gives high confidence in behavior parity |
-| TUI TTY passthrough fails on some Docker versions | Low | High | Harness includes `test_tty_passthrough_to_container` as a hard gate; fallback plan = s6-fdholder ([s6-overlay#230](https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/issues/230) Solution 2) |
-| s6-overlay non-root quirks (logutil-service, fix-attrs) bite us | Low | Low | Supervisor runs as root, services drop — sidesteps these issues |
-| Podman rootless UID mapping confuses s6 | Medium | Low | Documented as supported, fix reactively; a Podman + Docker environment is stood up for validation |
-| Test harness is flaky (docker daemon issues, timing) | Medium | Low | Generous timeouts; skip when docker unavailable; polling helpers replace fixed sleeps in `test_container_restart.py` |
-| Profile gateway crash loop masks a real config error | Low | Medium | s6 `finish` script `max_restarts` cap (planned follow-up); operators see crash-looping logs in `$HERMES_HOME/logs/gateways/<profile>/` |
-| Dockerfile+entrypoint drift from linter (hadolint/shellcheck) reveals latent bugs | Low | Low | CI lint jobs catch them; fix or document ignore with rationale |
-| Stale `gateway.pid` from a dead container collides with an unrelated live PID in the restarted container | Low | Medium | Cont-init reconciliation removes `gateway.pid` and `processes.json` from every profile dir on boot, before any new gateway starts |
-| `docker restart` silently loses per-profile gateway registrations (tmpfs scandir wiped) | High (without mitigation) | High | Cont-init reconciliation re-registers from persistent `$HERMES_HOME/profiles/` and auto-starts those last seen `running`; outcome recorded to `$HERMES_HOME/logs/container-boot.log` (size-bounded, rotates to `.1` at 256 KiB) |
-| A `running` gateway that's actually broken auto-restarts into a crash loop after every container restart | Low | Medium | s6 `finish` script `max_restarts` cap (planned); follow-up: `hermes doctor` alerts when N consecutive container restarts ended in `startup_failed` |
-| `_s6_running()` detection works as root but silently fails for unprivileged hermes user, making runtime-registration path inert | High (without mitigation) | High | **Caught in PR review.** Detection now probes `/proc/1/comm` (world-readable) + `/run/s6/basedir`. Docker integration tests refactored to `docker exec -u hermes` so the realistic runtime user is exercised |
-| `s6-svscanctl` from hermes hits EACCES on the root-owned control FIFO | Medium | Medium | `02-reconcile-profiles` chowns `/run/service/.s6-svscan/{control,lock}` to hermes after stage1 creates them |
-| Per-service `supervise/control` FIFO is root-owned by s6-supervise, blocking `s6-svc` from hermes | Known | Medium | Surfaced cleanly as `S6CommandError` (with rc + stderr) instead of raw `CalledProcessError`. Permission fix tracked as a follow-up (small SUID helper, polling chown loop in cont-init.d, or replace `s6-svc` with `down`-marker manipulation) |
-
----
-
-## Decision Log
-
-| # | Question | Decision |
-|---|---|---|
-| OQ1 | Gate Phase 2 behind env var? | Ship directly (Hermes is pre-1.0; users can pin the previous image) |
-| OQ2 | s6 root model | Root `/init`, drop per-service via `s6-setuidgid hermes` |
-| OQ3 | Dashboard opt-in mechanism | Always declared as an s6 service; `03-dashboard-toggle` cont-init script writes a `down` marker when `HERMES_DASHBOARD` is unset so `s6-svstat` reports the slot's real state |
-| OQ4 | Podman rootless | Supported, fix reactively |
-| OQ5 | Service naming | `gateway-<profile>` (matches pre-existing `hermes-gateway-<profile>.service` systemd convention) |
-| OQ6 | — (retired; no subagent gateways in scope) | — |
-| OQ7 | Resource limits per profile gateway | Defer (no per-cgroup limits; rely on the container's overall limit) |
-| OQ8 | Log persistence | `$HERMES_HOME/logs/gateways/<profile>/`. The log path is sourced from runtime `$HERMES_HOME` via `with-contenv`, NOT Python-substituted at registration time |
-| OQ9 | TUI passthrough | Trust the documented [s6-overlay#230](https://github.com/just-containers/s6-overlay/issues/230) Solution 1; harness includes a TTY passthrough hard-gate test |
-
-**Post-merge additions from PR #30136 review:**
-
-- **Multi-arch tarballs:** `TARGETARCH` mapped to `x86_64` / `aarch64`;
-  per-arch tarball fetched via `curl` because `ADD` doesn't honor BuildKit
-  args.
-- **SHA256 verification:** all three tarballs (noarch, symlinks, per-arch)
-  pinned via build ARGs and verified with `sha256sum -c` against a single
-  checksum file (avoids hadolint DL4006 piped-shell warning).
-- **`gateway-default` slot:** always registered by the reconciler so
-  `hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) has somewhere to land.
-- **Friendly lifecycle errors:** `GatewayNotRegisteredError` and
-  `S6CommandError` translate `CalledProcessError` into actionable CLI
-  messages.
-- **Atomic publication in the reconciler:** mirrors
-  `register_profile_gateway`'s tmp+rename pattern.
-- **`container-boot.log` rotation:** 256 KiB soft cap, rotated to `.1`.
-- **`port` parameter retired:** allocator + kwarg were dead code through
-  the entire stack; `config.yaml` is the single source of truth.
-
----
-
-## Verification Checklist
-
-- [x] Test harness (`tests/docker/`) passes against the s6 image
-- [x] hadolint + shellcheck run green in CI
-- [x] `docker run -it --rm hermes-agent --tui` starts the Ink TUI with
-      working keyboard input, cursor control, and resize (SIGWINCH)
-- [x] Dashboard crashes are recovered by s6 within ~2s
-- [x] `hermes profile create test` inside a container creates
-      `/run/service/gateway-test/`
-- [x] `hermes -p test gateway start` inside a container dispatches through s6
-- [x] `hermes -p test gateway stop` inside a container cleanly stops via s6
-- [x] `hermes profile delete test` inside a container removes
-      `/run/service/gateway-test/`
-- [x] Profile gateway logs persist at
-      `$HERMES_HOME/logs/gateways/test/current`
-- [x] `hermes status` inside the container shows `Manager: s6`
-- [x] `hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) inside a container targets
-      `gateway-default` and runs against the root profile
-- [x] `hermes gateway stop --all` / `... restart --all` iterate every
-      profile gateway under s6 instead of pkill-then-supervise-restart
-- [x] `docker restart` survives per-profile gateway registrations via the
-      cont-init reconciler; running gateways come back up, stopped ones
-      stay down
-- [x] Multi-arch image builds for both `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`
-- [x] s6-overlay tarballs are SHA256-verified at build time
-- [x] No systemd/launchd host-side functions were modified (only wrapped)
-- [x] `hermes gateway install/start/stop` on Linux host and macOS host
-      behave identically to pre-change

gateway/config.py

@@ -424,9 +424,7 @@ _PLATFORM_CONNECTED_CHECKERS: dict[Platform, Callable[[PlatformConfig], bool]] =
     Platform.SMS: lambda cfg: bool(os.getenv("TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID")),
     Platform.API_SERVER: lambda cfg: True,
     Platform.WEBHOOK: lambda cfg: True,
-    Platform.MSGRAPH_WEBHOOK: lambda cfg: bool(
-        str(cfg.extra.get("client_state") or "").strip()
-    ),
+    Platform.MSGRAPH_WEBHOOK: lambda cfg: True,
     Platform.FEISHU: lambda cfg: bool(cfg.extra.get("app_id")),
     Platform.WECOM: lambda cfg: bool(cfg.extra.get("bot_id")),
     Platform.WECOM_CALLBACK: lambda cfg: bool(
@@ -928,6 +926,73 @@ def load_gateway_config() -> GatewayConfig:
                         ac = ",".join(str(v) for v in ac)
                     os.environ["SLACK_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"] = str(ac)
 
+            # Discord settings → env vars (env vars take precedence)
+            discord_cfg = yaml_cfg.get("discord", {})
+            if isinstance(discord_cfg, dict):
+                if "require_mention" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(discord_cfg["require_mention"]).lower()
+                if "thread_require_mention" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_THREAD_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_THREAD_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(discord_cfg["thread_require_mention"]).lower()
+                frc = discord_cfg.get("free_response_channels")
+                if frc is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(frc, list):
+                        frc = ",".join(str(v) for v in frc)
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"] = str(frc)
+                if "auto_thread" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD"] = str(discord_cfg["auto_thread"]).lower()
+                if "reactions" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REACTIONS"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_REACTIONS"] = str(discord_cfg["reactions"]).lower()
+                # ignored_channels: channels where bot never responds (even when mentioned)
+                ic = discord_cfg.get("ignored_channels")
+                if ic is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_IGNORED_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(ic, list):
+                        ic = ",".join(str(v) for v in ic)
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_IGNORED_CHANNELS"] = str(ic)
+                # allowed_channels: if set, bot ONLY responds in these channels (whitelist)
+                ac = discord_cfg.get("allowed_channels")
+                if ac is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(ac, list):
+                        ac = ",".join(str(v) for v in ac)
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"] = str(ac)
+                # no_thread_channels: channels where bot responds directly without creating thread
+                ntc = discord_cfg.get("no_thread_channels")
+                if ntc is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_NO_THREAD_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(ntc, list):
+                        ntc = ",".join(str(v) for v in ntc)
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_NO_THREAD_CHANNELS"] = str(ntc)
+                # history_backfill: recover missed channel messages for shared sessions
+                # when require_mention is active.  Fetches messages between bot turns
+                # and prepends them to the user message for context.
+                if "history_backfill" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL"] = str(discord_cfg["history_backfill"]).lower()
+                hbl = discord_cfg.get("history_backfill_limit")
+                if hbl is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL_LIMIT"):
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL_LIMIT"] = str(hbl)
+                # allow_mentions: granular control over what the bot can ping.
+                # Safe defaults (no @everyone/roles) are applied in the adapter;
+                # these YAML keys only override when set and let users opt back
+                # into unsafe modes (e.g. roles=true) if they actually want it.
+                allow_mentions_cfg = discord_cfg.get("allow_mentions")
+                if isinstance(allow_mentions_cfg, dict):
+                    for yaml_key, env_key in (
+                        ("everyone", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_EVERYONE"),
+                        ("roles", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_ROLES"),
+                        ("users", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_USERS"),
+                        ("replied_user", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_REPLIED_USER"),
+                    ):
+                        if yaml_key in allow_mentions_cfg and not os.getenv(env_key):
+                            os.environ[env_key] = str(allow_mentions_cfg[yaml_key]).lower()
+                # reply_to_mode: top-level preferred, falls back to extra.reply_to_mode
+                # YAML 1.1 parses bare 'off' as boolean False — coerce to string "off".
+                _discord_extra = discord_cfg.get("extra") if isinstance(discord_cfg.get("extra"), dict) else {}
+                _discord_rtm = (
+                    discord_cfg["reply_to_mode"] if "reply_to_mode" in discord_cfg
+                    else _discord_extra.get("reply_to_mode")
+                )
+                if _discord_rtm is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE"):
+                    _rtm_str = "off" if _discord_rtm is False else str(_discord_rtm).lower()
+                    os.environ["DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE"] = _rtm_str
+
             # Bridge top-level require_mention to Telegram when the telegram: section
             # does not already provide one.  Users often write "require_mention: true"
             # at the top level alongside group_sessions_per_user, expecting it to work
@@ -1089,8 +1154,22 @@ def load_gateway_config() -> GatewayConfig:
                         allowed = ",".join(str(v) for v in allowed)
                     os.environ["DINGTALK_ALLOWED_USERS"] = str(allowed)
 
-            # Mattermost config bridge moved into plugins/platforms/mattermost/
-            # adapter.py::_apply_yaml_config — see #25443 (apply_yaml_config_fn).
+            # Mattermost settings → env vars (env vars take precedence)
+            mattermost_cfg = yaml_cfg.get("mattermost", {})
+            if isinstance(mattermost_cfg, dict):
+                if "require_mention" in mattermost_cfg and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
+                    os.environ["MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(mattermost_cfg["require_mention"]).lower()
+                frc = mattermost_cfg.get("free_response_channels")
+                if frc is not None and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(frc, list):
+                        frc = ",".join(str(v) for v in frc)
+                    os.environ["MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"] = str(frc)
+                # allowed_channels: if set, bot ONLY responds in these channels (whitelist)
+                ac = mattermost_cfg.get("allowed_channels")
+                if ac is not None and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"):
+                    if isinstance(ac, list):
+                        ac = ",".join(str(v) for v in ac)
+                    os.environ["MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"] = str(ac)
 
             # Matrix settings → env vars (env vars take precedence)
             matrix_cfg = yaml_cfg.get("matrix", {})
@@ -1799,17 +1878,6 @@ def _apply_env_overrides(config: GatewayConfig) -> None:
     # need to seed ``PlatformConfig.extra`` from env vars (e.g. Google Chat's
     # project_id / subscription_name) can supply ``env_enablement_fn`` on
     # their PlatformEntry — called here BEFORE adapter construction.
-    #
-    # Enablement gate (#31116): when a plugin registers ``is_connected``
-    # (the "has the user actually configured credentials for this?" check),
-    # we MUST consult it before flipping ``enabled = True``.  Otherwise
-    # ``check_fn`` alone — which for adapter plugins typically just
-    # verifies the SDK is importable / lazy-installs it — silently enables
-    # platforms the user never opted into, and the gateway then tries to
-    # connect to Discord / Teams / Google Chat with no token and emits
-    # noisy retry-forever errors.  ``_platform_status`` was already fixed
-    # for the same bug class in commit 7849a3d73; this is the runtime
-    # counterpart.
     try:
         from hermes_cli.plugins import discover_plugins
         discover_plugins()  # idempotent
@@ -1822,99 +1890,34 @@ def _apply_env_overrides(config: GatewayConfig) -> None:
                 logger.debug("check_fn for %s raised: %s", entry.name, e)
                 continue
             platform = Platform(entry.name)
-            existing_cfg = config.platforms.get(platform)
-            # Seed candidate extras from ``env_enablement_fn`` so plugins
-            # whose ``is_connected`` reads ``config.extra`` (e.g. Google
-            # Chat's ``_is_connected`` checks ``config.extra["project_id"]``)
-            # see the same state they will after enablement. Without this,
-            # Google-Chat-on-env-vars-only setups silently fail the gate
-            # below even though the user is configured.  Plugins whose
-            # ``is_connected`` reads env vars directly (Discord, IRC,
-            # Teams, LINE, ntfy, Simplex) are unaffected; this only
-            # restores Google Chat.
-            seed_for_probe = None
+            if platform not in config.platforms:
+                config.platforms[platform] = PlatformConfig()
+            config.platforms[platform].enabled = True
+            # Seed extras from env if the plugin opted in.
             if entry.env_enablement_fn is not None:
                 try:
-                    seed_for_probe = entry.env_enablement_fn()
+                    seed = entry.env_enablement_fn()
                 except Exception as e:
                     logger.debug(
                         "env_enablement_fn for %s raised: %s", entry.name, e
                     )
-                    seed_for_probe = None
-
-            # Only consult is_connected for platforms that are NOT already
-            # explicitly configured in YAML / env (existing_cfg with
-            # enabled=True means the user wrote it themselves or another
-            # env-var bridge enabled it — keep that decision).
-            if existing_cfg is None or not existing_cfg.enabled:
-                if entry.is_connected is not None:
-                    try:
-                        # Probe with ``enabled=True`` since we're asking
-                        # "would this plugin BE configured if we enabled
-                        # it?" not "is it currently enabled?". Google
-                        # Chat's ``_is_connected`` short-circuits on
-                        # ``config.enabled`` being False, which on the
-                        # default ``PlatformConfig()`` would fail the
-                        # gate even with proper env vars set.
-                        if existing_cfg is not None:
-                            probe_cfg = existing_cfg
-                            if not probe_cfg.enabled:
-                                probe_cfg = PlatformConfig(
-                                    enabled=True,
-                                    extra=dict(probe_cfg.extra or {}),
-                                )
-                        else:
-                            probe_cfg = PlatformConfig(enabled=True)
-                        if isinstance(seed_for_probe, dict) and seed_for_probe:
-                            # Don't mutate ``existing_cfg``; the probe gets
-                            # a transient view with env-seeded extras layered
-                            # on top of whatever's already there.
-                            probe_extra = dict(getattr(probe_cfg, "extra", {}) or {})
-                            for k, v in seed_for_probe.items():
-                                if k == "home_channel":
-                                    continue
-                                probe_extra.setdefault(k, v)
-                            probe_cfg = PlatformConfig(
-                                enabled=True,
-                                extra=probe_extra,
-                            )
-                        configured = bool(entry.is_connected(probe_cfg))
-                    except Exception as exc:
-                        logger.debug(
-                            "is_connected for %s raised: %s — skipping enablement",
-                            entry.name, exc,
+                    seed = None
+                if isinstance(seed, dict) and seed:
+                    # Extract the home_channel dict (if provided) so we wire it
+                    # up as a proper HomeChannel dataclass.  Everything else is
+                    # merged into ``extra``.
+                    home = seed.pop("home_channel", None)
+                    config.platforms[platform].extra.update(seed)
+                    if isinstance(home, dict) and home.get("chat_id"):
+                        config.platforms[platform].home_channel = HomeChannel(
+                            platform=platform,
+                            chat_id=str(home["chat_id"]),
+                            name=str(home.get("name") or "Home"),
+                            thread_id=(
+                                str(home["thread_id"])
+                                if home.get("thread_id")
+                                else None
+                            ),
                         )
-                        configured = False
-                    if not configured:
-                        logger.debug(
-                            "Plugin platform '%s' available but not configured "
-                            "(is_connected returned False) — skipping enable",
-                            entry.name,
-                        )
-                        continue
-            if platform not in config.platforms:
-                config.platforms[platform] = PlatformConfig()
-            config.platforms[platform].enabled = True
-            # Commit env-seeded extras onto the now-enabled platform.
-            # We've already called ``env_enablement_fn`` above (for the
-            # probe); reuse that result instead of calling it twice.
-            if isinstance(seed_for_probe, dict) and seed_for_probe:
-                seed = dict(seed_for_probe)
-                # Extract the home_channel dict (if provided) so we wire it
-                # up as a proper HomeChannel dataclass.  Everything else is
-                # merged into ``extra``.
-                home = seed.pop("home_channel", None)
-                config.platforms[platform].extra.update(seed)
-                if isinstance(home, dict) and home.get("chat_id"):
-                    config.platforms[platform].home_channel = HomeChannel(
-                        platform=platform,
-                        chat_id=str(home["chat_id"]),
-                        name=str(home.get("name") or "Home"),
-                        thread_id=(
-                            str(home["thread_id"])
-                            if home.get("thread_id")
-                            else None
-                        ),
-                    )
     except Exception as e:
         logger.debug("Plugin platform enable pass failed: %s", e)

gateway/pairing.py

@@ -28,10 +28,6 @@ import time
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Optional
 
-from gateway.whatsapp_identity import (
-    expand_whatsapp_aliases,
-    normalize_whatsapp_identifier,
-)
 from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
 from utils import atomic_replace
 
@@ -114,40 +110,12 @@ class PairingStore:
     def _save_json(self, path: Path, data: dict) -> None:
         _secure_write(path, json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False))
 
-    def _normalize_user_id(self, platform: str, user_id: str) -> str:
-        """Normalize platform-specific user IDs before persisting them."""
-        raw_user_id = str(user_id or "").strip()
-        if platform == "whatsapp":
-            return normalize_whatsapp_identifier(raw_user_id) or raw_user_id
-        return raw_user_id
-
-    def _user_id_aliases(self, platform: str, user_id: str) -> set[str]:
-        """Return all known equivalent user IDs for auth/rate-limit checks."""
-        raw_user_id = str(user_id or "").strip()
-        if not raw_user_id:
-            return set()
-
-        aliases = {raw_user_id, self._normalize_user_id(platform, raw_user_id)}
-        if platform == "whatsapp":
-            aliases.update(expand_whatsapp_aliases(raw_user_id))
-        aliases.discard("")
-        return aliases
-
-    def _user_ids_match(self, platform: str, left: str, right: str) -> bool:
-        """Return True when two user IDs represent the same principal."""
-        left_aliases = self._user_id_aliases(platform, left)
-        right_aliases = self._user_id_aliases(platform, right)
-        return bool(left_aliases and right_aliases and (left_aliases & right_aliases))
-
     # ----- Approved users -----
 
     def is_approved(self, platform: str, user_id: str) -> bool:
         """Check if a user is approved (paired) on a platform."""
         approved = self._load_json(self._approved_path(platform))
-        for approved_user_id in approved:
-            if self._user_ids_match(platform, approved_user_id, user_id):
-                return True
-        return False
+        return user_id in approved
 
     def list_approved(self, platform: str = None) -> list:
         """List approved users, optionally filtered by platform."""
@@ -162,16 +130,7 @@ class PairingStore:
     def _approve_user(self, platform: str, user_id: str, user_name: str = "") -> None:
         """Add a user to the approved list. Must be called under self._lock."""
         approved = self._load_json(self._approved_path(platform))
-        normalized_user_id = self._normalize_user_id(platform, user_id)
-        duplicate_ids = [
-            approved_user_id
-            for approved_user_id in approved
-            if self._user_ids_match(platform, approved_user_id, normalized_user_id)
-        ]
-        for approved_user_id in duplicate_ids:
-            del approved[approved_user_id]
-
-        approved[normalized_user_id] = {
+        approved[user_id] = {
             "user_name": user_name,
             "approved_at": time.time(),
         }
@@ -182,14 +141,8 @@ class PairingStore:
         path = self._approved_path(platform)
         with self._lock:
             approved = self._load_json(path)
-            matching_ids = [
-                approved_user_id
-                for approved_user_id in approved
-                if self._user_ids_match(platform, approved_user_id, user_id)
-            ]
-            if matching_ids:
-                for approved_user_id in matching_ids:
-                    del approved[approved_user_id]
+            if user_id in approved:
+                del approved[user_id]
                 self._save_json(path, approved)
                 return True
         return False
@@ -217,7 +170,6 @@ class PairingStore:
         """
         with self._lock:
             self._cleanup_expired(platform)
-            normalized_user_id = self._normalize_user_id(platform, user_id)
 
             # Check lockout
             if self._is_locked_out(platform):
@@ -246,7 +198,7 @@ class PairingStore:
             pending[entry_id] = {
                 "hash": code_hash,
                 "salt": salt.hex(),
-                "user_id": normalized_user_id,
+                "user_id": user_id,
                 "user_name": user_name,
                 "created_at": time.time(),
             }
@@ -335,27 +287,26 @@ class PairingStore:
         can see them age out without crashing on a missing ``hash`` field.
         """
         results = []
-        with self._lock:
-            platforms = [platform] if platform else self._all_platforms("pending")
-            for p in platforms:
-                self._cleanup_expired(p)
-                pending = self._load_json(self._pending_path(p))
-                for entry_id, info in pending.items():
-                    if not isinstance(info, dict):
-                        continue
-                    created_at = info.get("created_at")
-                    if not isinstance(created_at, (int, float)):
-                        continue
-                    age_min = int((time.time() - created_at) / 60)
-                    hash_val = info.get("hash")
-                    code_display = hash_val[:8] if isinstance(hash_val, str) else "legacy"
-                    results.append({
-                        "platform": p,
-                        "code": code_display,
-                        "user_id": info.get("user_id", ""),
-                        "user_name": info.get("user_name", ""),
-                        "age_minutes": age_min,
-                    })
+        platforms = [platform] if platform else self._all_platforms("pending")
+        for p in platforms:
+            self._cleanup_expired(p)
+            pending = self._load_json(self._pending_path(p))
+            for entry_id, info in pending.items():
+                if not isinstance(info, dict):
+                    continue
+                created_at = info.get("created_at")
+                if not isinstance(created_at, (int, float)):
+                    continue
+                age_min = int((time.time() - created_at) / 60)
+                hash_val = info.get("hash")
+                code_display = hash_val[:8] if isinstance(hash_val, str) else "legacy"
+                results.append({
+                    "platform": p,
+                    "code": code_display,
+                    "user_id": info.get("user_id", ""),
+                    "user_name": info.get("user_name", ""),
+                    "age_minutes": age_min,
+                })
         return results
 
     def clear_pending(self, platform: str = None) -> int:
@@ -374,20 +325,15 @@ class PairingStore:
     def _is_rate_limited(self, platform: str, user_id: str) -> bool:
         """Check if a user has requested a code too recently."""
         limits = self._load_json(self._rate_limit_path())
-        for alias in self._user_id_aliases(platform, user_id):
-            key = f"{platform}:{alias}"
-            last_request = limits.get(key, 0)
-            if (time.time() - last_request) < RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS:
-                return True
-        return False
+        key = f"{platform}:{user_id}"
+        last_request = limits.get(key, 0)
+        return (time.time() - last_request) < RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS
 
     def _record_rate_limit(self, platform: str, user_id: str) -> None:
         """Record the time of a pairing request for rate limiting."""
         limits = self._load_json(self._rate_limit_path())
-        now = time.time()
-        for alias in self._user_id_aliases(platform, user_id):
-            key = f"{platform}:{alias}"
-            limits[key] = now
+        key = f"{platform}:{user_id}"
+        limits[key] = time.time()
         self._save_json(self._rate_limit_path(), limits)
 
     def _is_locked_out(self, platform: str) -> bool:

gateway/platforms/api_server.py

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import re
 import sqlite3
 import time
 import uuid
-from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 try:
@@ -338,12 +337,10 @@ class ResponseStore:
                 db_path = str(get_hermes_home() / "response_store.db")
             except Exception:
                 db_path = ":memory:"
-        self._db_path: Optional[str] = db_path if db_path != ":memory:" else None
         try:
             self._conn = sqlite3.connect(db_path, check_same_thread=False)
         except Exception:
             self._conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:", check_same_thread=False)
-            self._db_path = None
         # Use shared WAL-fallback helper so response_store.db degrades
         # gracefully on NFS/SMB/FUSE-mounted HERMES_HOME (same filesystem
         # issue addressed for state.db/kanban.db — see
@@ -364,31 +361,6 @@ class ResponseStore:
             )"""
         )
         self._conn.commit()
-        # response_store.db contains conversation history (tool payloads,
-        # prompts, results). Tighten to owner-only after creation so other
-        # local users on a shared box can't read it. Run once at __init__
-        # rather than after every commit — chmod-on-every-write is wasted
-        # syscalls on a hot path.
-        self._tighten_file_permissions()
-
-    def _tighten_file_permissions(self) -> None:
-        """Force owner-only permissions on the DB and SQLite sidecars."""
-        if not self._db_path:
-            return
-        for candidate in (
-            Path(self._db_path),
-            Path(f"{self._db_path}-wal"),
-            Path(f"{self._db_path}-shm"),
-        ):
-            try:
-                if candidate.exists():
-                    candidate.chmod(0o600)
-            except OSError:
-                logger.debug(
-                    "Failed to restrict response store permissions for %s",
-                    candidate,
-                    exc_info=True,
-                )
 
     def get(self, response_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
         """Retrieve a stored response by ID (updates access time for LRU)."""
@@ -763,58 +735,6 @@ class APIServerAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
 
         return "*" in self._cors_origins or origin in self._cors_origins
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _clean_log_value(value: Any, *, max_len: int = 200) -> str:
-        """Sanitize request metadata before it reaches security logs."""
-        if value is None:
-            return ""
-        text = str(value).replace("\r", " ").replace("\n", " ").strip()
-        return text[:max_len]
-
-    def _request_audit_context(self, request: "web.Request") -> Dict[str, str]:
-        """Return non-secret source metadata for security/audit warnings."""
-        peer_ip = ""
-        try:
-            peer = request.transport.get_extra_info("peername") if request.transport else None
-            if isinstance(peer, (tuple, list)) and peer:
-                peer_ip = str(peer[0])
-        except Exception:
-            peer_ip = ""
-
-        return {
-            "remote": self._clean_log_value(getattr(request, "remote", "") or peer_ip),
-            "peer_ip": self._clean_log_value(peer_ip),
-            "forwarded_for": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "")),
-            "real_ip": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("X-Real-IP", "")),
-            "method": self._clean_log_value(request.method, max_len=16),
-            "path": self._clean_log_value(request.path_qs, max_len=500),
-            "user_agent": self._clean_log_value(request.headers.get("User-Agent", ""), max_len=300),
-        }
-
-    def _request_audit_log_suffix(self, request: "web.Request") -> str:
-        ctx = self._request_audit_context(request)
-        fields = [f"{key}={value!r}" for key, value in ctx.items() if value]
-        return " ".join(fields) if fields else "source='unknown'"
-
-    def _cron_origin_from_request(self, request: "web.Request") -> Dict[str, str]:
-        """Persist safe API source metadata on cron jobs created over HTTP."""
-        ctx = self._request_audit_context(request)
-        origin = {
-            "platform": "api_server",
-            "chat_id": "api",
-        }
-        if ctx.get("remote"):
-            origin["source_ip"] = ctx["remote"]
-        if ctx.get("peer_ip"):
-            origin["peer_ip"] = ctx["peer_ip"]
-        if ctx.get("forwarded_for"):
-            origin["forwarded_for"] = ctx["forwarded_for"]
-        if ctx.get("real_ip"):
-            origin["real_ip"] = ctx["real_ip"]
-        if ctx.get("user_agent"):
-            origin["user_agent"] = ctx["user_agent"]
-        return origin
-
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # Auth helper
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -836,10 +756,6 @@ class APIServerAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             if hmac.compare_digest(token, self._api_key):
                 return None  # Auth OK
 
-        logger.warning(
-            "API server rejected invalid API key: %s",
-            self._request_audit_log_suffix(request),
-        )
         return web.json_response(
             {"error": {"message": "Invalid API key", "type": "invalid_request_error", "code": "invalid_api_key"}},
             status=401,
@@ -2510,11 +2426,6 @@ class APIServerAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         """Validate and extract job_id. Returns (job_id, error_response)."""
         job_id = request.match_info["job_id"]
         if not self._JOB_ID_RE.fullmatch(job_id):
-            logger.warning(
-                "Cron jobs API rejected invalid job_id %r: %s",
-                job_id,
-                self._request_audit_log_suffix(request),
-            )
             return job_id, web.json_response(
                 {"error": "Invalid job ID format"}, status=400,
             )
@@ -2572,7 +2483,6 @@ class APIServerAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 "schedule": schedule,
                 "name": name,
                 "deliver": deliver,
-                "origin": self._cron_origin_from_request(request),
             }
             if skills:
                 kwargs["skills"] = skills

gateway/platforms/base.py

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import re
 import socket as _socket
 import subprocess
 import sys
-import time
 import uuid
 from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -41,16 +40,6 @@ def _platform_name(platform) -> str:
     return str(value or "").lower()
 
 
-def _float_env(name: str, default: float) -> float:
-    raw = os.environ.get(name, "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return default
-    try:
-        return float(raw)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return default
-
-
 def _thread_metadata_for_source(source, reply_to_message_id: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
     """Build platform-aware thread metadata for adapter sends.
 
@@ -483,7 +472,7 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]))
 
 from gateway.config import Platform, PlatformConfig
 from gateway.session import SessionSource, build_session_key
-from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir, get_hermes_home
+from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
 
 
 GATEWAY_SECRET_CAPTURE_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE = (
@@ -824,201 +813,6 @@ def cache_video_from_bytes(data: bytes, ext: str = ".mp4") -> str:
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 DOCUMENT_CACHE_DIR = get_hermes_dir("cache/documents", "document_cache")
-SCREENSHOT_CACHE_DIR = get_hermes_dir("cache/screenshots", "browser_screenshots")
-_HERMES_HOME = get_hermes_home()
-MEDIA_DELIVERY_ALLOW_DIRS_ENV = "HERMES_MEDIA_ALLOW_DIRS"
-MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_ENV = "HERMES_MEDIA_TRUST_RECENT_FILES"
-MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_SECONDS_ENV = "HERMES_MEDIA_TRUST_RECENT_SECONDS"
-MEDIA_DELIVERY_SAFE_ROOTS = (
-    IMAGE_CACHE_DIR,
-    AUDIO_CACHE_DIR,
-    VIDEO_CACHE_DIR,
-    DOCUMENT_CACHE_DIR,
-    SCREENSHOT_CACHE_DIR,
-    _HERMES_HOME / "image_cache",
-    _HERMES_HOME / "audio_cache",
-    _HERMES_HOME / "video_cache",
-    _HERMES_HOME / "document_cache",
-    _HERMES_HOME / "browser_screenshots",
-)
-
-# Default recency window for trusting freshly-produced files (seconds).
-# The agent's actual work generally completes well inside 10 minutes; legitimate
-# build artifacts (PDFs from pandoc, plots from matplotlib, etc.) almost always
-# land seconds before delivery. Old system files (/etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa,
-# stray credentials) have mtimes measured in days or months — well outside this
-# window — so prompt-injection paths pointing at pre-existing host files are
-# still rejected.
-_MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_DEFAULT_SECONDS = 600
-
-# Hard denylist applied even when a path would otherwise pass recency trust.
-# These prefixes hold credentials, system state, or process introspection that
-# should never be uploaded as a gateway attachment, regardless of how new the
-# file looks. The cache-dir allowlist still beats this — an operator-configured
-# allowed root can intentionally live under one of these prefixes (rare, but
-# their choice).
-_MEDIA_DELIVERY_DENIED_PREFIXES = (
-    "/etc",
-    "/proc",
-    "/sys",
-    "/dev",
-    "/root",
-    "/boot",
-    "/var/log",
-    "/var/lib",
-    "/var/run",
-)
-
-# Within $HOME we additionally deny common credential / config directories.
-# Resolved at check time against the live $HOME so containers and alt-home
-# setups work correctly.
-_MEDIA_DELIVERY_DENIED_HOME_SUBPATHS = (
-    ".ssh",
-    ".aws",
-    ".gnupg",
-    ".kube",
-    ".docker",
-    ".config",
-    ".azure",
-    ".gcloud",
-    "Library/Keychains",  # macOS
-)
-
-
-def _media_delivery_allowed_roots() -> List[Path]:
-    """Return roots from which model-emitted local media may be delivered."""
-    roots = [Path(root) for root in MEDIA_DELIVERY_SAFE_ROOTS]
-    extra_roots = os.environ.get(MEDIA_DELIVERY_ALLOW_DIRS_ENV, "")
-    for chunk in extra_roots.split(os.pathsep):
-        for raw_root in chunk.split(","):
-            raw_root = raw_root.strip()
-            if not raw_root:
-                continue
-            root = Path(os.path.expanduser(raw_root))
-            if root.is_absolute():
-                roots.append(root)
-    return roots
-
-
-def _media_delivery_recency_seconds() -> float:
-    """Return the recency window for trusting freshly-produced files.
-
-    0 disables recency-based trust entirely (pure-allowlist mode).
-    """
-    raw = os.environ.get(MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_ENV, "1").strip().lower()
-    if raw in ("0", "false", "no", "off", ""):
-        return 0.0
-    try:
-        custom = os.environ.get(MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_SECONDS_ENV, "").strip()
-        if custom:
-            seconds = float(custom)
-            return max(0.0, seconds)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        pass
-    return float(_MEDIA_DELIVERY_TRUST_RECENT_DEFAULT_SECONDS)
-
-
-def _media_delivery_denied_paths() -> List[Path]:
-    """Return absolute denylist paths under which delivery is never allowed."""
-    denied = [Path(p) for p in _MEDIA_DELIVERY_DENIED_PREFIXES]
-    home = Path(os.path.expanduser("~"))
-    for sub in _MEDIA_DELIVERY_DENIED_HOME_SUBPATHS:
-        denied.append(home / sub)
-    # The Hermes home itself contains credentials (auth.json, .env) — only the
-    # cache subdirectories under it are explicitly allowlisted above.
-    denied.append(_HERMES_HOME / ".env")
-    denied.append(_HERMES_HOME / "auth.json")
-    denied.append(_HERMES_HOME / "credentials")
-    return denied
-
-
-def _path_under_denied_prefix(resolved: Path) -> bool:
-    """Return True if ``resolved`` lives under a deny-listed system path."""
-    for denied in _media_delivery_denied_paths():
-        try:
-            resolved_denied = denied.expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
-        except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
-            continue
-        if _path_is_within(resolved, resolved_denied) or resolved == resolved_denied:
-            return True
-    return False
-
-
-def _file_is_recently_produced(resolved: Path, window_seconds: float) -> bool:
-    """Return True if the file's mtime is within ``window_seconds`` of now.
-
-    Used as a session-scoped trust signal: agents almost always produce
-    delivery artifacts within seconds of asking to send them, while
-    prompt-injection paths pointing at pre-existing host files (/etc/passwd,
-    ~/.ssh/id_rsa) have mtimes measured in days or months.
-    """
-    if window_seconds <= 0:
-        return False
-    try:
-        mtime = resolved.stat().st_mtime
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-    return (time.time() - mtime) <= window_seconds
-
-
-def _path_is_within(path: Path, root: Path) -> bool:
-    try:
-        path.relative_to(root)
-        return True
-    except ValueError:
-        return False
-
-
-def validate_media_delivery_path(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return a safe absolute file path for native media delivery, else None.
-
-    MEDIA tags and bare local paths in model output are untrusted text. Only
-    existing regular files under Hermes-managed media caches, or roots the
-    operator explicitly allowlists, may be uploaded as native attachments.
-    Symlinks are resolved before the containment check.
-    """
-    if not path:
-        return None
-
-    candidate = str(path).strip()
-    if len(candidate) >= 2 and candidate[0] == candidate[-1] and candidate[0] in "`\"'":
-        candidate = candidate[1:-1].strip()
-    candidate = candidate.lstrip("`\"'").rstrip("`\"',.;:)}]")
-    if not candidate:
-        return None
-
-    expanded = Path(os.path.expanduser(candidate))
-    if not expanded.is_absolute():
-        return None
-
-    try:
-        resolved = expanded.resolve(strict=True)
-    except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
-        return None
-
-    if not resolved.is_file():
-        return None
-
-    for root in _media_delivery_allowed_roots():
-        try:
-            resolved_root = root.expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
-        except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
-            continue
-        if _path_is_within(resolved, resolved_root):
-            return str(resolved)
-
-    # Outside the cache/operator allowlist: fall back to recency-based trust
-    # for files the agent has just produced (e.g. ``pandoc -o /tmp/report.pdf``
-    # or ``write_file("/home/user/report.pdf", ...)``). System paths and
-    # credential locations remain blocked even when "recent" — see
-    # ``_MEDIA_DELIVERY_DENIED_PREFIXES`` for the denylist.
-    window = _media_delivery_recency_seconds()
-    if window > 0 and not _path_under_denied_prefix(resolved):
-        if _file_is_recently_produced(resolved, window):
-            return str(resolved)
-
-    return None
-
 
 SUPPORTED_DOCUMENT_TYPES = {
     ".pdf": "application/pdf",
@@ -1229,14 +1023,6 @@ class MessageEvent:
         return args
 
 
-@dataclass
-class TextDebounceState:
-    event: MessageEvent
-    task: asyncio.Task | None
-    first_ts: float
-    last_ts: float
-
-
 _PLAINTEXT_GATEWAY_RESTART_PATTERNS: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
     re.compile(r"^(?:please\s+)?restart\s+(?:the\s+)?gateway[.!?\s]*$", re.IGNORECASE),
     re.compile(r"^(?:please\s+)?restart\s+(?:the\s+)?hermes\s+gateway[.!?\s]*$", re.IGNORECASE),
@@ -1532,17 +1318,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
         self._active_sessions: Dict[str, asyncio.Event] = {}
         self._pending_messages: Dict[str, MessageEvent] = {}
         self._session_tasks: Dict[str, asyncio.Task] = {}
-        self._busy_text_mode: str = (
-            os.environ.get("HERMES_GATEWAY_BUSY_TEXT_MODE", "queue").strip().lower()
-            or "queue"
-        )
-        self._busy_text_debounce_seconds: float = _float_env(
-            "HERMES_GATEWAY_BUSY_TEXT_DEBOUNCE_SECONDS", 0.35
-        )
-        self._busy_text_hard_cap_seconds: float = _float_env(
-            "HERMES_GATEWAY_BUSY_TEXT_HARD_CAP_SECONDS", 1.0
-        )
-        self._text_debounce: dict[str, TextDebounceState] = {}
         # Background message-processing tasks spawned by handle_message().
         # Gateway shutdown cancels these so an old gateway instance doesn't keep
         # working on a task after --replace or manual restarts.
@@ -2344,35 +2119,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
             text = f"{caption}\n{text}"
         return await self.send(chat_id=chat_id, content=text, reply_to=reply_to, metadata=metadata)
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def validate_media_delivery_path(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Return a resolved path if it is safe for native attachment upload."""
-        return validate_media_delivery_path(path)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files) -> List[Tuple[str, bool]]:
-        """Drop unsafe MEDIA paths and normalize accepted paths."""
-        safe_media: List[Tuple[str, bool]] = []
-        for media_path, is_voice in media_files or []:
-            safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(str(media_path))
-            if safe_path:
-                safe_media.append((safe_path, bool(is_voice)))
-            else:
-                logger.warning("Skipping unsafe MEDIA directive path outside allowed roots")
-        return safe_media
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def filter_local_delivery_paths(file_paths) -> List[str]:
-        """Drop unsafe bare local file paths and normalize accepted paths."""
-        safe_paths: List[str] = []
-        for file_path in file_paths or []:
-            safe_path = validate_media_delivery_path(str(file_path))
-            if safe_path:
-                safe_paths.append(safe_path)
-            else:
-                logger.warning("Skipping unsafe local file path outside allowed roots")
-        return safe_paths
-
     @staticmethod
     def extract_media(content: str) -> Tuple[List[Tuple[str, bool]], str]:
         """
@@ -2870,161 +2616,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
             return f"{existing_text}\n\n{new_text}".strip()
         return existing_text
 
-    def _text_debounce_store(self) -> dict[str, TextDebounceState]:
-        store = getattr(self, "_text_debounce", None)
-        if store is None:
-            store = {}
-            self._text_debounce = store
-        return store
-
-    def _is_queue_text_debounce_candidate(self, event: MessageEvent) -> bool:
-        """Return True for normal text eligible for queue-mode debounce."""
-        result = (
-            getattr(self, "_busy_text_mode", "queue") == "queue"
-            and event.message_type == MessageType.TEXT
-            and not getattr(event, "internal", False)
-            and not event.is_command()
-            and bool((event.text or "").strip())
-        )
-        if result:
-            logger.debug(
-                "[%s] Queue-text debounce candidate accepted: session=%s text_len=%d",
-                self.name,
-                getattr(event, "session_key", "?"),
-                len(event.text or ""),
-            )
-        return result
-
-    def _can_merge_text_debounce_events(self, existing: MessageEvent, event: MessageEvent) -> bool:
-        """Return True when two text debounce events came from the same sender."""
-
-        def _identity(candidate: MessageEvent) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
-            source = getattr(candidate, "source", None)
-            if source is None:
-                return None
-            platform = _platform_name(getattr(source, "platform", None))
-            sender = getattr(source, "user_id_alt", None) or getattr(source, "user_id", None)
-            if sender:
-                return (platform, str(sender))
-            if getattr(source, "chat_type", None) in {"dm", "private"} and getattr(source, "chat_id", None):
-                return (platform, "dm", str(source.chat_id))
-            return None
-
-        existing_sender = _identity(existing)
-        incoming_sender = _identity(event)
-        return existing_sender is not None and existing_sender == incoming_sender
-
-    def _text_debounce_delay(self, session_key: str) -> float:
-        """Return bounded busy-text debounce delay for ``session_key``."""
-        state = self._text_debounce_store().get(session_key)
-        if state is None:
-            return 0.0
-        now = time.monotonic()
-        window_deadline = state.last_ts + self._busy_text_debounce_seconds
-        hard_cap_deadline = state.first_ts + self._busy_text_hard_cap_seconds
-        return max(0.0, min(window_deadline, hard_cap_deadline) - now)
-
-    async def _queue_text_debounce(self, session_key: str, event: MessageEvent) -> None:
-        """Buffer normal queue-mode busy text and schedule a bounded flush."""
-        store = self._text_debounce_store()
-        state = store.get(session_key)
-
-        if state is not None and not self._can_merge_text_debounce_events(state.event, event):
-            # Preserve sender attribution in shared sessions. The current
-            # buffer becomes the next pending turn; the new sender starts a
-            # fresh debounce burst when the pending slot allows it.
-            await self._flush_text_debounce_now(session_key)
-            state = store.get(session_key)
-            if state is not None and not self._can_merge_text_debounce_events(state.event, event):
-                existing_pending = self._pending_messages.get(session_key)
-                if existing_pending is not None and self._can_merge_text_debounce_events(existing_pending, event):
-                    merge_pending_message_event(
-                        self._pending_messages,
-                        session_key,
-                        event,
-                        merge_text=True,
-                    )
-                return
-
-        now = time.monotonic()
-        if state is None:
-            state = TextDebounceState(
-                event=event,
-                task=None,
-                first_ts=now,
-                last_ts=now,
-            )
-            store[session_key] = state
-        else:
-            if event.text:
-                state.event.text = (
-                    f"{state.event.text}\n{event.text}"
-                    if state.event.text
-                    else event.text
-                )
-            latest_message_id = getattr(event, "message_id", None)
-            latest_anchor = latest_message_id or getattr(event, "reply_to_message_id", None)
-            if latest_message_id is not None:
-                state.event.message_id = str(latest_message_id)
-            if latest_anchor is not None and hasattr(state.event, "reply_to_message_id"):
-                state.event.reply_to_message_id = str(latest_anchor)
-            state.last_ts = now
-
-        if state.task is not None and not state.task.done():
-            state.task.cancel()
-
-        delay = self._text_debounce_delay(session_key)
-        state.task = asyncio.create_task(self._flush_text_debounce(session_key, delay))
-
-    async def _flush_text_debounce(self, session_key: str, delay: float) -> None:
-        """Timer task that flushes the debounced text buffer."""
-        try:
-            await asyncio.sleep(delay)
-            await self._flush_text_debounce_now(session_key)
-        except asyncio.CancelledError:
-            return
-        finally:
-            current = asyncio.current_task()
-            state = self._text_debounce_store().get(session_key)
-            if state is not None and state.task is current:
-                state.task = None
-
-    async def _flush_text_debounce_now(self, session_key: str) -> bool:
-        """Force-flush one debounced busy-text burst into the pending slot."""
-        store = self._text_debounce_store()
-        state = store.get(session_key)
-        if state is None:
-            return False
-
-        current = asyncio.current_task()
-        if state.task is not None and state.task is not current and not state.task.done():
-            state.task.cancel()
-        state.task = None
-
-        existing_pending = self._pending_messages.get(session_key)
-        if (
-            existing_pending is not None
-            and not self._can_merge_text_debounce_events(existing_pending, state.event)
-        ):
-            return False
-
-        state = store.pop(session_key, None)
-        if state is None:
-            return False
-        merge_pending_message_event(
-            self._pending_messages,
-            session_key,
-            state.event,
-            merge_text=True,
-        )
-        return True
-
-    def _discard_text_debounce(self, session_key: str) -> None:
-        """Cancel and drop pending text debounce state for control commands."""
-        state = self._text_debounce_store().pop(session_key, None)
-        if state is not None and state.task is not None and not state.task.done():
-            state.task.cancel()
-
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # Session task + guard ownership helpers
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -3094,7 +2685,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
         self._active_sessions.pop(session_key, None)
         self._pending_messages.pop(session_key, None)
         self._session_tasks.pop(session_key, None)
-        self._discard_text_debounce(session_key)
         return True
 
     def _start_session_processing(
@@ -3176,7 +2766,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 )
         if discard_pending:
             self._pending_messages.pop(session_key, None)
-            self._discard_text_debounce(session_key)
         if release_guard:
             self._release_session_guard(session_key)
 
@@ -3191,7 +2780,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
         command-scoped guard, then — if a follow-up message landed while the
         command was running — spawns a fresh processing task for it.
         """
-        await self._flush_text_debounce_now(session_key)
         pending_event = self._pending_messages.pop(session_key, None)
         self._release_session_guard(session_key, guard=command_guard)
         if pending_event is None:
@@ -3323,7 +2911,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 # through the dedicated handoff path that serializes
                 # cancellation + runner response + pending drain.
                 if cmd in {"stop", "new", "reset"}:
-                    self._discard_text_debounce(session_key)
                     try:
                         await self._dispatch_active_session_command(event, session_key, cmd)
                     except Exception as e:
@@ -3368,9 +2955,8 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
             # clarify-intercept can resolve it and unblock the agent.
             #
             # Without this bypass: the message gets queued in
-            # _pending_messages as a follow-up turn instead of reaching the
-            # clarify resolver, leaving the agent blocked and discarding the
-            # user's answer.
+            # _pending_messages AND triggers an interrupt, killing the
+            # agent run mid-clarify and discarding the user's answer.
             # Same shape as the /approve deadlock fix (PR #4926) — both
             # cases are "agent thread blocked on Event.wait, message must
             # reach the resolver before being treated as a new turn."
@@ -3429,28 +3015,27 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 merge_pending_message_event(self._pending_messages, session_key, event)
                 return  # Don't interrupt now - will run after current task completes
 
-            if self._is_queue_text_debounce_candidate(event):
-                logger.debug(
-                    "[%s] New text message while session %s is active — "
-                    "debouncing follow-up (busy_text_mode=queue, window=%.2fs)",
-                    self.name,
-                    session_key,
-                    self._busy_text_debounce_seconds,
-                )
-                await self._queue_text_debounce(session_key, event)
-            else:
-                logger.debug(
-                    "[%s] New message while session %s is active — queuing follow-up "
-                    "(no interrupt, will cascade after current turn)",
-                    self.name,
-                    session_key,
-                )
-                merge_pending_message_event(
-                    self._pending_messages,
-                    session_key,
-                    event,
-                    merge_text=event.message_type == MessageType.TEXT,
-                )
+            # Default behavior for non-photo follow-ups: interrupt the running agent.
+            #
+            # Use merge_text=True so rapid TEXT follow-ups (#4469) accumulate
+            # into the single pending slot instead of clobbering each other.
+            # Without merging, three rapid messages "A", "B", "C" land like:
+            #   _pending_messages[k] = A  (interrupts)
+            #   _pending_messages[k] = B  (replaces A before consumer reads)
+            #   _pending_messages[k] = C  (replaces B)
+            # ...and only "C" reaches the next turn.  merge_pending_message_event
+            # already does the right thing for photo/media bursts; the
+            # ``merge_text=True`` flag extends that to plain TEXT events.
+            # Same shape as the Telegram bursty-grace path in gateway/run.py.
+            logger.debug("[%s] New message while session %s is active — triggering interrupt", self.name, session_key)
+            merge_pending_message_event(
+                self._pending_messages,
+                session_key,
+                event,
+                merge_text=True,
+            )
+            # Signal the interrupt (the processing task checks this)
+            self._active_sessions[session_key].set()
             return  # Don't process now - will be handled after current task finishes
         
         # Mark session as active BEFORE spawning background task to close
@@ -3581,7 +3166,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
 
                 # Extract MEDIA:<path> tags (from TTS tool) before other processing
                 media_files, response = self.extract_media(response)
-                media_files = self.filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files)
 
                 # Extract image URLs and send them as native platform attachments
                 images, text_content = self.extract_images(response)
@@ -3595,7 +3179,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 # Auto-detect bare local file paths for native media delivery
                 # (helps small models that don't use MEDIA: syntax)
                 local_files, text_content = self.extract_local_files(text_content)
-                local_files = self.filter_local_delivery_paths(local_files)
                 if local_files:
                     logger.info("[%s] extract_local_files found %d file(s) in response", self.name, len(local_files))
                 
@@ -3804,15 +3387,10 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 ProcessingOutcome.SUCCESS if processing_ok else ProcessingOutcome.FAILURE,
             )
 
-            # The active drain owns debounce state. If a queue-mode timer has
-            # not fired yet, force-flush into _pending_messages here and let
-            # this task hand off the follow-up.
-            await self._flush_text_debounce_now(session_key)
-
             # Check if there's a pending message that was queued during our processing
             if session_key in self._pending_messages:
                 pending_event = self._pending_messages.pop(session_key)
-                logger.debug("[%s] Processing queued follow-up message", self.name)
+                logger.debug("[%s] Processing queued message from interrupt", self.name)
                 # Keep the _active_sessions entry live across the turn chain
                 # and only CLEAR the interrupt Event — do NOT delete the entry.
                 # If we deleted here, a concurrent inbound message arriving
@@ -3821,7 +3399,7 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                 # with the recursive drain below.  Two agents on one
                 # session_key = duplicate responses, duplicate tool calls.
                 # Clearing the Event keeps the guard live so follow-ups take
-                # the busy-handler path as intended.
+                # the busy-handler path (queue + interrupt) as intended.
                 _active = self._active_sessions.get(session_key)
                 if _active is not None:
                     _active.clear()
@@ -3914,9 +3492,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
                     await self.stop_typing(event.source.chat_id)
             except Exception:
                 pass
-            # Final drain/release boundary: force-flush any timer that missed
-            # the in-band drain before deciding whether the guard can clear.
-            await self._flush_text_debounce_now(session_key)
             # Late-arrival drain: a message may have arrived during the
             # cleanup awaits above (typing_task cancel, stop_typing).  Such
             # messages passed the Level-1 guard (entry still live, Event
@@ -4036,10 +3611,6 @@ class BasePlatformAdapter(ABC):
         self._session_tasks.clear()
         self._pending_messages.clear()
         self._active_sessions.clear()
-        for state in list(self._text_debounce_store().values()):
-            if state.task is not None and not state.task.done():
-                state.task.cancel()
-        self._text_debounce_store().clear()
 
     def has_pending_interrupt(self, session_key: str) -> bool:
         """Check if there's a pending interrupt for a session."""

gateway/platforms/bluebubbles.py

@@ -189,10 +189,7 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         app = web.Application()
         app.router.add_get("/health", lambda _: web.Response(text="ok"))
         app.router.add_post(self.webhook_path, self._handle_webhook)
-        # The webhook auth value is carried in the query string because the
-        # BlueBubbles webhook API cannot send custom headers. Do not let
-        # aiohttp access logs write that request target to agent.log.
-        self._runner = web.AppRunner(app, access_log=None)
+        self._runner = web.AppRunner(app)
         await self._runner.setup()
         site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, self.webhook_host, self.webhook_port)
         await site.start()
@@ -245,14 +242,6 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             return f"{base}?password={quote(self.password, safe='')}"
         return base
 
-    @property
-    def _webhook_register_url_for_log(self) -> str:
-        """Webhook registration URL safe for logs."""
-        base = self._webhook_url
-        if self.password:
-            return f"{base}?password=***"
-        return base
-
     async def _find_registered_webhooks(self, url: str) -> list:
         """Return list of BB webhook entries matching *url*."""
         try:
@@ -280,8 +269,7 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         existing = await self._find_registered_webhooks(webhook_url)
         if existing:
             logger.info(
-                "[bluebubbles] webhook already registered: %s",
-                self._webhook_register_url_for_log,
+                "[bluebubbles] webhook already registered: %s", webhook_url
             )
             return True
 
@@ -296,7 +284,7 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             if 200 <= status < 300:
                 logger.info(
                     "[bluebubbles] webhook registered with server: %s",
-                    self._webhook_register_url_for_log,
+                    webhook_url,
                 )
                 return True
             else:
@@ -336,8 +324,7 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                     removed = True
             if removed:
                 logger.info(
-                    "[bluebubbles] webhook unregistered: %s",
-                    self._webhook_register_url_for_log,
+                    "[bluebubbles] webhook unregistered: %s", webhook_url
                 )
         except Exception as exc:
             logger.debug(
@@ -947,3 +934,4 @@ class BlueBubblesAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             asyncio.create_task(self.mark_read(session_chat_id))
 
         return web.Response(text="ok")
+

gateway/platforms/dingtalk.py

@@ -358,19 +358,6 @@ class DingTalkAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             await asyncio.gather(*self._bg_tasks, return_exceptions=True)
             self._bg_tasks.clear()
 
-        # Finalize any open streaming cards before the HTTP client closes so
-        # they don't stay stuck in streaming state on DingTalk's UI after
-        # a gateway restart.  _close_streaming_siblings handles its own
-        # per-card exceptions; the outer try is a safety net for token fetch.
-        for _chat_id in list(self._streaming_cards):
-            try:
-                await self._close_streaming_siblings(_chat_id)
-            except Exception as _exc:
-                logger.debug(
-                    "[%s] Failed to finalize streaming card on disconnect for %s: %s",
-                    self.name, _chat_id, _exc,
-                )
-
         if self._http_client:
             await self._http_client.aclose()
             self._http_client = None

gateway/platforms/discord.py

@@ -1489,8 +1489,7 @@ class DiscordAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         reported in ``raw_response['warnings']`` so the caller can surface
         partial-send issues.
         """
-        # _derive_forum_thread_name is defined further down in this same
-        # module — no cross-module import needed.
+        from tools.send_message_tool import _derive_forum_thread_name
 
         formatted = self.format_message(content)
         chunks = self.truncate_message(formatted, self.MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH)
@@ -1552,8 +1551,7 @@ class DiscordAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         ForumChannel accepts the same file/files/content kwargs as
         ``channel.send``, creating the thread and starter message atomically.
         """
-        # _derive_forum_thread_name is defined further down in this same
-        # module — no cross-module import needed.
+        from tools.send_message_tool import _derive_forum_thread_name
 
         if not thread_name:
             # Prefer the text content, fall back to the first attached
@@ -5701,492 +5699,7 @@ def _define_discord_view_classes() -> None:
             self.resolved = True
             for child in self.children:
                 child.disabled = True
+
+
 if DISCORD_AVAILABLE:
     _define_discord_view_classes()
-
-
-# ── Standalone (out-of-process) sender ────────────────────────────────────────
-# Used by ``tools/send_message_tool._send_via_adapter`` when the gateway runner
-# is not in this process (e.g. ``hermes cron`` running standalone) and no live
-# DiscordAdapter instance is available.  Implements the same forum/thread/
-# multipart logic the live adapter would use, via Discord's REST API directly.
-#
-# This block was previously hosted in ``tools/send_message_tool.py`` as
-# ``_send_discord``.  It moved into the plugin so all Discord-specific HTTP
-# logic lives next to the adapter — same shape as Teams' ``_standalone_send``.
-
-# Process-local cache for Discord channel-type probes.  Avoids re-probing the
-# same channel on every send when the directory cache has no entry (e.g. fresh
-# install, or channel created after the last directory build).
-_DISCORD_CHANNEL_TYPE_PROBE_CACHE: Dict[str, bool] = {}
-
-
-def _remember_channel_is_forum(chat_id: str, is_forum: bool) -> None:
-    _DISCORD_CHANNEL_TYPE_PROBE_CACHE[str(chat_id)] = bool(is_forum)
-
-
-def _probe_is_forum_cached(chat_id: str) -> Optional[bool]:
-    return _DISCORD_CHANNEL_TYPE_PROBE_CACHE.get(str(chat_id))
-
-
-def _derive_forum_thread_name(message: str) -> str:
-    """Derive a thread name from the first line of the message, capped at 100 chars."""
-    first_line = message.strip().split("\n", 1)[0].strip()
-    # Strip common markdown heading prefixes
-    first_line = first_line.lstrip("#").strip()
-    if not first_line:
-        first_line = "New Post"
-    return first_line[:100]
-
-
-def _standalone_sanitize_error(text) -> str:
-    """Local copy of tools.send_message_tool._sanitize_error_text — strips bot
-    tokens from any error payload before bubbling it up.  Inlined so the
-    plugin doesn't introduce a hard dependency on send_message_tool internals.
-    """
-    s = str(text)
-    # Mask anything that looks like a Bot token in an Authorization header.
-    import re as _re_san
-    return _re_san.sub(
-        r"(Authorization:\s*Bot\s+)\S+",
-        r"\1***",
-        s,
-        flags=_re_san.IGNORECASE,
-    )
-
-
-async def _standalone_send(
-    pconfig,
-    chat_id: str,
-    message: str,
-    *,
-    thread_id: Optional[str] = None,
-    media_files: Optional[list] = None,
-    force_document: bool = False,
-) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Send via Discord REST API without a live gateway adapter.
-
-    Used by ``tools/send_message_tool._send_via_adapter`` when the gateway
-    runner is not in this process.  Reads ``DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN`` from
-    ``pconfig.token`` (set by the gateway config loader from env) and falls
-    back to the ``DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN`` env var.
-
-    Forum channels (type 15) reject ``POST /messages`` — a thread post is
-    created automatically via ``POST /channels/{id}/threads``.  Media files
-    are uploaded as multipart attachments on the starter message of the new
-    thread.  Channel type is resolved from the channel directory first, then
-    a process-local probe cache, and only as a last resort with a live
-    ``GET /channels/{id}`` probe (whose result is memoized).
-
-    ``force_document`` is accepted for signature parity but unused — Discord
-    treats every uploaded file as a generic attachment.
-    """
-    try:
-        import aiohttp
-    except ImportError:
-        return {"error": "aiohttp not installed. Run: pip install aiohttp"}
-
-    token = (getattr(pconfig, "token", None) or os.getenv("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN", "")).strip()
-    if not token:
-        return {"error": "Discord standalone send: DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN is not set"}
-
-    try:
-        from gateway.platforms.base import resolve_proxy_url, proxy_kwargs_for_aiohttp
-        _proxy = resolve_proxy_url(platform_env_var="DISCORD_PROXY")
-        _sess_kw, _req_kw = proxy_kwargs_for_aiohttp(_proxy)
-        auth_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bot {token}"}
-        json_headers = {**auth_headers, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
-        media_files = media_files or []
-        last_data = None
-        warnings = []
-
-        # Thread endpoint: Discord threads are channels; send directly to the thread ID.
-        if thread_id:
-            url = f"https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/{thread_id}/messages"
-        else:
-            # Check if the target channel is a forum channel (type 15).
-            # Forum channels reject POST /messages — create a thread post instead.
-            # Three-layer detection: directory cache → process-local probe
-            # cache → GET /channels/{id} probe (with result memoized).
-            _channel_type = None
-            try:
-                from gateway.channel_directory import lookup_channel_type
-                _channel_type = lookup_channel_type("discord", chat_id)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-
-            if _channel_type == "forum":
-                is_forum = True
-            elif _channel_type is not None:
-                is_forum = False
-            else:
-                cached = _probe_is_forum_cached(chat_id)
-                if cached is not None:
-                    is_forum = cached
-                else:
-                    is_forum = False
-                    try:
-                        info_url = f"https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/{chat_id}"
-                        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=15), **_sess_kw) as info_sess:
-                            async with info_sess.get(info_url, headers=json_headers, **_req_kw) as info_resp:
-                                if info_resp.status == 200:
-                                    info = await info_resp.json()
-                                    is_forum = info.get("type") == 15
-                                    _remember_channel_is_forum(chat_id, is_forum)
-                    except Exception:
-                        logger.debug("Failed to probe channel type for %s", chat_id, exc_info=True)
-
-            if is_forum:
-                thread_name = _derive_forum_thread_name(message)
-                thread_url = f"https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/{chat_id}/threads"
-
-                # Filter to readable media files up front so we can pick the
-                # right code path (JSON vs multipart) before opening a session.
-                valid_media = []
-                for media_path, _is_voice in media_files:
-                    if not os.path.exists(media_path):
-                        warning = f"Media file not found, skipping: {media_path}"
-                        logger.warning(warning)
-                        warnings.append(warning)
-                        continue
-                    valid_media.append(media_path)
-
-                async with aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=60), **_sess_kw) as session:
-                    if valid_media:
-                        # Multipart: payload_json + files[N] creates a forum
-                        # thread with the starter message plus attachments in
-                        # a single API call.
-                        attachments_meta = [
-                            {"id": str(idx), "filename": os.path.basename(path)}
-                            for idx, path in enumerate(valid_media)
-                        ]
-                        starter_message = {"content": message, "attachments": attachments_meta}
-                        payload_json = json.dumps({"name": thread_name, "message": starter_message})
-
-                        form = aiohttp.FormData()
-                        form.add_field("payload_json", payload_json, content_type="application/json")
-
-                        try:
-                            for idx, media_path in enumerate(valid_media):
-                                with open(media_path, "rb") as fh:
-                                    form.add_field(
-                                        f"files[{idx}]",
-                                        fh.read(),
-                                        filename=os.path.basename(media_path),
-                                    )
-                            async with session.post(thread_url, headers=auth_headers, data=form, **_req_kw) as resp:
-                                if resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                                    body = await resp.text()
-                                    return {"error": f"Discord forum thread creation error ({resp.status}): {body}"}
-                                data = await resp.json()
-                        except Exception as e:
-                            return {"error": _standalone_sanitize_error(f"Discord forum thread upload failed: {e}")}
-                    else:
-                        # No media — simple JSON POST creates the thread with
-                        # just the text starter.
-                        async with session.post(
-                            thread_url,
-                            headers=json_headers,
-                            json={
-                                "name": thread_name,
-                                "message": {"content": message},
-                            },
-                            **_req_kw,
-                        ) as resp:
-                            if resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                                body = await resp.text()
-                                return {"error": f"Discord forum thread creation error ({resp.status}): {body}"}
-                            data = await resp.json()
-
-                thread_id_created = data.get("id")
-                starter_msg_id = (data.get("message") or {}).get("id", thread_id_created)
-                result = {
-                    "success": True,
-                    "platform": "discord",
-                    "chat_id": chat_id,
-                    "thread_id": thread_id_created,
-                    "message_id": starter_msg_id,
-                }
-                if warnings:
-                    result["warnings"] = warnings
-                return result
-
-            url = f"https://discord.com/api/v10/channels/{chat_id}/messages"
-
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30), **_sess_kw) as session:
-            # Send text message (skip if empty and media is present)
-            if message.strip() or not media_files:
-                async with session.post(url, headers=json_headers, json={"content": message}, **_req_kw) as resp:
-                    if resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                        body = await resp.text()
-                        return {"error": f"Discord API error ({resp.status}): {body}"}
-                    last_data = await resp.json()
-
-            # Send each media file as a separate multipart upload
-            for media_path, _is_voice in media_files:
-                if not os.path.exists(media_path):
-                    warning = f"Media file not found, skipping: {media_path}"
-                    logger.warning(warning)
-                    warnings.append(warning)
-                    continue
-                try:
-                    form = aiohttp.FormData()
-                    filename = os.path.basename(media_path)
-                    with open(media_path, "rb") as f:
-                        form.add_field("files[0]", f, filename=filename)
-                        async with session.post(url, headers=auth_headers, data=form, **_req_kw) as resp:
-                            if resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                                body = await resp.text()
-                                warning = _standalone_sanitize_error(f"Failed to send media {media_path}: Discord API error ({resp.status}): {body}")
-                                logger.error(warning)
-                                warnings.append(warning)
-                                continue
-                            last_data = await resp.json()
-                except Exception as e:
-                    warning = _standalone_sanitize_error(f"Failed to send media {media_path}: {e}")
-                    logger.error(warning)
-                    warnings.append(warning)
-
-        if last_data is None:
-            error = "No deliverable text or media remained after processing"
-            if warnings:
-                return {"error": error, "warnings": warnings}
-            return {"error": error}
-
-        result = {"success": True, "platform": "discord", "chat_id": chat_id, "message_id": last_data.get("id")}
-        if warnings:
-            result["warnings"] = warnings
-        return result
-    except Exception as e:
-        return {"error": _standalone_sanitize_error(f"Discord send failed: {e}")}
-
-
-# ── Plugin entry point ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def _clean_discord_user_ids(raw: str) -> list:
-    """Strip common Discord mention prefixes from a comma-separated ID string."""
-    cleaned = []
-    for uid in raw.replace(" ", "").split(","):
-        uid = uid.strip()
-        if uid.startswith("<@") and uid.endswith(">"):
-            uid = uid.lstrip("<@!").rstrip(">")
-        if uid.lower().startswith("user:"):
-            uid = uid[5:]
-        if uid:
-            cleaned.append(uid)
-    return cleaned
-
-
-def interactive_setup() -> None:
-    """Guide the user through Discord bot setup.
-
-    Mirrors Teams' ``interactive_setup`` shape: lazy-imports CLI helpers so
-    the plugin's import surface stays small, prompts for the bot token,
-    captures an allowlist, and offers to set a home channel.
-    """
-    from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value, save_env_value
-    from hermes_cli.cli_output import (
-        prompt,
-        prompt_yes_no,
-        print_header,
-        print_info,
-        print_success,
-    )
-
-    print_header("Discord")
-    existing = get_env_value("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN")
-    if existing:
-        print_info("Discord: already configured")
-        if not prompt_yes_no("Reconfigure Discord?", False):
-            if not get_env_value("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS"):
-                print_info("⚠️  Discord has no user allowlist - anyone can use your bot!")
-                if prompt_yes_no("Add allowed users now?", True):
-                    print_info("   To find Discord ID: Enable Developer Mode, right-click name → Copy ID")
-                    allowed_users = prompt("Allowed user IDs (comma-separated)")
-                    if allowed_users:
-                        cleaned_ids = _clean_discord_user_ids(allowed_users)
-                        save_env_value("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", ",".join(cleaned_ids))
-                        print_success("Discord allowlist configured")
-            return
-
-    print_info("Create a bot at https://discord.com/developers/applications")
-    token = prompt("Discord bot token", password=True)
-    if not token:
-        return
-    save_env_value("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN", token)
-    print_success("Discord token saved")
-
-    print()
-    print_info("🔒 Security: Restrict who can use your bot")
-    print_info("   To find your Discord user ID:")
-    print_info("   1. Enable Developer Mode in Discord settings")
-    print_info("   2. Right-click your name → Copy ID")
-    print()
-    print_info("   You can also use Discord usernames (resolved on gateway start).")
-    print()
-    allowed_users = prompt(
-        "Allowed user IDs or usernames (comma-separated, leave empty for open access)"
-    )
-    if allowed_users:
-        cleaned_ids = _clean_discord_user_ids(allowed_users)
-        save_env_value("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", ",".join(cleaned_ids))
-        print_success("Discord allowlist configured")
-    else:
-        print_info("⚠️  No allowlist set - anyone in servers with your bot can use it!")
-
-    print()
-    print_info("📬 Home Channel: where Hermes delivers cron job results,")
-    print_info("   cross-platform messages, and notifications.")
-    print_info("   To get a channel ID: right-click a channel → Copy Channel ID")
-    print_info("   (requires Developer Mode in Discord settings)")
-    print_info("   You can also set this later by typing /set-home in a Discord channel.")
-    home_channel = prompt("Home channel ID (leave empty to set later with /set-home)")
-    if home_channel:
-        save_env_value("DISCORD_HOME_CHANNEL", home_channel)
-
-
-def _apply_yaml_config(yaml_cfg: dict, discord_cfg: dict) -> dict | None:
-    """Translate ``config.yaml`` ``discord:`` keys into env vars.
-
-    Implements the ``apply_yaml_config_fn`` contract (#24836).  Mirrors the
-    legacy ``discord_cfg`` block that used to live in
-    ``gateway/config.py::load_gateway_config()`` before this migration.
-
-    The DiscordAdapter reads its runtime configuration via ``os.getenv()``
-    throughout the connect / handle code paths (``DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION``,
-    ``DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS``, ``DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD``,
-    ``DISCORD_REACTIONS``, ``DISCORD_IGNORED_CHANNELS``,
-    ``DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS``, ``DISCORD_NO_THREAD_CHANNELS``,
-    ``DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL``, ``DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL_LIMIT``,
-    ``DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_*``, ``DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE``,
-    ``DISCORD_THREAD_REQUIRE_MENTION``).  Rather than rewrite ~50 call sites
-    inside the adapter to read from ``PlatformConfig.extra`` instead, this
-    hook keeps the existing env-driven model and merely owns the
-    YAML→env translation here, next to the adapter that consumes it.
-
-    Env vars take precedence over YAML — every assignment is guarded by
-    ``not os.getenv(...)`` so explicit env vars survive a config.yaml
-    update.  Returns ``None`` because no extras are seeded into
-    ``PlatformConfig.extra`` directly (everything flows through env).
-    """
-    if "require_mention" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(discord_cfg["require_mention"]).lower()
-    if "thread_require_mention" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_THREAD_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_THREAD_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(discord_cfg["thread_require_mention"]).lower()
-    frc = discord_cfg.get("free_response_channels")
-    if frc is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(frc, list):
-            frc = ",".join(str(v) for v in frc)
-        os.environ["DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"] = str(frc)
-    if "auto_thread" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD"] = str(discord_cfg["auto_thread"]).lower()
-    if "reactions" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REACTIONS"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_REACTIONS"] = str(discord_cfg["reactions"]).lower()
-    # ignored_channels: channels where bot never responds (even when mentioned)
-    ic = discord_cfg.get("ignored_channels")
-    if ic is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_IGNORED_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(ic, list):
-            ic = ",".join(str(v) for v in ic)
-        os.environ["DISCORD_IGNORED_CHANNELS"] = str(ic)
-    # allowed_channels: if set, bot ONLY responds in these channels (whitelist)
-    ac = discord_cfg.get("allowed_channels")
-    if ac is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(ac, list):
-            ac = ",".join(str(v) for v in ac)
-        os.environ["DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"] = str(ac)
-    # no_thread_channels: channels where bot responds directly without creating thread
-    ntc = discord_cfg.get("no_thread_channels")
-    if ntc is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_NO_THREAD_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(ntc, list):
-            ntc = ",".join(str(v) for v in ntc)
-        os.environ["DISCORD_NO_THREAD_CHANNELS"] = str(ntc)
-    # history_backfill: recover missed channel messages for shared sessions
-    # when require_mention is active.  Fetches messages between bot turns
-    # and prepends them to the user message for context.
-    if "history_backfill" in discord_cfg and not os.getenv("DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL"] = str(discord_cfg["history_backfill"]).lower()
-    hbl = discord_cfg.get("history_backfill_limit")
-    if hbl is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL_LIMIT"):
-        os.environ["DISCORD_HISTORY_BACKFILL_LIMIT"] = str(hbl)
-    # allow_mentions: granular control over what the bot can ping.
-    # Safe defaults (no @everyone/roles) are applied in the adapter;
-    # these YAML keys only override when set and let users opt back
-    # into unsafe modes (e.g. roles=true) if they actually want it.
-    allow_mentions_cfg = discord_cfg.get("allow_mentions")
-    if isinstance(allow_mentions_cfg, dict):
-        for yaml_key, env_key in (
-            ("everyone", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_EVERYONE"),
-            ("roles", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_ROLES"),
-            ("users", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_USERS"),
-            ("replied_user", "DISCORD_ALLOW_MENTION_REPLIED_USER"),
-        ):
-            if yaml_key in allow_mentions_cfg and not os.getenv(env_key):
-                os.environ[env_key] = str(allow_mentions_cfg[yaml_key]).lower()
-    # reply_to_mode: top-level preferred, falls back to extra.reply_to_mode.
-    # YAML 1.1 parses bare 'off' as boolean False — coerce to string "off".
-    _discord_extra = discord_cfg.get("extra") if isinstance(discord_cfg.get("extra"), dict) else {}
-    _discord_rtm = (
-        discord_cfg["reply_to_mode"] if "reply_to_mode" in discord_cfg
-        else _discord_extra.get("reply_to_mode")
-    )
-    if _discord_rtm is not None and not os.getenv("DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE"):
-        _rtm_str = "off" if _discord_rtm is False else str(_discord_rtm).lower()
-        os.environ["DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE"] = _rtm_str
-    return None  # all settings flow through env; nothing to merge into extras
-
-
-def _is_connected(config) -> bool:
-    """Discord is considered connected when DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN is set.
-
-    Looks up via ``hermes_cli.gateway.get_env_value`` at call time (not via
-    the plugin's own bound import) so tests that patch ``gateway_mod.get_env_value``
-    — including ``test_setup_openclaw_migration`` — can suppress ambient
-    ``DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN`` env vars. Matches what the legacy
-    ``_PLATFORMS["discord"]`` dispatch did before this migration.
-    """
-    import hermes_cli.gateway as gateway_mod
-    return bool((gateway_mod.get_env_value("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN") or "").strip())
-
-
-def _build_adapter(config):
-    """Factory wrapper that constructs DiscordAdapter from a PlatformConfig."""
-    return DiscordAdapter(config)
-
-
-def register(ctx) -> None:
-    """Plugin entry point — called by the Hermes plugin system."""
-    ctx.register_platform(
-        name="discord",
-        label="Discord",
-        adapter_factory=_build_adapter,
-        check_fn=check_discord_requirements,
-        is_connected=_is_connected,
-        required_env=["DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN"],
-        install_hint="pip install 'hermes-agent[discord]'",
-        # Interactive setup wizard — replaces the central
-        # hermes_cli/setup.py::_setup_discord function.  Same shape as Teams.
-        setup_fn=interactive_setup,
-        # YAML→env config bridge — owns the translation of ``config.yaml``
-        # ``discord:`` keys (require_mention, free_response_channels,
-        # auto_thread, reactions, ignored_channels, allowed_channels,
-        # no_thread_channels, allow_mentions.*, reply_to_mode,
-        # thread_require_mention) into ``DISCORD_*`` env vars that the
-        # adapter reads via ``os.getenv()``.  Replaces the hardcoded block
-        # that used to live in ``gateway/config.py``.  Hook contract: #24836.
-        apply_yaml_config_fn=_apply_yaml_config,
-        # Auth env vars for _is_user_authorized() integration
-        allowed_users_env="DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS",
-        allow_all_env="DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
-        # Cron home-channel delivery
-        cron_deliver_env_var="DISCORD_HOME_CHANNEL",
-        # Out-of-process cron delivery via Discord REST API.  Without this
-        # hook, ``deliver=discord`` cron jobs fail with "No live adapter"
-        # when cron runs separately from the gateway.  Mirrors Teams pattern.
-        standalone_sender_fn=_standalone_send,
-        # Discord hard limit per message
-        max_message_length=2000,
-        # Display
-        emoji="🎮",
-        allow_update_command=True,
-    )

gateway/platforms/feishu.py

@@ -1514,10 +1514,8 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             connection_mode=str(
                 extra.get("connection_mode") or os.getenv("FEISHU_CONNECTION_MODE", "websocket")
             ).strip().lower(),
-            encrypt_key=str(extra.get("encrypt_key") or os.getenv("FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY", "")).strip(),
-            verification_token=str(
-                extra.get("verification_token") or os.getenv("FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN", "")
-            ).strip(),
+            encrypt_key=os.getenv("FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY", "").strip(),
+            verification_token=os.getenv("FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN", "").strip(),
             group_policy=os.getenv("FEISHU_GROUP_POLICY", "allowlist").strip().lower(),
             allowed_group_users=frozenset(
                 item.strip()
@@ -1644,11 +1642,6 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 self._connection_mode,
             )
             return False
-        if self._connection_mode == "webhook" and not (self._verification_token or self._encrypt_key):
-            logger.error(
-                "[Feishu] Webhook mode requires FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN or FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY."
-            )
-            return False
 
         try:
             self._app_lock_identity = self._app_id
@@ -2570,44 +2563,13 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         if approval_id is None:
             logger.debug("[Feishu] Card action missing approval_id, ignoring")
             return P2CardActionTriggerResponse() if P2CardActionTriggerResponse else None
-        state = self._approval_state.get(approval_id)
-        if not state:
-            logger.debug("[Feishu] Approval %s already resolved or unknown", approval_id)
-            return P2CardActionTriggerResponse() if P2CardActionTriggerResponse else None
         choice = _APPROVAL_CHOICE_MAP.get(action_value.get("hermes_action"), "deny")
 
         operator = getattr(event, "operator", None)
         open_id = str(getattr(operator, "open_id", "") or "")
-        sender_id = SimpleNamespace(open_id=open_id, user_id=str(getattr(operator, "user_id", "") or ""))
-        if not self._allow_group_message(sender_id, state.get("chat_id", ""), is_bot=False):
-            logger.warning("[Feishu] Unauthorized approval click by %s", open_id or "<unknown>")
-            return P2CardActionTriggerResponse() if P2CardActionTriggerResponse else None
-
-        callback_chat_id = str(getattr(getattr(event, "context", None), "open_chat_id", "") or "")
-        expected_chat_id = str(state.get("chat_id", "") or "")
-        if callback_chat_id and expected_chat_id and callback_chat_id != expected_chat_id:
-            logger.warning(
-                "[Feishu] Approval callback chat mismatch for %s (expected=%s, got=%s)",
-                approval_id,
-                expected_chat_id,
-                callback_chat_id,
-            )
-            return P2CardActionTriggerResponse() if P2CardActionTriggerResponse else None
-
         user_name = self._get_cached_sender_name(open_id) or open_id
 
-        chat_context = getattr(event, "context", None)
-        chat_id = str(getattr(chat_context, "open_chat_id", "") or "")
-        if not self._submit_on_loop(
-            loop,
-            self._resolve_approval(
-                approval_id=approval_id,
-                choice=choice,
-                user_name=user_name,
-                open_id=open_id,
-                chat_id=chat_id,
-            ),
-        ):
+        if not self._submit_on_loop(loop, self._resolve_approval(approval_id, choice, user_name)):
             return P2CardActionTriggerResponse() if P2CardActionTriggerResponse else None
 
         if P2CardActionTriggerResponse is None:
@@ -2655,33 +2617,11 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             response.card = card
         return response
 
-    async def _resolve_approval(
-        self,
-        approval_id: Any,
-        choice: str,
-        user_name: str,
-        *,
-        open_id: str = "",
-        chat_id: str = "",
-    ) -> None:
+    async def _resolve_approval(self, approval_id: Any, choice: str, user_name: str) -> None:
         """Pop approval state and unblock the waiting agent thread."""
-        state = self._approval_state.get(approval_id)
-        if not state:
-            logger.debug("[Feishu] Approval %s already resolved or unknown", approval_id)
-            return
-        if not self._is_interactive_operator_authorized(open_id):
-            logger.warning("[Feishu] Unauthorized approval click by %s for approval %s", open_id or "<unknown>", approval_id)
-            return
-        expected_chat_id = str(state.get("chat_id", "") or "")
-        if expected_chat_id and chat_id and expected_chat_id != chat_id:
-            logger.warning(
-                "[Feishu] Approval %s chat mismatch (expected=%s, got=%s)",
-                approval_id, expected_chat_id, chat_id,
-            )
-            return
         state = self._approval_state.pop(approval_id, None)
         if not state:
-            logger.debug("[Feishu] Approval %s already resolved while validating callback", approval_id)
+            logger.debug("[Feishu] Approval %s already resolved or unknown", approval_id)
             return
         try:
             from tools.approval import resolve_gateway_approval
@@ -3289,6 +3229,11 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             self._record_webhook_anomaly(remote_ip, "400")
             return web.json_response({"code": 400, "msg": "invalid json"}, status=400)
 
+        # URL verification challenge — respond before other checks so that Feishu's
+        # subscription setup works even before encrypt_key is wired.
+        if payload.get("type") == "url_verification":
+            return web.json_response({"challenge": payload.get("challenge", "")})
+
         # Verification token check — second layer of defence beyond signature (matches openclaw).
         if self._verification_token:
             header = payload.get("header") or {}
@@ -3298,13 +3243,6 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 self._record_webhook_anomaly(remote_ip, "401-token")
                 return web.Response(status=401, text="Invalid verification token")
 
-        # URL verification challenge — Feishu includes the verification token in
-        # challenge requests. Validate the token (above) before reflecting the
-        # challenge so an unauthenticated remote request cannot prove endpoint
-        # control by getting attacker-supplied challenge data echoed back.
-        if payload.get("type") == "url_verification":
-            return web.json_response({"challenge": payload.get("challenge", "")})
-
         # Timing-safe signature verification (only enforced when encrypt_key is set).
         if self._encrypt_key and not self._is_webhook_signature_valid(request.headers, body_bytes):
             logger.warning("[Feishu] Webhook rejected: invalid signature from %s", remote_ip)

gateway/platforms/matrix.py

@@ -138,8 +138,7 @@ _OUTBOUND_MENTION_RE = re.compile(
 )
 
 _E2EE_INSTALL_HINT = (
-    "Install with: pip install 'mautrix[encryption]' asyncpg aiosqlite  "
-    "(requires libolm C library)"
+    "Install with: pip install 'mautrix[encryption]'  (requires libolm C library)"
 )
 
 _MATRIX_IMAGE_FILENAME_EXTS = frozenset({
@@ -215,22 +214,9 @@ def _create_matrix_session(proxy_url: str | None):
 
 
 def _check_e2ee_deps() -> bool:
-    """Return True if mautrix E2EE dependencies are available.
-
-    Verifies python-olm (via mautrix.crypto.OlmMachine), the SQLite crypto
-    store backend (mautrix.crypto.store.asyncpg.PgCryptoStore — yes, the
-    PgCryptoStore class also drives the sqlite backend in mautrix 0.21),
-    and the database drivers actually used at connect time (``asyncpg`` for
-    the underlying upgrade_table machinery, ``aiosqlite`` for the
-    ``sqlite:///`` URL we pass to ``Database.create``).  Without all four,
-    encrypted rooms fail at connect time with a confusing
-    ``No module named 'asyncpg'`` (#31116).
-    """
+    """Return True if mautrix E2EE dependencies (python-olm) are available."""
     try:
         from mautrix.crypto import OlmMachine  # noqa: F401
-        from mautrix.crypto.store.asyncpg import PgCryptoStore  # noqa: F401
-        import asyncpg  # noqa: F401
-        import aiosqlite  # noqa: F401
 
         return True
     except (ImportError, AttributeError):
@@ -240,13 +226,8 @@ def _check_e2ee_deps() -> bool:
 def check_matrix_requirements() -> bool:
     """Return True if the Matrix adapter can be used.
 
-    Lazy-installs the full ``platform.matrix`` feature group via
-    ``tools.lazy_deps.ensure_and_bind`` whenever any of the declared
-    packages (mautrix, Markdown, aiosqlite, asyncpg, aiohttp-socks) is
-    missing — not just mautrix itself.  Previously this short-circuited on
-    ``import mautrix``, which left the other four packages uninstalled
-    forever and broke E2EE connect with ``No module named 'asyncpg'``
-    (#31116).  Rebinds module-level type globals on success.
+    Lazy-installs mautrix via ``tools.lazy_deps.ensure("platform.matrix")``
+    on first call if not present. Rebinds all module-level type globals on success.
     """
     token = os.getenv("MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN", "")
     password = os.getenv("MATRIX_PASSWORD", "")
@@ -258,20 +239,9 @@ def check_matrix_requirements() -> bool:
     if not homeserver:
         logger.warning("Matrix: MATRIX_HOMESERVER not set")
         return False
-
-    # Check whether any package in the platform.matrix feature group is
-    # missing.  ``feature_missing`` is cheap (per-spec importlib.metadata
-    # lookups) and correctly handles ``mautrix[encryption]`` by stripping
-    # the extras marker before checking the bare package.
     try:
-        from tools.lazy_deps import feature_missing, ensure_and_bind
-        missing = feature_missing("platform.matrix")
-    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover — defensive
-        logger.debug("Matrix: lazy_deps lookup failed: %s", exc)
-        missing = ()
-        ensure_and_bind = None  # type: ignore[assignment]
-
-    if missing or ensure_and_bind is None:
+        import mautrix  # noqa: F401
+    except ImportError:
         def _import():
             from mautrix.types import (
                 ContentURI, EventID, EventType, PaginationDirection,
@@ -291,14 +261,10 @@ def check_matrix_requirements() -> bool:
                 "UserID": UserID,
             }
 
-        if ensure_and_bind is None:
-            return False
+        from tools.lazy_deps import ensure_and_bind
         if not ensure_and_bind("platform.matrix", _import, globals(), prompt=False):
             logger.warning(
-                "Matrix: required packages not installed (%s). "
-                "Run: pip install 'mautrix[encryption]' asyncpg aiosqlite "
-                "Markdown aiohttp-socks",
-                ", ".join(missing) if missing else "platform.matrix",
+                "Matrix: mautrix not installed. Run: pip install 'mautrix[encryption]'"
             )
             return False
 

gateway/platforms/mattermost.py

@@ -871,322 +871,3 @@ class MattermostAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         await self.handle_message(msg_event)
 
 
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Plugin standalone-send (out-of-process cron delivery via Mattermost REST)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-async def _standalone_send(
-    pconfig,
-    chat_id: str,
-    message: str,
-    *,
-    thread_id: Optional[str] = None,
-    media_files: Optional[list] = None,
-    force_document: bool = False,
-) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Send via the Mattermost v4 REST API without a live gateway adapter.
-
-    Used by ``tools/send_message_tool._send_via_adapter`` when the gateway
-    runner is not in this process (typical for cron jobs running out-of-process).
-    Reads ``MATTERMOST_TOKEN`` from ``pconfig.token`` (set by the gateway
-    config loader from env) and falls back to the ``MATTERMOST_TOKEN`` env
-    var.  Server URL comes from ``pconfig.extra["url"]`` (set by the YAML
-    bridge / env loader) or the ``MATTERMOST_URL`` env var.
-
-    Thread replies (Mattermost CRT) are supported via the ``root_id`` field
-    on the ``POST /posts`` payload — pass ``thread_id`` when threading is
-    desired.  ``media_files`` are uploaded via ``POST /files``
-    (multipart/form-data), then their returned ``file_id`` values are
-    attached to the post.
-
-    ``force_document`` is accepted for signature parity with other
-    standalone senders but unused — Mattermost stores every uploaded file
-    as a generic attachment regardless.
-    """
-    try:
-        import aiohttp
-    except ImportError:
-        return {"error": "aiohttp not installed. Run: pip install aiohttp"}
-
-    base_url = (
-        (getattr(pconfig, "extra", {}) or {}).get("url")
-        or os.getenv("MATTERMOST_URL", "")
-    ).rstrip("/")
-    token = (getattr(pconfig, "token", None) or os.getenv("MATTERMOST_TOKEN", "")).strip()
-    if not base_url or not token:
-        return {
-            "error": (
-                "Mattermost standalone send: MATTERMOST_URL and "
-                "MATTERMOST_TOKEN must both be set"
-            )
-        }
-
-    headers = {
-        "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
-        "Content-Type": "application/json",
-    }
-    upload_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
-
-    media_files = media_files or []
-
-    try:
-        # Resolve proxy + session kwargs once so a single ClientSession can
-        # cover the optional file uploads + final post.
-        from gateway.platforms.base import resolve_proxy_url, proxy_kwargs_for_aiohttp
-        _proxy = resolve_proxy_url(platform_env_var="MATTERMOST_PROXY")
-        _sess_kw, _req_kw = proxy_kwargs_for_aiohttp(_proxy)
-
-        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(
-            timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=60),
-            **_sess_kw,
-        ) as session:
-            # 1. Upload media (if any) and collect file_ids.
-            file_ids: List[str] = []
-            for media in media_files:
-                file_path = media.get("path") if isinstance(media, dict) else media
-                if not file_path or not os.path.exists(file_path):
-                    continue
-                form = aiohttp.FormData()
-                # Mattermost requires channel_id on file uploads so the
-                # server can attribute them.
-                form.add_field("channel_id", chat_id)
-                with open(file_path, "rb") as fh:
-                    form.add_field(
-                        "files",
-                        fh.read(),
-                        filename=os.path.basename(file_path),
-                    )
-                async with session.post(
-                    f"{base_url}/api/v4/files",
-                    data=form,
-                    headers=upload_headers,
-                    **_req_kw,
-                ) as upload_resp:
-                    if upload_resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                        body = await upload_resp.text()
-                        return {
-                            "error": (
-                                f"Mattermost file upload failed "
-                                f"({upload_resp.status}): {body[:400]}"
-                            )
-                        }
-                    upload_data = await upload_resp.json()
-                    for info in upload_data.get("file_infos", []):
-                        if info.get("id"):
-                            file_ids.append(info["id"])
-
-            # 2. Post the message (with thread root + attached file_ids).
-            payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
-                "channel_id": chat_id,
-                "message": message,
-            }
-            if thread_id:
-                payload["root_id"] = thread_id
-            if file_ids:
-                payload["file_ids"] = file_ids
-            async with session.post(
-                f"{base_url}/api/v4/posts",
-                headers=headers,
-                json=payload,
-                **_req_kw,
-            ) as resp:
-                if resp.status not in {200, 201}:
-                    body = await resp.text()
-                    return {
-                        "error": (
-                            f"Mattermost API error ({resp.status}): "
-                            f"{body[:400]}"
-                        )
-                    }
-                data = await resp.json()
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "platform": "mattermost",
-                "chat_id": chat_id,
-                "message_id": data.get("id"),
-            }
-    except aiohttp.ClientError as exc:
-        return {"error": f"Mattermost send failed (network): {exc}"}
-    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
-        return {"error": f"Mattermost send failed: {exc}"}
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Interactive setup wizard
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def interactive_setup() -> None:
-    """Guide the user through Mattermost bot setup.
-
-    Mirrors Discord/Teams' ``interactive_setup`` shape: lazy-imports CLI
-    helpers so the plugin's import surface stays small, prompts for the
-    server URL + bot token, captures an allowlist, and offers to set a
-    home channel.  Replaces the central
-    ``hermes_cli/setup.py::_setup_mattermost`` function this migration
-    removes.
-    """
-    from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value, save_env_value
-    from hermes_cli.cli_output import (
-        prompt,
-        prompt_yes_no,
-        print_header,
-        print_info,
-        print_success,
-    )
-
-    print_header("Mattermost")
-    existing = get_env_value("MATTERMOST_TOKEN")
-    if existing:
-        print_info("Mattermost: already configured")
-        if not prompt_yes_no("Reconfigure Mattermost?", False):
-            return
-
-    print_info("Works with any self-hosted Mattermost instance.")
-    print_info("   1. In Mattermost: Integrations → Bot Accounts → Add Bot Account")
-    print_info("   2. Copy the bot token")
-    print()
-    mm_url = prompt("Mattermost server URL (e.g. https://mm.example.com)")
-    if mm_url:
-        save_env_value("MATTERMOST_URL", mm_url.rstrip("/"))
-    token = prompt("Bot token", password=True)
-    if not token:
-        return
-    save_env_value("MATTERMOST_TOKEN", token)
-    print_success("Mattermost token saved")
-
-    print()
-    print_info("🔒 Security: Restrict who can use your bot")
-    print_info("   To find your user ID: click your avatar → Profile")
-    print_info("   or use the API: GET /api/v4/users/me")
-    print()
-    allowed_users = prompt("Allowed user IDs (comma-separated, leave empty for open access)")
-    if allowed_users:
-        save_env_value("MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS", allowed_users.replace(" ", ""))
-        print_success("Mattermost allowlist configured")
-    else:
-        print_info("⚠️  No allowlist set - anyone who can message the bot can use it!")
-
-    print()
-    print_info("📬 Home Channel: where Hermes delivers cron job results and notifications.")
-    print_info("   To get a channel ID: click channel name → View Info → copy the ID")
-    print_info("   You can also set this later by typing /set-home in a Mattermost channel.")
-    home_channel = prompt("Home channel ID (leave empty to set later with /set-home)")
-    if home_channel:
-        save_env_value("MATTERMOST_HOME_CHANNEL", home_channel)
-    print_info("   Open config in your editor:  hermes config edit")
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# YAML → env config bridge (apply_yaml_config_fn, #25443)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _apply_yaml_config(yaml_cfg: dict, mattermost_cfg: dict) -> dict | None:
-    """Translate ``config.yaml`` ``mattermost:`` keys into env vars.
-
-    Implements the ``apply_yaml_config_fn`` contract (#24836 / #25443).
-    Mirrors the legacy ``mattermost_cfg`` block that used to live in
-    ``gateway/config.py::load_gateway_config()`` before this migration.
-
-    The MattermostAdapter reads its runtime configuration via
-    ``os.getenv()`` for ``MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION``,
-    ``MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS``, and
-    ``MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS``.  Rather than rewrite those call sites
-    to read from ``PlatformConfig.extra``, this hook keeps the env-driven
-    model and merely owns the YAML→env translation here, next to the
-    adapter that consumes it.
-
-    Env vars take precedence over YAML — every assignment is guarded
-    by ``not os.getenv(...)`` so an explicit env var survives a config.yaml
-    update.  Returns ``None`` because no extras are seeded into
-    ``PlatformConfig.extra`` directly (everything flows through env).
-    """
-    if "require_mention" in mattermost_cfg and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION"):
-        os.environ["MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION"] = str(mattermost_cfg["require_mention"]).lower()
-    frc = mattermost_cfg.get("free_response_channels")
-    if frc is not None and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(frc, list):
-            frc = ",".join(str(v) for v in frc)
-        os.environ["MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS"] = str(frc)
-    # allowed_channels: if set, bot ONLY responds in these channels (whitelist)
-    ac = mattermost_cfg.get("allowed_channels")
-    if ac is not None and not os.getenv("MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"):
-        if isinstance(ac, list):
-            ac = ",".join(str(v) for v in ac)
-        os.environ["MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS"] = str(ac)
-    return None  # all settings flow through env; nothing to merge into extras
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# is_connected probe
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _is_connected(config) -> bool:
-    """Mattermost is considered connected when BOTH MATTERMOST_TOKEN and
-    MATTERMOST_URL are set.
-
-    Looks up via ``hermes_cli.gateway.get_env_value`` at call time (not via
-    the plugin's own bound import) so tests that patch
-    ``gateway_mod.get_env_value`` can suppress ambient env vars.  Matches
-    what the legacy connected-platforms check did before this migration.
-    """
-    import hermes_cli.gateway as gateway_mod
-    return bool(
-        (gateway_mod.get_env_value("MATTERMOST_TOKEN") or "").strip()
-        and (gateway_mod.get_env_value("MATTERMOST_URL") or "").strip()
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Plugin registration entry point
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _build_adapter(config):
-    """Factory wrapper that constructs MattermostAdapter from a PlatformConfig."""
-    return MattermostAdapter(config)
-
-
-def register(ctx) -> None:
-    """Plugin entry point — called by the Hermes plugin system."""
-    ctx.register_platform(
-        name="mattermost",
-        label="Mattermost",
-        adapter_factory=_build_adapter,
-        check_fn=check_mattermost_requirements,
-        is_connected=_is_connected,
-        required_env=["MATTERMOST_URL", "MATTERMOST_TOKEN"],
-        install_hint="pip install aiohttp",
-        # Interactive setup wizard — replaces the central
-        # hermes_cli/setup.py::_setup_mattermost function.
-        setup_fn=interactive_setup,
-        # YAML→env config bridge — owns the translation of
-        # ``config.yaml`` ``mattermost:`` keys (require_mention,
-        # free_response_channels, allowed_channels) into ``MATTERMOST_*``
-        # env vars that the adapter reads via ``os.getenv()``.  Replaces
-        # the hardcoded block that used to live in ``gateway/config.py``.
-        # Hook contract: #24836 / #25443.
-        apply_yaml_config_fn=_apply_yaml_config,
-        # Auth env vars for _is_user_authorized() integration.
-        allowed_users_env="MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS",
-        allow_all_env="MATTERMOST_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
-        # Cron home-channel delivery.
-        cron_deliver_env_var="MATTERMOST_HOME_CHANNEL",
-        # Out-of-process cron delivery via Mattermost REST API.  Without
-        # this hook, ``deliver=mattermost`` cron jobs fail with "No live
-        # adapter" when cron runs separately from the gateway.  Mirrors
-        # the Discord / Teams pattern.
-        standalone_sender_fn=_standalone_send,
-        # Mattermost practical post-length limit (server default is 16383
-        # but 4000 is the readable threshold the adapter has used since
-        # day one).
-        max_message_length=MAX_POST_LENGTH,
-        # Display
-        emoji="💬",
-        allow_update_command=True,
-    )

gateway/platforms/msgraph_webhook.py

@@ -133,12 +133,6 @@ class MSGraphWebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         self._notification_scheduler = scheduler
 
     async def connect(self) -> bool:
-        if self._client_state is None:
-            logger.error(
-                "[msgraph_webhook] Refusing to start without extra.client_state configured"
-            )
-            return False
-
         app = web.Application()
         app.router.add_get(self._health_path, self._handle_health)
         app.router.add_get(self._webhook_path, self._handle_validation)
@@ -316,7 +310,7 @@ class MSGraphWebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         """
         expected = self._client_state
         if expected is None:
-            return False
+            return True
         provided = self._string_or_none(notification.get("clientState"))
         if provided is None:
             return False

gateway/platforms/qqbot/adapter.py

@@ -534,30 +534,9 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 self._mark_transport_disconnected()
                 self._fail_pending("Connection closed")
 
-                # Stop reconnecting for fatal codes (unrecoverable errors)
-                if code in {
-                        4001,  # Invalid opcode
-                        4002,  # Invalid payload
-                        4010,  # Invalid shard
-                        4011,  # Sharding required
-                        4012,  # Invalid API version
-                        4013,  # Invalid intent
-                        4014,  # Intent not authorized
-                        4914,  # Offline/sandbox-only
-                        4915,  # Banned
-                }:
-                    fatal_descriptions = {
-                        4001: "invalid opcode",
-                        4002: "invalid payload",
-                        4010: "invalid shard",
-                        4011: "sharding required",
-                        4012: "invalid API version",
-                        4013: "invalid intent",
-                        4014: "intent not authorized",
-                        4914: "offline/sandbox-only",
-                        4915: "banned",
-                    }
-                    desc = fatal_descriptions.get(code, f"fatal error (code={code})")
+                # Stop reconnecting for fatal codes
+                if code in {4914, 4915}:
+                    desc = "offline/sandbox-only" if code == 4914 else "banned"
                     logger.error(
                         "[%s] Bot is %s. Check QQ Open Platform.", self._log_tag, desc
                     )
@@ -594,11 +573,10 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                     self._token_expires_at = 0.0
 
                 # Session invalid → clear session, will re-identify on next Hello
-                # Note: 4009 (connection timeout) is NOT included here — it is
-                # resumable per the QQ protocol and should preserve session state.
                 if code in {
                         4006,
                         4007,
+                        4009,
                         4900,
                         4901,
                         4902,
@@ -727,8 +705,9 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 "token": f"QQBot {token}",
                 "intents": (1 << 25)
                            | (1 << 30)
-                           | (1 << 12)
-                           | (1 << 26),  # C2C_GROUP_AT_MESSAGES + PUBLIC_GUILD_MESSAGES + DIRECT_MESSAGE + INTERACTION
+                           | (
+                                   1 << 12
+                           ),  # C2C_GROUP_AT_MESSAGES + PUBLIC_GUILD_MESSAGES + DIRECT_MESSAGE
                 "shard": [0, 1],
                 "properties": {
                     "$os": "macOS",
@@ -847,32 +826,6 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         if op == 11:
             return
 
-        # op 7 = Server Reconnect — server asks client to reconnect (e.g.
-        # load-balancing, maintenance).  Close the WS so _read_events raises
-        # and the outer loop triggers a reconnect with Resume.
-        if op == 7:
-            logger.info("[%s] Server requested reconnect (op 7)", self._log_tag)
-            if self._ws and not self._ws.closed:
-                self._create_task(self._ws.close())
-            return
-
-        # op 9 = Invalid Session — d=True means session is resumable,
-        # d=False means we must re-identify from scratch.
-        if op == 9:
-            resumable = bool(d) if d is not None else False
-            if not resumable:
-                logger.info(
-                    "[%s] Invalid session (op 9, not resumable), clearing session",
-                    self._log_tag,
-                )
-                self._session_id = None
-                self._last_seq = None
-            else:
-                logger.info("[%s] Invalid session (op 9, resumable)", self._log_tag)
-            if self._ws and not self._ws.closed:
-                self._create_task(self._ws.close())
-            return
-
         logger.debug("[%s] Unknown op: %s", self._log_tag, op)
 
     def _handle_ready(self, d: Any) -> None:
@@ -1054,46 +1007,6 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         "deny": "deny",
     }
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _parse_gateway_session_key(session_key: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, str]]:
-        """Parse ``agent:main:<platform>:<chat_type>:<chat_id>[:<user_id>]``."""
-        parts = str(session_key or "").split(":")
-        if len(parts) < 5 or parts[0] != "agent" or parts[1] != "main":
-            return None
-        parsed = {
-            "platform": parts[2],
-            "chat_type": parts[3],
-            "chat_id": parts[4],
-        }
-        if len(parts) > 5:
-            parsed["user_id"] = parts[5]
-        return parsed
-
-    def _is_authorized_interaction_for_session(
-            self,
-            event: InteractionEvent,
-            session_key: str,
-    ) -> bool:
-        """Authorize approval/update interactions against session + operator."""
-        parsed = self._parse_gateway_session_key(session_key)
-        operator = str(event.operator_openid or "").strip()
-        if not parsed or parsed.get("platform") != "qqbot" or not operator:
-            return False
-
-        chat_type = parsed.get("chat_type", "")
-        chat_id = parsed.get("chat_id", "")
-        if chat_type == "c2c":
-            return bool(chat_id) and operator == chat_id
-
-        if chat_type in {"group", "guild"}:
-            event_chat = str(event.group_openid or event.guild_id or "").strip()
-            if not event_chat or event_chat != chat_id:
-                return False
-            session_user = str(parsed.get("user_id", "")).strip()
-            return bool(session_user) and operator == session_user
-
-        return False
-
     async def _default_interaction_dispatch(
             self,
             event: InteractionEvent,
@@ -1127,13 +1040,6 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                     self._log_tag, decision, session_key,
                 )
                 return
-            if not self._is_authorized_interaction_for_session(event, session_key):
-                logger.warning(
-                    "[%s] Rejected unauthorized approval click for session %s "
-                    "(operator=%s)",
-                    self._log_tag, session_key, event.operator_openid,
-                )
-                return
             try:
                 # Import lazily to keep the adapter importable in tests that
                 # don't exercise the approval subsystem.
@@ -1154,13 +1060,6 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
 
         update_answer = parse_update_prompt_button_data(button_data)
         if update_answer is not None:
-            update_session_key = f"agent:main:qqbot:{event.scene}:{event.group_openid or event.guild_id or event.user_openid}"
-            if not self._is_authorized_interaction_for_session(event, update_session_key):
-                logger.warning(
-                    "[%s] Rejected unauthorized update prompt click (operator=%s)",
-                    self._log_tag, event.operator_openid,
-                )
-                return
             self._write_update_response(update_answer, event.operator_openid)
             return
 
@@ -1708,7 +1607,7 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             elif ct.startswith("image/"):
                 # Image: download and cache locally.
                 try:
-                    cached_path = await self._download_and_cache(url, ct, filename)
+                    cached_path = await self._download_and_cache(url, ct)
                     if cached_path and os.path.isfile(cached_path):
                         image_urls.append(cached_path)
                         image_media_types.append(ct or "image/jpeg")
@@ -1721,15 +1620,11 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 except Exception as exc:
                     logger.debug("[%s] Failed to cache image: %s", self._log_tag, exc)
             else:
-                # Other attachments (video, file, etc.): download and record with path.
+                # Other attachments (video, file, etc.): record as text.
                 try:
-                    cached_path = await self._download_and_cache(url, ct, filename)
+                    cached_path = await self._download_and_cache(url, ct)
                     if cached_path:
-                        name = filename or ct
-                        if ct.startswith("video/"):
-                            other_attachments.append(f"[video: {name} ({cached_path})]")
-                        else:
-                            other_attachments.append(f"[file: {name} ({cached_path})]")
+                        other_attachments.append(f"[Attachment: {filename or ct}]")
                 except Exception as exc:
                     logger.debug("[%s] Failed to cache attachment: %s", self._log_tag, exc)
 
@@ -1741,14 +1636,8 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             "attachment_info": attachment_info,
         }
 
-    async def _download_and_cache(
-            self, url: str, content_type: str, original_name: str = "",
-    ) -> Optional[str]:
-        """Download a URL and cache it locally.
-
-        :param original_name: Preferred filename from attachment metadata.
-            Falls back to the URL path basename if empty.
-        """
+    async def _download_and_cache(self, url: str, content_type: str) -> Optional[str]:
+        """Download a URL and cache it locally."""
         from tools.url_safety import is_safe_url
 
         if not is_safe_url(url):
@@ -1779,11 +1668,7 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             # Convert to .wav using ffmpeg so STT engines can process it.
             return await self._convert_audio_to_wav(data, url)
         else:
-            filename = (
-                original_name
-                or Path(urlparse(url).path).name
-                or "qq_attachment"
-            )
+            filename = Path(urlparse(url).path).name or "qq_attachment"
             return cache_document_from_bytes(data, filename)
 
     @staticmethod
@@ -1996,7 +1881,7 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
     @staticmethod
     def _guess_ext_from_data(data: bytes) -> str:
         """Guess file extension from magic bytes."""
-        if data[:9] == b"#!SILK_V3" or data[:6] == b"#!SILK":
+        if data[:9] == b"#!SILK_V3" or data[:5] == b"#!SILK":
             return ".silk"
         if data[:2] == b"\x02!":
             return ".silk"
@@ -2016,7 +1901,7 @@ class QQAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
     @staticmethod
     def _looks_like_silk(data: bytes) -> bool:
         """Check if bytes look like a SILK audio file."""
-        return data[:6] == b"#!SILK" or data[:2] == b"\x02!" or data[:9] == b"#!SILK_V3"
+        return data[:4] == b"#!SILK" or data[:2] == b"\x02!" or data[:9] == b"#!SILK_V3"
 
     async def _convert_silk_to_wav(self, src_path: str, wav_path: str) -> Optional[str]:
         """Convert audio file to WAV using the pilk library.

gateway/platforms/telegram.py

@@ -429,13 +429,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         self._polling_conflict_count: int = 0
         self._polling_network_error_count: int = 0
         self._polling_error_callback_ref = None
-        # After sustained reconnect storms the PTB httpx pool can return
-        # SendResult(success=True) for sends that never actually transmit.
-        # _handle_polling_network_error sets this; _verify_polling_after_reconnect
-        # clears it once getMe() confirms the Bot client is healthy.
-        # While True, send() short-circuits to a failure so callers
-        # (cron live-adapter branch) fall through to standalone delivery.
-        self._send_path_degraded: bool = False
         # DM Topics: map of topic_name -> message_thread_id (populated at startup)
         self._dm_topics: Dict[str, int] = {}
         # Track forum chats where we've already registered bot commands
@@ -475,10 +468,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         # "all"       — every message triggers a push notification (legacy
         #               behavior; opt-in via display.platforms.telegram.notifications).
         self._notifications_mode: str = "important"
-        # send_or_update_status() bookkeeping: {(chat_id, status_key) -> bot message_id}
-        # Tracks status bubbles owned by this adapter so subsequent calls with the
-        # same key edit the same message instead of appending new ones (#30045).
-        self._status_message_ids: Dict[tuple, str] = {}
 
     def _notification_kwargs(
         self, metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]
@@ -881,7 +870,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         MAX_DELAY = 60
 
         self._polling_network_error_count += 1
-        self._send_path_degraded = True
         attempt = self._polling_network_error_count
 
         if attempt > MAX_NETWORK_RETRIES:
@@ -979,7 +967,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
 
         try:
             await asyncio.wait_for(self._app.bot.get_me(), PROBE_TIMEOUT)
-            self._send_path_degraded = False
         except Exception as probe_err:
             logger.warning(
                 "[%s] Polling heartbeat probe failed %ds after reconnect: %s",
@@ -1692,11 +1679,7 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         """Send a message to a Telegram chat."""
         if not self._bot:
             return SendResult(success=False, error="Not connected")
-
-        # getattr() — tests build adapters via object.__new__() (no __init__).
-        if getattr(self, "_send_path_degraded", False):
-            return SendResult(success=False, error="send_path_degraded", retryable=True)
-
+        
         # Skip whitespace-only text to prevent Telegram 400 empty-text errors.
         if not content or not content.strip():
             return SendResult(success=True, message_id=None)
@@ -1925,40 +1908,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             is_connect_timeout = self._looks_like_connect_timeout(e)
             return SendResult(success=False, error=str(e), retryable=(is_connect_timeout or not is_timeout))
 
-    async def send_or_update_status(
-        self,
-        chat_id: str,
-        status_key: str,
-        content: str,
-        *,
-        metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
-    ) -> SendResult:
-        """Send a status message, or edit the previous one with the same key.
-
-        Issue #30045: progress/status callbacks (context-pressure, lifecycle,
-        compression, etc.) used to append a fresh bubble on every call. With
-        this method, the first call sends and the message id is remembered;
-        subsequent calls with the same (chat_id, status_key) edit that same
-        message in place. If the edit fails (message deleted, too old, etc.)
-        we drop the cached id and send fresh.
-        """
-        key = (str(chat_id), str(status_key))
-        cached_id = self._status_message_ids.get(key)
-        if cached_id is not None:
-            result = await self.edit_message(
-                chat_id, cached_id, content, finalize=True, metadata=metadata,
-            )
-            if result.success:
-                if result.message_id:
-                    self._status_message_ids[key] = str(result.message_id)
-                return result
-            # Edit failed — clear the cached id and fall through to a fresh send.
-            self._status_message_ids.pop(key, None)
-        result = await self.send(chat_id, content, metadata=metadata)
-        if result.success and result.message_id:
-            self._status_message_ids[key] = str(result.message_id)
-        return result
-
     async def edit_message(
         self,
         chat_id: str,
@@ -4624,10 +4573,10 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         return (
             "You are handling a Telegram group chat message.\n"
             f"- Your identity: user_id={bot_id}, @-mention name in this group=@{username}\n"
-            "- observed Telegram group context may be provided in a separate context-only block "
-            "before the current message; it is not necessarily addressed to you.\n"
+            "- Lines in history prefixed with `[nickname|user_id]` are observed Telegram group context "
+            "and are not necessarily addressed to you.\n"
             "- Treat only the current new message as a request explicitly directed at you, "
-            "and use observed context only when the current message asks for it."
+            "and answer it directly."
         )
 
     def _apply_telegram_group_observe_attribution(self, event: MessageEvent) -> MessageEvent:
@@ -4644,12 +4593,6 @@ class TelegramAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         shared_source = self._telegram_group_observe_shared_source(event.source)
         observe_prompt = self._telegram_group_observe_channel_prompt()
         channel_prompt = f"{event.channel_prompt}\n\n{observe_prompt}" if event.channel_prompt else observe_prompt
-        if event.message_type == MessageType.COMMAND:
-            return dataclasses.replace(
-                event,
-                source=shared_source,
-                channel_prompt=channel_prompt,
-            )
         return dataclasses.replace(
             event,
             text=self._telegram_group_observe_attributed_text(event),

gateway/platforms/webhook.py

@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ Security:
 """
 
 import asyncio
-import base64
-import binascii
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
@@ -328,17 +326,6 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                         _INSECURE_NO_AUTH,
                     )
                     continue
-                if (
-                    effective_secret == _INSECURE_NO_AUTH
-                    and not _is_loopback_host(self._host)
-                ):
-                    logger.warning(
-                        "[webhook] Dynamic route '%s' skipped: INSECURE_NO_AUTH "
-                        "is only allowed on loopback hosts. Current host: '%s'.",
-                        k,
-                        self._host,
-                    )
-                    continue
                 new_dynamic[k] = v
             self._dynamic_routes = new_dynamic
             self._routes = {**self._dynamic_routes, **self._static_routes}
@@ -379,21 +366,9 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             logger.error("[webhook] Failed to read body: %s", e)
             return web.json_response({"error": "Bad request"}, status=400)
 
-        # Validate HMAC signature FIRST (skip only for the explicit local-test
-        # INSECURE_NO_AUTH mode). Missing/empty secrets must fail closed here,
-        # not only during connect(), so direct handler reuse cannot turn a
-        # network webhook route into an unauthenticated agent-dispatch surface.
+        # Validate HMAC signature FIRST (skip for INSECURE_NO_AUTH testing mode)
         secret = route_config.get("secret", self._global_secret)
-        if not secret:
-            logger.error(
-                "[webhook] Route %s has no HMAC secret; refusing request",
-                route_name,
-            )
-            return web.json_response(
-                {"error": "Webhook route is missing an HMAC secret"},
-                status=403,
-            )
-        if secret != _INSECURE_NO_AUTH:
+        if secret and secret != _INSECURE_NO_AUTH:
             if not self._validate_signature(request, raw_body, secret):
                 logger.warning(
                     "[webhook] Invalid signature for route %s", route_name
@@ -433,7 +408,6 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             request.headers.get("X-GitHub-Event", "")
             or request.headers.get("X-GitLab-Event", "")
             or payload.get("event_type", "")
-            or payload.get("type", "")
             or "unknown"
         )
         allowed_events = route_config.get("events", [])
@@ -486,10 +460,7 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         # Build a unique delivery ID
         delivery_id = request.headers.get(
             "X-GitHub-Delivery",
-            request.headers.get(
-                "svix-id",
-                request.headers.get("X-Request-ID", str(int(time.time() * 1000))),
-            ),
+            request.headers.get("X-Request-ID", str(int(time.time() * 1000))),
         )
 
         # ── Idempotency ─────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -634,32 +605,7 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
     def _validate_signature(
         self, request: "web.Request", body: bytes, secret: str
     ) -> bool:
-        """Validate webhook signature (GitHub, GitLab, Svix, generic HMAC-SHA256)."""
-        def _header(name: str) -> str:
-            return (
-                request.headers.get(name, "")
-                or request.headers.get(name.lower(), "")
-                or request.headers.get(name.upper(), "")
-            )
-
-        # Svix / AgentMail:
-        #   svix-id: msg_...
-        #   svix-timestamp: unix seconds
-        #   svix-signature: v1,<base64-hmac> [v1,<base64-hmac> ...]
-        # Signed content is: "{id}.{timestamp}.{raw_body}".  Svix secrets
-        # usually start with "whsec_" and the remainder is base64-encoded.
-        svix_id = _header("svix-id")
-        svix_timestamp = _header("svix-timestamp")
-        svix_signature = _header("svix-signature")
-        if svix_id or svix_timestamp or svix_signature:
-            return self._validate_svix_signature(
-                body=body,
-                secret=secret,
-                msg_id=svix_id,
-                timestamp=svix_timestamp,
-                signature_header=svix_signature,
-            )
-
+        """Validate webhook signature (GitHub, GitLab, generic HMAC-SHA256)."""
         # GitHub: X-Hub-Signature-256 = sha256=<hex>
         gh_sig = request.headers.get("X-Hub-Signature-256", "")
         if gh_sig:
@@ -687,56 +633,6 @@ class WebhookAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         )
         return False
 
-    def _validate_svix_signature(
-        self,
-        body: bytes,
-        secret: str,
-        msg_id: str,
-        timestamp: str,
-        signature_header: str,
-        tolerance_seconds: int = 300,
-    ) -> bool:
-        """Validate Svix-compatible signatures used by AgentMail webhooks."""
-        if not (msg_id and timestamp and signature_header and secret):
-            return False
-
-        try:
-            ts = int(timestamp)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            return False
-        if abs(int(time.time()) - ts) > tolerance_seconds:
-            logger.warning("[webhook] Svix signature timestamp outside replay window")
-            return False
-
-        if secret.startswith("whsec_"):
-            encoded_secret = secret.removeprefix("whsec_")
-            try:
-                key = base64.b64decode(encoded_secret, validate=True)
-            except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
-                logger.debug("[webhook] Invalid whsec_ Svix signing secret")
-                return False
-        else:
-            # Be permissive for providers that document Svix-style headers but
-            # hand out raw shared secrets rather than whsec_ base64 secrets.
-            logger.debug("[webhook] Validating Svix-style signature with raw secret")
-            key = secret.encode()
-
-        signed_content = msg_id.encode() + b"." + timestamp.encode() + b"." + body
-        expected = base64.b64encode(
-            hmac.new(key, signed_content, hashlib.sha256).digest()
-        ).decode()
-
-        # Svix can send multiple signatures separated by spaces during secret
-        # rotation. Each entry is formatted as "vN,<base64>".
-        for part in signature_header.split():
-            try:
-                version, signature = part.split(",", 1)
-            except ValueError:
-                continue
-            if version == "v1" and hmac.compare_digest(signature, expected):
-                return True
-        return False
-
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # Prompt rendering
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------

gateway/platforms/wecom.py

@@ -616,18 +616,6 @@ class WeComAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
             else:
                 delay = self._text_batch_delay_seconds
             await asyncio.sleep(delay)
-            # Guard against the cancel-delivery race: when the sleep timer
-            # fires just before cancel() is called, CPython sets
-            # Task._must_cancel but cannot cancel the already-done sleep
-            # future, so CancelledError is delivered at the *next* await
-            # (handle_message) rather than here.  By that point this task
-            # has already popped the merged event, so the superseding task
-            # sees an empty batch and silently drops the message.
-            # This check is synchronous — no await between the sleep and
-            # the pop — so no other coroutine can modify the task registry
-            # in between.
-            if self._pending_text_batch_tasks.get(key) is not current_task:
-                return
             event = self._pending_text_batches.pop(key, None)
             if not event:
                 return

gateway/platforms/wecom_callback.py

@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ class WecomCallbackAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
         app = self._resolve_app_for_chat(chat_id)
         touser = chat_id.split(":", 1)[1] if ":" in chat_id else chat_id
         try:
+            token = await self._get_access_token(app)
             payload = {
                 "touser": touser,
                 "msgtype": "text",
@@ -194,31 +195,18 @@ class WecomCallbackAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
                 "text": {"content": content[:2048]},
                 "safe": 0,
             }
-            for _attempt in range(2):
-                token = await self._get_access_token(app)
-                resp = await self._http_client.post(
-                    f"https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token={token}",
-                    json=payload,
-                )
-                data = resp.json()
-                errcode = data.get("errcode")
-                if errcode in {40001, 42001} and _attempt == 0:
-                    # WeCom rejected the token — evict the cached entry so
-                    # the next _get_access_token call forces a fresh fetch.
-                    logger.warning(
-                        "[WecomCallback] Token rejected for app '%s' (errcode=%s), refreshing",
-                        app.get("name", "default"), errcode,
-                    )
-                    self._access_tokens.pop(app["name"], None)
-                    continue
-                if errcode != 0:
-                    return SendResult(success=False, error=str(data))
-                return SendResult(
-                    success=True,
-                    message_id=str(data.get("msgid", "")),
-                    raw_response=data,
-                )
-            return SendResult(success=False, error="send failed after token refresh")
+            resp = await self._http_client.post(
+                f"https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token={token}",
+                json=payload,
+            )
+            data = resp.json()
+            if data.get("errcode") != 0:
+                return SendResult(success=False, error=str(data))
+            return SendResult(
+                success=True,
+                message_id=str(data.get("msgid", "")),
+                raw_response=data,
+            )
         except Exception as exc:
             return SendResult(success=False, error=str(exc))
 

gateway/platforms/weixin.py

@@ -1679,10 +1679,8 @@ class WeixinAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
 
         # Extract MEDIA: tags and bare local file paths before text delivery.
         media_files, cleaned_content = self.extract_media(content)
-        media_files = self.filter_media_delivery_paths(media_files)
         _, image_cleaned = self.extract_images(cleaned_content)
         local_files, final_content = self.extract_local_files(image_cleaned)
-        local_files = self.filter_local_delivery_paths(local_files)
 
         _AUDIO_EXTS = {".ogg", ".opus", ".mp3", ".wav", ".m4a", ".flac"}
         _VIDEO_EXTS = {".mp4", ".mov", ".avi", ".mkv", ".webm", ".3gp"}

gateway/session.py

@@ -1277,7 +1277,6 @@ class SessionStore:
                     platform_message_id=(
                         message.get("platform_message_id") or message.get("message_id")
                     ),
-                    observed=bool(message.get("observed")),
                 )
             except Exception as e:
                 logger.debug("Session DB operation failed: %s", e)

gateway/session_context.py

@@ -83,21 +83,6 @@ _VAR_MAP = {
 }
 
 
-def set_current_session_id(session_id: str) -> None:
-    """Synchronize ``HERMES_SESSION_ID`` across ContextVar and ``os.environ``.
-
-    Long-lived single-process entrypoints like the CLI can rotate sessions via
-    ``/new``, ``/resume``, ``/branch``, or compression splits without
-    reconstructing the entire agent. Tools still consult
-    ``get_session_env("HERMES_SESSION_ID")`` with an ``os.environ`` fallback,
-    so both storage paths must move together when the active session changes.
-    """
-    import os
-
-    os.environ["HERMES_SESSION_ID"] = session_id
-    _SESSION_ID.set(session_id)
-
-
 def set_session_vars(
     platform: str = "",
     chat_id: str = "",

gateway/stream_consumer.py

@@ -192,11 +192,6 @@ class GatewayStreamConsumer:
         """True when the stream consumer delivered the final assistant reply."""
         return self._final_response_sent
 
-    @property
-    def message_id(self) -> str | None:
-        """The Discord/chat message ID of the last-sent or edited message."""
-        return self._message_id
-
     @property
     def final_content_delivered(self) -> bool:
         """True when the final response content reached the user, even if

hermes_cli/_parser.py

@@ -129,8 +129,7 @@ def build_top_level_parser():
         default=None,
         help=(
             "Provider override for this invocation (e.g. openrouter, anthropic). "
-            "Applies to -z/--oneshot and --tui. The persistent provider lives in config.yaml "
-            "under model.provider — use `hermes setup` or edit the file to change it."
+            "Applies to -z/--oneshot and --tui. Also settable via HERMES_INFERENCE_PROVIDER env var."
         ),
     )
     parser.add_argument(
@@ -269,11 +268,7 @@ def build_top_level_parser():
         help="Inference provider (default: auto). Built-in or a user-defined name from `providers:` in config.yaml.",
     )
     chat_parser.add_argument(
-        "-v",
-        "--verbose",
-        action="store_true",
-        default=argparse.SUPPRESS,
-        help="Verbose output",
+        "-v", "--verbose", action="store_true", help="Verbose output"
     )
     chat_parser.add_argument(
         "-Q",

hermes_cli/auth.py

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer, ThreadingHTTPServer
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, FrozenSet, List, Optional, Tuple
+from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
 from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlencode, urlparse
 
 import httpx
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ import yaml
 
 from hermes_cli.config import get_hermes_home, get_config_path, read_raw_config
 from hermes_constants import OPENROUTER_BASE_URL, secure_parent_dir
-from agent.credential_persistence import sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload
 from utils import atomic_replace, atomic_yaml_write, is_truthy_value
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -197,17 +196,9 @@ PROVIDER_REGISTRY: Dict[str, ProviderConfig] = {
         auth_type="oauth_external",
         inference_base_url=DEFAULT_CODEX_BASE_URL,
     ),
-    "openai-api": ProviderConfig(
-        id="openai-api",
-        name="OpenAI API",
-        auth_type="api_key",
-        inference_base_url="https://api.openai.com/v1",
-        api_key_env_vars=("OPENAI_API_KEY",),
-        base_url_env_var="OPENAI_BASE_URL",
-    ),
     "xai-oauth": ProviderConfig(
         id="xai-oauth",
-        name="xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+)",
+        name="xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription)",
         auth_type="oauth_external",
         inference_base_url=DEFAULT_XAI_OAUTH_BASE_URL,
     ),
@@ -562,7 +553,6 @@ _PLACEHOLDER_SECRET_VALUES = {
     "***",
     "changeme",
     "your_api_key",
-    "your_api_key_here",
     "your-api-key",
     "placeholder",
     "example",
@@ -1177,23 +1167,14 @@ def read_credential_pool(provider_id: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
 
 
 def write_credential_pool(provider_id: str, entries: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Path:
-    """Persist one provider's credential pool under auth.json.
-
-    This is the final disk-boundary guard for borrowed/reference-only
-    credentials. Callers may pass raw dictionaries, so sanitize here even when
-    ``PooledCredential.to_dict()`` already did the same work upstream.
-    """
+    """Persist one provider's credential pool under auth.json."""
     with _auth_store_lock():
         auth_store = _load_auth_store()
         pool = auth_store.get("credential_pool")
         if not isinstance(pool, dict):
             pool = {}
             auth_store["credential_pool"] = pool
-        pool[provider_id] = [
-            sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload(entry, provider_id)
-            if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry
-            for entry in entries
-        ]
+        pool[provider_id] = list(entries)
         return _save_auth_store(auth_store)
 
 
@@ -1578,67 +1559,6 @@ def _optional_base_url(value: Any) -> Optional[str]:
     return cleaned if cleaned else None
 
 
-# Allowlist of hosts the Nous Portal proxy is willing to forward minted
-# bearer tokens to. The bearer is a long-lived agent_key minted by
-# portal.nousresearch.com — sending it anywhere else would leak it.
-#
-# This is consulted only for URLs coming from the NETWORK side (Portal
-# refresh / agent-key-mint responses). User-controlled env-var overrides
-# (NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL) bypass validation — that's the documented
-# dev/staging escape hatch and the env source is already trusted (the
-# user set it themselves).
-_ALLOWED_NOUS_INFERENCE_HOSTS: FrozenSet[str] = frozenset({
-    "inference-api.nousresearch.com",
-})
-
-
-def _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(url: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Validate a Portal-returned inference URL against the host allowlist.
-
-    Returns ``url`` (normalised by stripping trailing slashes) if it's a
-    well-formed ``https://<allowlisted-host>/...`` URL. Returns ``None``
-    if the URL is missing, malformed, non-https, or points at an
-    unexpected host — letting the caller fall back to the configured
-    default rather than persist or forward a poisoned value.
-
-    Defense-in-depth: a compromised refresh / mint response from the
-    Portal API (MITM, malicious response injection) could otherwise
-    redirect every subsequent proxy request — bearing the user's
-    legitimately-minted agent_key — to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
-    Validating scheme + host at the source closes that loop before the
-    poisoned URL ever lands in ``auth.json``.
-
-    The env-var override path (``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL``) bypasses
-    this — env values come from the trusted OS user, not from the
-    network, and the override is documented for staging/dev use.
-
-    Co-authored-by: memosr <mehmet.sr35@gmail.com>
-    """
-    if not isinstance(url, str):
-        return None
-    cleaned = url.strip()
-    if not cleaned:
-        return None
-    try:
-        parsed = urlparse(cleaned)
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-    if parsed.scheme != "https":
-        logger.warning(
-            "nous: refusing non-https inference URL scheme %r from Portal response",
-            parsed.scheme,
-        )
-        return None
-    if parsed.hostname not in _ALLOWED_NOUS_INFERENCE_HOSTS:
-        logger.warning(
-            "nous: refusing inference URL host %r from Portal response "
-            "(not in allowlist); falling back to default",
-            parsed.hostname,
-        )
-        return None
-    return cleaned.rstrip("/")
-
-
 def _decode_jwt_claims(token: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     if not isinstance(token, str) or token.count(".") != 2:
         return {}
@@ -2084,10 +2004,7 @@ def resolve_qwen_runtime_credentials(
 def get_qwen_auth_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
     auth_path = _qwen_cli_auth_path()
     try:
-        # Validate the runtime credentials, including refresh when the cached
-        # CLI token is expired. Otherwise stale tokens show up as "logged in"
-        # and `hermes model` walks users into a broken Qwen setup flow.
-        creds = resolve_qwen_runtime_credentials(refresh_if_expiring=True)
+        creds = resolve_qwen_runtime_credentials(refresh_if_expiring=False)
         return {
             "logged_in": True,
             "auth_file": str(auth_path),
@@ -2488,32 +2405,6 @@ def _make_xai_callback_handler(expected_path: str) -> tuple[type[BaseHTTPRequest
                 "error_description": params.get("error_description", [None])[0],
             }
 
-            # Diagnostic logging — emits at INFO so reporters of loopback bugs
-            # (#27385 — "callback received but Hermes times out") can produce
-            # actionable evidence without a code change.  Logged values are
-            # fingerprints / booleans only; no actual code/state strings leak
-            # into the log file.  Run with ``HERMES_LOG_LEVEL=INFO`` (or check
-            # ``~/.hermes/logs/agent.log`` which captures INFO+ unconditionally).
-            try:
-                logger.info(
-                    "xAI loopback callback received: path=%s has_code=%s has_state=%s has_error=%s "
-                    "ua=%s",
-                    parsed.path,
-                    incoming["code"] is not None,
-                    incoming["state"] is not None,
-                    incoming["error"] is not None,
-                    (self.headers.get("User-Agent") or "")[:80],
-                )
-                if incoming["error"]:
-                    logger.info(
-                        "xAI loopback callback carries error=%s error_description=%s",
-                        incoming["error"],
-                        (incoming["error_description"] or "")[:200],
-                    )
-            except Exception:
-                # Logging must never break the OAuth flow.
-                pass
-
             # Treat a hit on the callback path with neither `code` nor `error`
             # as a missing OAuth callback (e.g. xAI's auth backend failed to
             # redirect and the user navigated to the bare loopback URL by hand).
@@ -2618,17 +2509,6 @@ def _xai_wait_for_callback(
         server.shutdown()
         server.server_close()
         thread.join(timeout=1.0)
-    # Diagnostic: distinguish "no callback ever arrived" from "callback
-    # arrived but result wasn't populated" (#27385).  The per-hit handler
-    # also logs at INFO; if neither line appears, xAI's IDP never reached
-    # the loopback at all (firewall, port-binding, IPv6/IPv4 mismatch).
-    logger.info(
-        "xAI loopback wait timed out after %.0fs with no usable callback "
-        "(result.code=%s result.error=%s)",
-        max(5.0, timeout_seconds),
-        result["code"] is not None,
-        result["error"] is not None,
-    )
     raise AuthError(
         "xAI authorization timed out waiting for the local callback.",
         provider="xai-oauth",
@@ -3462,7 +3342,7 @@ def _read_xai_oauth_tokens(*, _lock: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     state = _load_provider_state(auth_store, "xai-oauth")
     if not state:
         raise AuthError(
-            "No xAI OAuth credentials stored. Select xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+) in `hermes model`.",
+            "No xAI OAuth credentials stored. Select xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription) in `hermes model`.",
             provider="xai-oauth",
             code="xai_auth_missing",
             relogin_required=True,
@@ -4896,7 +4776,7 @@ def refresh_nous_oauth_pure(
             state["refresh_token"] = refreshed.get("refresh_token") or state["refresh_token"]
             state["token_type"] = refreshed.get("token_type") or state.get("token_type") or "Bearer"
             state["scope"] = refreshed.get("scope") or state.get("scope")
-            refreshed_url = _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
+            refreshed_url = _optional_base_url(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
             if refreshed_url:
                 state["inference_base_url"] = refreshed_url
             state["obtained_at"] = now.isoformat()
@@ -4932,7 +4812,7 @@ def refresh_nous_oauth_pure(
             state["agent_key_expires_in"] = mint_payload.get("expires_in")
             state["agent_key_reused"] = bool(mint_payload.get("reused", False))
             state["agent_key_obtained_at"] = now.isoformat()
-            minted_url = _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))
+            minted_url = _optional_base_url(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))
             if minted_url:
                 state["inference_base_url"] = minted_url
 
@@ -5210,7 +5090,7 @@ def resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
                         state["refresh_token"] = refreshed.get("refresh_token") or refresh_token
                         state["token_type"] = refreshed.get("token_type") or state.get("token_type") or "Bearer"
                         state["scope"] = refreshed.get("scope") or state.get("scope")
-                        refreshed_url = _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
+                        refreshed_url = _optional_base_url(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
                         if refreshed_url:
                             inference_base_url = refreshed_url
                         state["obtained_at"] = now.isoformat()
@@ -5318,7 +5198,7 @@ def resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
                                 state["refresh_token"] = refreshed.get("refresh_token") or latest_refresh_token
                                 state["token_type"] = refreshed.get("token_type") or state.get("token_type") or "Bearer"
                                 state["scope"] = refreshed.get("scope") or state.get("scope")
-                                refreshed_url = _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
+                                refreshed_url = _optional_base_url(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))
                                 if refreshed_url:
                                     inference_base_url = refreshed_url
                                 state["obtained_at"] = now.isoformat()
@@ -5373,7 +5253,7 @@ def resolve_nous_runtime_credentials(
                 state["agent_key_expires_in"] = mint_payload.get("expires_in")
                 state["agent_key_reused"] = bool(mint_payload.get("reused", False))
                 state["agent_key_obtained_at"] = now.isoformat()
-                minted_url = _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))
+                minted_url = _optional_base_url(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))
                 if minted_url:
                     inference_base_url = minted_url
                 _oauth_trace(
@@ -6393,7 +6273,7 @@ def _login_xai_oauth(
             pass
 
     print()
-    print("Signing in to xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+)...")
+    print("Signing in to xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription)...")
     print("(Hermes creates its own local OAuth session)")
     print()
 
@@ -7165,95 +7045,10 @@ def _refresh_minimax_oauth_state(
     return new_state
 
 
-def _minimax_oauth_quarantine_on_terminal_refresh(state: Dict[str, Any], exc: AuthError) -> None:
-    """Wipe dead tokens from auth.json after a terminal refresh failure.
-
-    Shared by both the eager-resolve path and the lazy per-request token
-    provider. Mirrors the Nous / xAI-OAuth / Codex-OAuth quarantine pattern
-    so subsequent calls fail fast without a network retry.
-    """
-    if not (exc.relogin_required and state.get("refresh_token")):
-        return
-    for _k in ("access_token", "refresh_token", "expires_at", "expires_in", "obtained_at"):
-        state.pop(_k, None)
-    state["last_auth_error"] = {
-        "provider": "minimax-oauth",
-        "code": exc.code or "refresh_failed",
-        "message": str(exc),
-        "reason": "runtime_refresh_failure",
-        "relogin_required": True,
-        "at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-    }
-    try:
-        _minimax_save_auth_state(state)
-    except Exception as _save_exc:
-        logger.debug("MiniMax OAuth: failed to persist quarantined state: %s", _save_exc)
-
-
-def build_minimax_oauth_token_provider() -> Callable[[], str]:
-    """Return a zero-arg callable that yields a fresh MiniMax access token.
-
-    The Anthropic SDK caches ``api_key`` as a static string at construction
-    time, so a session that resolves credentials once at startup will keep
-    sending the same bearer until MiniMax's server returns 401 — typically
-    ~15 minutes in, because MiniMax issues short-lived access tokens.
-
-    Returning a *callable* instead of a string lets us hook into the
-    existing Entra-ID bearer infrastructure in
-    :mod:`agent.anthropic_adapter`: ``build_anthropic_client`` detects a
-    callable and routes through ``_build_anthropic_client_with_bearer_hook``,
-    which mints a fresh ``Authorization`` header on every outbound request.
-    Each invocation re-reads the persisted state from ``auth.json`` and
-    calls :func:`_refresh_minimax_oauth_state` — that helper is a no-op
-    when the token still has more than ``MINIMAX_OAUTH_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS``
-    of life left, so the steady-state cost is one file read + one
-    timestamp compare per request.
-
-    Reading state fresh each time also means a refresh persisted by one
-    process (CLI, gateway, cron) is immediately visible to every other
-    process sharing the same ``auth.json``.
-    """
-    def _provide() -> str:
-        state = get_provider_auth_state("minimax-oauth")
-        if not state or not state.get("access_token"):
-            raise AuthError(
-                "Not logged into MiniMax OAuth. Run `hermes model` and select "
-                "MiniMax (OAuth).",
-                provider="minimax-oauth", code="not_logged_in", relogin_required=True,
-            )
-        try:
-            state = _refresh_minimax_oauth_state(state)
-        except AuthError as exc:
-            _minimax_oauth_quarantine_on_terminal_refresh(state, exc)
-            raise
-        token = state.get("access_token")
-        if not token:
-            raise AuthError(
-                "MiniMax OAuth state has no access_token after refresh.",
-                provider="minimax-oauth", code="no_access_token", relogin_required=True,
-            )
-        return token
-
-    return _provide
-
-
 def resolve_minimax_oauth_runtime_credentials(
     *, min_token_ttl_seconds: int = MINIMAX_OAUTH_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS,
-    as_token_provider: bool = False,
 ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-    """Return {provider, api_key, base_url, source} for minimax-oauth.
-
-    When ``as_token_provider`` is True, ``api_key`` is a zero-arg callable
-    that mints a fresh access token per call (proactively refreshing if
-    the cached token is within ``MINIMAX_OAUTH_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS`` of
-    expiry). This is what the runtime provider path uses so that long
-    sessions survive MiniMax's short access-token lifetime — see
-    :func:`build_minimax_oauth_token_provider` for the rationale.
-
-    The default (string ``api_key``) preserves the historical contract for
-    diagnostic call sites like ``hermes status`` that just want to know
-    whether a valid token exists right now.
-    """
+    """Return {provider, api_key, base_url, source} for minimax-oauth."""
     state = get_provider_auth_state("minimax-oauth")
     if not state or not state.get("access_token"):
         raise AuthError(
@@ -7264,15 +7059,28 @@ def resolve_minimax_oauth_runtime_credentials(
     try:
         state = _refresh_minimax_oauth_state(state)
     except AuthError as exc:
-        _minimax_oauth_quarantine_on_terminal_refresh(state, exc)
+        if exc.relogin_required and state.get("refresh_token"):
+            # Terminal refresh failure — clear dead tokens from auth.json so
+            # subsequent calls fail fast without a network retry, mirroring
+            # the Nous / xAI-OAuth / Codex-OAuth quarantine pattern.
+            for _k in ("access_token", "refresh_token", "expires_at", "expires_in", "obtained_at"):
+                state.pop(_k, None)
+            state["last_auth_error"] = {
+                "provider": "minimax-oauth",
+                "code": exc.code or "refresh_failed",
+                "message": str(exc),
+                "reason": "runtime_refresh_failure",
+                "relogin_required": True,
+                "at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+            }
+            try:
+                _minimax_save_auth_state(state)
+            except Exception as _save_exc:
+                logger.debug("MiniMax OAuth: failed to persist quarantined state: %s", _save_exc)
         raise
-    if as_token_provider:
-        api_key: Any = build_minimax_oauth_token_provider()
-    else:
-        api_key = state["access_token"]
     return {
         "provider": "minimax-oauth",
-        "api_key": api_key,
+        "api_key": state["access_token"],
         "base_url": state["inference_base_url"].rstrip("/"),
         "source": "oauth",
     }

hermes_cli/auth_commands.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+from getpass import getpass
 import math
 import sys
 import time
@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ from agent.credential_pool import (
 import hermes_cli.auth as auth_mod
 from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
 from hermes_constants import OPENROUTER_BASE_URL
-from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
 
 
 # Providers that support OAuth login in addition to API keys.
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ def auth_add_command(args) -> None:
     if requested_type == AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY:
         token = (getattr(args, "api_key", None) or "").strip()
         if not token:
-            token = masked_secret_prompt("Paste your API key: ").strip()
+            token = getpass("Paste your API key: ").strip()
         if not token:
             raise SystemExit("No API key provided.")
         default_label = _api_key_default_label(len(pool.entries()) + 1)

hermes_cli/backup.py

@@ -85,22 +85,6 @@ def _should_exclude(rel_path: Path) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
-def _should_skip_backup_file(abs_path: Path, rel_path: Path, out_path: Path) -> bool:
-    """Return True when a candidate file should not be written to a backup zip."""
-    if _should_exclude(rel_path):
-        return True
-
-    # zipfile.write() follows file symlinks, so skip links before any archive
-    # write can copy data from outside HERMES_HOME.
-    if abs_path.is_symlink():
-        return True
-
-    try:
-        return abs_path.resolve() == out_path.resolve()
-    except (OSError, ValueError):
-        return False
-
-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # SQLite safe copy
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -189,9 +173,16 @@ def run_backup(args) -> None:
             fpath = dp / fname
             rel = fpath.relative_to(hermes_root)
 
-            if _should_skip_backup_file(fpath, rel, out_path):
+            if _should_exclude(rel):
                 continue
 
+            # Skip the output zip itself if it happens to be inside hermes root
+            try:
+                if fpath.resolve() == out_path.resolve():
+                    continue
+            except (OSError, ValueError):
+                pass
+
             files_to_add.append((fpath, rel))
 
     if not files_to_add:
@@ -735,9 +726,16 @@ def _write_full_zip_backup(out_path: Path, hermes_root: Path) -> Optional[Path]:
                 except ValueError:
                     continue
 
-                if _should_skip_backup_file(fpath, rel, out_path):
+                if _should_exclude(rel):
                     continue
 
+                # Skip the output zip itself if it already exists inside root.
+                try:
+                    if fpath.resolve() == out_path.resolve():
+                        continue
+                except (OSError, ValueError):
+                    pass
+
                 files_to_add.append((fpath, rel))
     except OSError as exc:
         logger.warning("Full-zip backup: walk failed: %s", exc)

hermes_cli/callbacks.py

@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ with the TUI.
 
 import queue
 import time as _time
+import getpass
 
 from hermes_cli.banner import cprint, _DIM, _RST
 from hermes_cli.config import save_env_value_secure
-from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
 from hermes_constants import display_hermes_home
 
 
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ def prompt_for_secret(cli, var_name: str, prompt: str, metadata=None) -> dict:
         if not hasattr(cli, "_secret_deadline"):
             cli._secret_deadline = 0
         try:
-            value = masked_secret_prompt(f"{prompt} (hidden, ESC or empty Enter to skip): ")
+            value = getpass.getpass(f"{prompt} (hidden, ESC or empty Enter to skip): ")
         except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
             value = ""
 

hermes_cli/cli_output.py

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ functions previously duplicated across setup.py, tools_config.py,
 mcp_config.py, and memory_setup.py.
 """
 
+import getpass
+
 from hermes_cli.colors import Colors, color
-from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
 
 
 # ─── Print Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ def prompt(
 
     try:
         if password:
-            value = masked_secret_prompt(display)
+            value = getpass.getpass(display)
         else:
             value = input(display)
         value = value.strip()

hermes_cli/commands.py

@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ COMMAND_REGISTRY: list[CommandDef] = [
                cli_only=True),
     CommandDef("skills", "Search, install, inspect, or manage skills",
                "Tools & Skills", cli_only=True,
-               subcommands=("search", "browse", "inspect", "install", "audit")),
+               subcommands=("search", "browse", "inspect", "install")),
     CommandDef("bundles", "List skill bundles (aliases /<name> for multiple skills)",
                "Tools & Skills"),
     CommandDef("cron", "Manage scheduled tasks", "Tools & Skills",
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ def _iter_plugin_command_entries() -> list[tuple[str, str, str]]:
     :func:`hermes_cli.plugins.PluginContext.register_command`. They behave
     like ``CommandDef`` entries for gateway surfacing: they appear in the
     Telegram command menu, in Slack's ``/hermes`` subcommand mapping, and
-    (via :func:`plugins.platforms.discord.adapter._register_slash_commands`) in
+    (via :func:`gateway.platforms.discord._register_slash_commands`) in
     Discord's native slash command picker.
 
     Lookup is lazy so importing this module never forces plugin discovery

hermes_cli/config.py

@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Dict, Any, Optional, List, Tuple
 
-from hermes_cli.secret_prompt import masked_secret_prompt
-
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 # Track which (config_path, mtime_ns, size) tuples we've already warned about
@@ -660,8 +658,7 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         # are owned by your host user instead of root, which avoids needing
         # `sudo chown` after container runs. Default off to preserve behavior
         # for images whose entrypoints expect to start as root (e.g. the
-        # bundled Hermes image, which drops to the `hermes` user via
-        # s6-setuidgid inside each supervised service).
+        # bundled Hermes image, which drops to the `hermes` user via gosu).
         # When on, SETUID/SETGID caps are omitted from the container since
         # no privilege drop is needed.
         "docker_run_as_host_user": False,
@@ -1011,19 +1008,6 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         "compact": False,
         "personality": "kawaii",
         "resume_display": "full",
-        # Recap tuning for /resume and startup resume. The defaults match the
-        # historical hardcoded values; expose them as config so power users can
-        # widen or tighten the snapshot to taste.
-        "resume_exchanges": 10,            # max user+assistant pairs to show
-        "resume_max_user_chars": 300,      # truncate user message text
-        "resume_max_assistant_chars": 200, # truncate non-last assistant text
-        "resume_max_assistant_lines": 3,   # truncate non-last assistant lines
-        # When True (default), assistant entries that are *only* tool calls
-        # (no visible text) are skipped in the recap. This prevents the recap
-        # from being dominated by `[2 tool calls: terminal, read_file]` lines
-        # when an exchange was tool-heavy. Set False to restore the legacy
-        # behavior of showing tool-call summaries inline.
-        "resume_skip_tool_only": True,
         "busy_input_mode": "interrupt",  # interrupt | queue | steer
         # When true, `hermes --tui` auto-resumes the most recent human-
         # facing session on launch instead of forging a fresh one.
@@ -1638,31 +1622,6 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         "force_ipv4": False,
     },
 
-    # Gateway settings — control how messaging platforms (Telegram, Discord,
-    # Slack, etc.) deliver agent-produced files as native attachments.
-    "gateway": {
-        # Extra directories from which model-emitted bare file paths may be
-        # uploaded as native gateway attachments. Files inside the Hermes
-        # cache (~/.hermes/cache/{documents,images,audio,video,screenshots})
-        # are always trusted; this list adds operator-controlled roots
-        # (project dirs, scratch dirs, mounted shares). Accepts a list of
-        # absolute paths or a single os.pathsep-separated string. Bridged
-        # to HERMES_MEDIA_ALLOW_DIRS at gateway startup. Tilde paths are
-        # expanded.
-        "media_delivery_allow_dirs": [],
-        # When true, files whose mtime is within ``trust_recent_files_seconds``
-        # of "now" are trusted for native delivery even outside the cache /
-        # operator allowlist — useful for ``pandoc -o /tmp/report.pdf`` or
-        # PDFs the agent writes into a working directory. System paths
-        # (/etc, /proc, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, etc.) remain blocked regardless.
-        # Disable to fall back to pure-allowlist mode. Bridged to
-        # HERMES_MEDIA_TRUST_RECENT_FILES.
-        "trust_recent_files": True,
-        # Recency window in seconds. 600 (10 min) comfortably covers a
-        # multi-tool agent turn. Bridged to HERMES_MEDIA_TRUST_RECENT_SECONDS.
-        "trust_recent_files_seconds": 600,
-    },
-
     # Session storage — controls automatic cleanup of ~/.hermes/state.db.
     # state.db accumulates every session, message, tool call, and FTS5 index
     # entry forever.  Without auto-pruning, a heavy user (gateway + cron)
@@ -1771,7 +1730,6 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         "servers": {},
     },
 
-
     # X (Twitter) Search via xAI's built-in x_search Responses tool.
     # The tool registers when xAI credentials are available (SuperGrok
     # OAuth or XAI_API_KEY) AND the x_search toolset is enabled in
@@ -1817,26 +1775,17 @@ DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
             # ~/.hermes/bin/ on first use.  When False you must install
             # bws yourself and have it on PATH.
             "auto_install": True,
-            # Bitwarden region / self-hosted endpoint.  Empty string
-            # means use the bws CLI default (US Cloud,
-            # https://vault.bitwarden.com).  Set to
-            # https://vault.bitwarden.eu for EU Cloud, or your own URL
-            # for self-hosted Bitwarden.  Plumbed into the bws subprocess
-            # as BWS_SERVER_URL.  Prompted for during
-            # `hermes secrets bitwarden setup`.
-            "server_url": "",
         },
     },
 
-    # Paste collapse thresholds (TUI + CLI).
-    # collapse_threshold: paste collapses to a file reference when line count
-    #   exceeds this value (bracketed paste, safe: appends to existing text).
-    # collapse_threshold_fallback: same but for the fallback heuristic used
-    #   by terminals without bracketed paste support (destructive: replaces
-    #   entire buffer).  0 = disabled.
-    "paste_collapse_threshold": 5,
-    "paste_collapse_threshold_fallback": 0,
-
+    # ── Nous Portal feature flags ──────────────────────────────────────
+    "portal": {
+        # App tools: 500+ external app integrations (Gmail, Slack, GitHub,
+        # Notion, etc.) via the Nous tool gateway.  Requires an active Nous
+        # subscription.  Set to False to hide the app_tools toolset even
+        # when a subscription is present.
+        "app_tools": True,
+    },
 
     # Config schema version - bump this when adding new required fields
     "_config_version": 24,
@@ -2327,6 +2276,22 @@ OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS = {
         "category": "tool",
         "advanced": True,
     },
+    "TOOLS_GATEWAY_URL": {
+        "description": "Explicit URL for the tools-gateway (app integrations). Overrides the auto-derived tools-gateway.nousresearch.com",
+        "prompt": "Tools-gateway URL",
+        "url": None,
+        "password": False,
+        "category": "tool",
+        "advanced": True,
+    },
+    "PORTAL_APP_TOOLS": {
+        "description": "Enable app integration tools (500+ apps via Nous tool gateway). Requires Nous subscription.",
+        "prompt": "Enable app tools (500+ apps)",
+        "url": None,
+        "password": False,
+        "category": "tool",
+        "advanced": True,
+    },
     "TAVILY_API_KEY": {
         "description": "Tavily API key for AI-native web search, extract, and crawl",
         "prompt": "Tavily API key",
@@ -3361,7 +3326,7 @@ _KNOWN_ROOT_KEYS = {
     "fallback_providers", "credential_pool_strategies", "toolsets",
     "agent", "terminal", "display", "compression", "delegation",
     "auxiliary", "custom_providers", "context", "memory", "gateway",
-    "sessions",
+    "sessions", "portal",
 }
 
 # Valid fields inside a custom_providers list entry
@@ -4024,6 +3989,26 @@ def migrate_config(interactive: bool = True, quiet: bool = False) -> Dict[str, A
                         f"{', '.join(added_aux)}"
                     )
 
+    # ── Version 23 → 24: inject app_tools into saved platform_toolsets ──
+    # The portal.app_tools config flag is handled by deep-merge (DEFAULT_CONFIG
+    # has it, so load_config() always includes it). But platform_toolsets are
+    # user-owned lists that deep-merge can't append to — existing users who
+    # ran `hermes tools` have a saved list that won't include app_tools.
+    if current_ver < 24:
+        config = read_raw_config()
+        pt = config.get("platform_toolsets")
+        if isinstance(pt, dict):
+            patched = False
+            for plat_key, ts_list in pt.items():
+                if isinstance(ts_list, list) and "app_tools" not in ts_list:
+                    ts_list.append("app_tools")
+                    patched = True
+            if patched:
+                save_config(config)
+                results["config_added"].append("app_tools added to platform_toolsets")
+                if not quiet:
+                    print("  ✓ Added app_tools to saved platform toolset lists")
+
     if current_ver < latest_ver and not quiet:
         print(f"Config version: {current_ver} → {latest_ver}")
     
@@ -4042,7 +4027,8 @@ def migrate_config(interactive: bool = True, quiet: bool = False) -> Dict[str, A
                 print(f"  Get your key at: {var['url']}")
             
             if var.get("password"):
-                value = masked_secret_prompt(f"  {var['prompt']}: ")
+                import getpass
+                value = getpass.getpass(f"  {var['prompt']}: ")
             else:
                 value = input(f"  {var['prompt']}: ").strip()
             
@@ -4093,9 +4079,8 @@ def migrate_config(interactive: bool = True, quiet: bool = False) -> Dict[str, A
                     else:
                         print(f"  {info.get('description', name)}")
                     if info.get("password"):
-                        value = masked_secret_prompt(
-                            f"  {info.get('prompt', name)} (Enter to skip): "
-                        )
+                        import getpass
+                        value = getpass.getpass(f"  {info.get('prompt', name)} (Enter to skip): ")
                     else:
                         value = input(f"  {info.get('prompt', name)} (Enter to skip): ").strip()
                     if value:

hermes_cli/container_boot.py

@@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
-"""Container-boot reconciliation of per-profile gateway s6 services.
-
-Service directories under /run/service/ live on **tmpfs** and are wiped
-on every container restart. Profile directories under
-``$HERMES_HOME/profiles/<name>/`` live on the persistent VOLUME, and
-each one records its gateway's last state in ``gateway_state.json``.
-This module bridges the two: on every container boot, walk the
-persistent profiles, recreate the s6 service slots, and auto-start
-only those whose last recorded state was ``running``.
-
-Wired into the image as /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles by the
-Dockerfile (Phase 4 Task 4.0). Runs as root after 01-hermes-setup
-(the stage2 hook) has chowned the volume and seeded $HERMES_HOME, but
-before s6-rc starts user services.
-
-Without this module, every ``docker restart`` would silently wipe
-every per-profile gateway, even though the user's profiles still
-exist on disk.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import logging
-import os
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Literal
-
-log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-# Only this prior state triggers automatic restart. Everything else
-# (startup_failed, starting, stopped, missing) registers the slot in
-# the down state and waits for explicit user action — this avoids the
-# crash-loop where a broken gateway keeps being restarted across
-# `docker restart` cycles.
-_AUTOSTART_STATES = frozenset({"running"})
-
-# Stale runtime files we sweep before recreating service slots. These
-# all hold container-namespaced state (PIDs, process tables) that's
-# garbage post-restart — a numerically-equal PID in the new container
-# is a different process. See the Risk Register in the plan.
-_STALE_RUNTIME_FILES = ("gateway.pid", "processes.json")
-
-ReconcileActionLabel = Literal["started", "registered", "skipped"]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ReconcileAction:
-    """One profile's outcome from a single reconciliation pass."""
-    profile: str
-    prior_state: str | None
-    action: ReconcileActionLabel
-
-
-def reconcile_profile_gateways(
-    *,
-    hermes_home: Path,
-    scandir: Path,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> list[ReconcileAction]:
-    """Recreate s6 service registrations for every persistent profile.
-
-    Always registers a ``gateway-default`` slot for the root profile
-    (the implicit profile that lives at the top of ``$HERMES_HOME``,
-    not under ``profiles/``). The dispatcher in ``hermes_cli.gateway``
-    maps an empty profile suffix to ``gateway-default``, so this slot
-    is what ``hermes gateway start`` (no ``-p``) targets. Without it,
-    bare ``hermes gateway start`` inside the container would land on
-    ``s6-svc -u /run/service/gateway-default`` → uncaught
-    ``CalledProcessError`` → traceback to the user (PR #30136 review).
-
-    The default slot's prior state is read from
-    ``$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json`` (sibling to the profile root,
-    not under ``profiles/``); stale runtime files there are swept the
-    same way as for named profiles.
-
-    Args:
-        hermes_home: The container's HERMES_HOME (typically /opt/data).
-            Profiles live under ``<hermes_home>/profiles/<name>/``;
-            the default profile lives at ``<hermes_home>`` itself.
-        scandir: The s6 dynamic scandir (typically /run/service). Service
-            directories are created at ``<scandir>/gateway-<profile>/``.
-        dry_run: When True, walk and return the action list without
-            touching the filesystem. For tests and `--dry-run` debug.
-
-    Returns:
-        One :class:`ReconcileAction` per profile, in this order:
-        ``default`` first, then named profiles in directory order.
-    """
-    actions: list[ReconcileAction] = []
-
-    # Default profile — always register, even if nothing has ever
-    # populated the root profile dir. The slot exists so
-    # ``hermes gateway start`` (no ``-p``) has somewhere to land;
-    # auto-up only when the prior state was "running" (same rule as
-    # named profiles).
-    default_prior_state = _read_prior_state(hermes_home)
-    default_should_start = default_prior_state in _AUTOSTART_STATES
-    if not dry_run:
-        _cleanup_stale_runtime_files(hermes_home)
-        _register_service(scandir, "default", start=default_should_start)
-    actions.append(ReconcileAction(
-        profile="default",
-        prior_state=default_prior_state,
-        action="started" if default_should_start else "registered",
-    ))
-
-    profiles_root = hermes_home / "profiles"
-    if profiles_root.is_dir():
-        for entry in sorted(profiles_root.iterdir()):
-            if not entry.is_dir():
-                continue
-            # SOUL.md is always seeded by `hermes profile create` (config.yaml
-            # is not — that comes later via `hermes setup`). Use it as the
-            # "real profile" marker so stray dirs (backups, manual mkdir)
-            # aren't picked up.
-            if not (entry / "SOUL.md").exists():
-                continue
-            # The "default" service name is reserved for the root
-            # profile (above) — if a user has somehow created a
-            # ``profiles/default/`` directory, skip it to avoid the
-            # slot collision. Their gateway would still be reachable
-            # via ``hermes -p default-named gateway start`` if they
-            # rename the directory; we don't try to disambiguate here.
-            if entry.name == "default":
-                log.warning(
-                    "profiles/default/ exists — skipping to avoid colliding "
-                    "with the reserved root-profile s6 slot",
-                )
-                continue
-
-            prior_state = _read_prior_state(entry)
-            should_start = prior_state in _AUTOSTART_STATES
-
-            if not dry_run:
-                _cleanup_stale_runtime_files(entry)
-                _register_service(scandir, entry.name, start=should_start)
-
-            actions.append(ReconcileAction(
-                profile=entry.name,
-                prior_state=prior_state,
-                action="started" if should_start else "registered",
-            ))
-
-    if not dry_run:
-        _write_reconcile_log(hermes_home, actions)
-    return actions
-
-
-def _read_prior_state(profile_dir: Path) -> str | None:
-    """Read gateway_state.json's ``gateway_state`` field, or None if
-    missing or unparseable. Unparseable counts as "no prior state" so
-    we don't bork the whole reconciliation on a corrupt file."""
-    state_file = profile_dir / "gateway_state.json"
-    if not state_file.exists():
-        return None
-    try:
-        return json.loads(state_file.read_text()).get("gateway_state")
-    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-        log.warning(
-            "could not read %s; treating as no prior state", state_file,
-        )
-        return None
-
-
-def _cleanup_stale_runtime_files(profile_dir: Path) -> None:
-    """Remove gateway.pid and processes.json — they reference PIDs in
-    the dead container's process namespace and would otherwise confuse
-    the newly-started gateway's process-mismatch checks."""
-    for name in _STALE_RUNTIME_FILES:
-        (profile_dir / name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
-
-
-def _register_service(scandir: Path, profile: str, *, start: bool) -> None:
-    """Recreate the s6 service slot for one profile.
-
-    Mirrors the rendering in :func:`S6ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway`,
-    but here we control the start state directly via the ``down`` marker
-    file (s6-svscan honors it on rescan). Cannot use the manager
-    directly because the cont-init.d phase runs as root before
-    s6-svscan starts scanning the dynamic scandir — the manager's
-    ``s6-svscanctl -a`` call would fail with no control socket.
-
-    Atomicity: build the new layout in a sibling temp directory and
-    rename it into place via :meth:`Path.replace`. This matches
-    :meth:`S6ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway` (PR #30136
-    review item O4) — even though cont-init.d runs before s6-svscan
-    starts scanning, an atomic publication keeps the contract uniform
-    between the two registration paths and protects against a
-    half-populated dir if the script is interrupted mid-write.
-    """
-    import shutil
-
-    from hermes_cli.service_manager import (
-        S6ServiceManager,
-        _seed_supervise_skeleton,
-        validate_profile_name,
-    )
-
-    validate_profile_name(profile)
-    service_dir = scandir / f"gateway-{profile}"
-    tmp_dir = service_dir.with_name(service_dir.name + ".tmp")
-
-    # Wipe any leftover tmp from a previous interrupted run.
-    if tmp_dir.exists():
-        shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
-    tmp_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
-
-    try:
-        (tmp_dir / "type").write_text("longrun\n")
-
-        # Reuse the manager's run-script rendering — single source of
-        # truth so register_profile_gateway and reconcile_profile_gateways
-        # stay consistent. extra_env is empty here; users who need
-        # per-profile env can set it via the profile's config.yaml
-        # (which the gateway itself loads).
-        run = tmp_dir / "run"
-        run.write_text(S6ServiceManager._render_run_script(profile, extra_env={}))
-        run.chmod(0o755)
-
-        # Persistent log rotation (OQ8-C).
-        log_subdir = tmp_dir / "log"
-        log_subdir.mkdir()
-        log_run = log_subdir / "run"
-        log_run.write_text(S6ServiceManager._render_log_run(profile))
-        log_run.chmod(0o755)
-
-        # The presence of a `down` file tells s6-supervise to NOT
-        # start the service when s6-svscan picks it up. User brings
-        # it up explicitly with `hermes -p <profile> gateway start`
-        # (which routes through the Phase 4
-        # _dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6 helper to `s6-svc -u`).
-        if not start:
-            (tmp_dir / "down").touch()
-
-        # Pre-create the supervise/ skeleton with hermes ownership
-        # BEFORE we publish the slot. Mirrors the same pre-creation
-        # step in S6ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway — when
-        # s6-svscan picks the published slot up, the s6-supervise it
-        # spawns will EEXIST our dirs/FIFOs and inherit hermes
-        # ownership, so runtime s6-svc / s6-svstat / s6-svwait calls
-        # (all dispatched as the hermes user) won't hit EACCES. See
-        # ``_seed_supervise_skeleton`` in service_manager.py for the
-        # full rationale.
-        _seed_supervise_skeleton(tmp_dir)
-
-        # Publish atomically. Path.replace handles the existing-target
-        # case the same way os.rename does on POSIX: the target is
-        # silently replaced, so a previous reconcile pass's slot is
-        # cleanly overwritten in one operation.
-        if service_dir.exists():
-            shutil.rmtree(service_dir)
-        tmp_dir.replace(service_dir)
-    except Exception:
-        shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
-        raise
-
-
-def _write_reconcile_log(
-    hermes_home: Path, actions: list[ReconcileAction],
-) -> None:
-    """Append one line per profile to $HERMES_HOME/logs/container-boot.log.
-
-    Operators inspect this to debug "why didn't my profile come back
-    up". Keeping a separate log file (vs. mixing into agent.log) lets
-    troubleshooters grep for "profile=foo" without wading through
-    unrelated activity.
-
-    Size-bounded: when the file exceeds ``_LOG_ROTATE_BYTES``
-    (defaults to 256 KiB ≈ 3000 reconcile lines), the current file
-    is renamed to ``container-boot.log.1`` (replacing any previous
-    rotation) before the new entries are appended. This gives long-
-    lived containers a soft cap of ~512 KiB across the two files
-    without pulling in logrotate or s6-log machinery just for this
-    one append-only file (PR #30136 review item O3).
-    """
-    import time
-    log_dir = hermes_home / "logs"
-    log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    log_path = log_dir / "container-boot.log"
-
-    # Rotate before opening to append, so the new entries always land
-    # in a fresh file when we crossed the threshold last time.
-    try:
-        if log_path.exists() and log_path.stat().st_size >= _LOG_ROTATE_BYTES:
-            log_path.replace(log_dir / "container-boot.log.1")
-    except OSError as exc:
-        # Rotation failure is non-fatal — keep appending to the
-        # existing file rather than losing the entry entirely.
-        log.warning("could not rotate %s: %s", log_path, exc)
-
-    ts = time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z")
-    with log_path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-        for a in actions:
-            f.write(
-                f"{ts} profile={a.profile} prior_state={a.prior_state} "
-                f"action={a.action}\n"
-            )
-
-
-# 256 KiB soft cap on container-boot.log; rotated to .1 when crossed.
-# At ~80 B per reconcile-action line this is ~3000 lines, or about a
-# year of daily reboots on a 5-profile container. Two files = ~512 KiB
-# worst case. Tuned for visibility (small enough to grep / cat without
-# scrolling forever) more than space (the persistent volume has GB).
-_LOG_ROTATE_BYTES = 256 * 1024
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    """Entry point invoked from /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles."""
-    hermes_home = Path(os.environ.get("HERMES_HOME", "/opt/data"))
-    scandir = Path(os.environ.get("S6_PROFILE_GATEWAY_SCANDIR", "/run/service"))
-    actions = reconcile_profile_gateways(
-        hermes_home=hermes_home, scandir=scandir,
-    )
-    for a in actions:
-        print(
-            f"reconcile: profile={a.profile} "
-            f"prior_state={a.prior_state} action={a.action}"
-        )
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())

hermes_cli/debug.py

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ Currently supports:
 import io
 import json
 import logging
-import re
 import sys
 import time
 import urllib.error
@@ -37,12 +36,6 @@ _REDACTION_BANNER = (
     "run with --no-redact to disable]\n"
 )
 
-_EMAIL_ADDRESS_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9._%+-])"
-    r"[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}"
-    r"(?![A-Za-z0-9._%+-])"
-)
-
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Paste services — try paste.rs first, dpaste.com as fallback.
@@ -405,8 +398,7 @@ def _redact_log_text(text: str) -> str:
         return text
     from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
 
-    text = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True)
-    return _EMAIL_ADDRESS_RE.sub("[REDACTED_EMAIL]", text)
+    return redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True)
 
 
 def _capture_log_snapshot(

hermes_cli/doctor.py

@@ -207,69 +207,14 @@ def _fail_and_issue(text: str, detail: str, fix: str, issues: list[str]) -> None
     issues.append(fix)
 
 
-def _check_s6_supervision(issues: list[str]) -> None:
-    """Inside a container under our s6 /init, surface what s6 sees.
-
-    Runs as a counterpart to :func:`_check_gateway_service_linger` for
-    the systemd-on-host case. No-op everywhere except in the s6
-    container so host runs aren't cluttered with irrelevant output.
-
-    Reports:
-      - Whether the main-hermes and dashboard static services are up
-      - How many per-profile gateway slots are registered (via
-        ``S6ServiceManager.list_profile_gateways()``) and how many are
-        currently supervised as ``up``
-    """
-    try:
-        from hermes_cli.service_manager import (
-            S6ServiceManager,
-            detect_service_manager,
-        )
-    except Exception:
-        return
-
-    if detect_service_manager() != "s6":
-        return
-
-    _section("s6 Supervision")
-
-    mgr = S6ServiceManager()
-
-    # Static services. They live under /run/service/ via s6-rc symlinks,
-    # so the same s6-svstat probe works.
-    for static in ("main-hermes", "dashboard"):
-        if mgr.is_running(static):
-            check_ok(f"{static}: up")
-        else:
-            check_info(f"{static}: down (expected if not enabled via env)")
-
-    profiles = mgr.list_profile_gateways()
-    if not profiles:
-        check_info("No per-profile gateways registered yet — create one with `hermes profile create <name>`")
-        return
-
-    up_count = sum(1 for p in profiles if mgr.is_running(f"gateway-{p}"))
-    check_ok(
-        f"Per-profile gateways: {up_count}/{len(profiles)} supervised up"
-        + (f" ({', '.join(sorted(profiles))})" if len(profiles) <= 8 else "")
-    )
-
-
 def _check_gateway_service_linger(issues: list[str]) -> None:
-    """Warn when a systemd user gateway service will stop after logout.
-
-    Skipped inside a container running under s6 — the linger concept
-    (user-systemd surviving SSH logout) doesn't apply there, and the
-    s6 supervision state is surfaced separately by
-    ``_check_s6_supervision``.
-    """
+    """Warn when a systemd user gateway service will stop after logout."""
     try:
         from hermes_cli.gateway import (
             get_systemd_linger_status,
             get_systemd_unit_path,
             is_linux,
         )
-        from hermes_cli.service_manager import detect_service_manager
     except Exception as e:
         check_warn("Gateway service linger", f"(could not import gateway helpers: {e})")
         return
@@ -277,12 +222,6 @@ def _check_gateway_service_linger(issues: list[str]) -> None:
     if not is_linux():
         return
 
-    # Inside a container under our s6 /init, _check_s6_supervision
-    # reports the live supervision state; the linger warning would be
-    # confusing here (no systemd, no logout, no "lingering" concept).
-    if detect_service_manager() == "s6":
-        return
-
     unit_path = get_systemd_unit_path()
     if not unit_path.exists():
         return
@@ -569,13 +508,6 @@ def run_doctor(args):
             if should_fix:
                 env_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
                 env_path.touch()
-                # .env holds API keys — restrict to owner-only access from
-                # creation. touch() obeys umask which is commonly 0o022,
-                # leaving the file world-readable; tighten explicitly.
-                try:
-                    os.chmod(str(env_path), 0o600)
-                except OSError:
-                    pass
                 check_ok(f"Created empty {_DHH}/.env")
                 check_info("Run 'hermes setup' to configure API keys")
                 fixed_count += 1
@@ -1052,7 +984,6 @@ def run_doctor(args):
             pass
 
     _check_gateway_service_linger(issues)
-    _check_s6_supervision(issues)
 
     if sys.platform != "win32":
         _section("Command Installation")
@@ -1145,26 +1076,6 @@ def run_doctor(args):
     
     # Docker (optional)
     terminal_env = os.getenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
-    try:
-        from hermes_constants import is_container as _is_container
-        running_in_container = _is_container()
-    except Exception:
-        running_in_container = False
-
-    if running_in_container:
-        # Inside our container the Docker terminal backend is not
-        # configured by default (Docker-in-Docker isn't set up); the
-        # local backend is the intended one. Skip the noisy "docker
-        # not found" warning. If the user has explicitly chosen
-        # TERMINAL_ENV=docker inside the container they likely mounted
-        # /var/run/docker.sock, so fall through to the normal check.
-        if terminal_env != "docker":
-            check_info(
-                "Running inside a container — using local terminal backend "
-                "(docker-in-docker is not configured by default)"
-            )
-            # Skip to next section; Docker isn't relevant here.
-            terminal_env = "local"
     if terminal_env == "docker":
         if _safe_which("docker"):
             # Check if docker daemon is running
@@ -1187,8 +1098,6 @@ def run_doctor(args):
         check_ok("docker", "(optional)")
     elif _is_termux():
         check_info("Docker backend is not available inside Termux (expected on Android)")
-    elif running_in_container:
-        pass  # already explained above
     else:
         check_warn("docker not found", "(optional)")
     

hermes_cli/env_loader.py

@@ -36,9 +36,7 @@ def get_secret_source(env_var: str) -> str | None:
     Returns ``"bitwarden"`` for keys pulled from Bitwarden Secrets Manager
     during the current process's ``load_hermes_dotenv()`` call.  Returns
     ``None`` for keys that came from ``.env``, the shell environment, or
-    aren't tracked.  The returned label is metadata only: credential-pool
-    persistence may store it to explain the origin of a borrowed secret, but
-    must never treat it as authorization to persist the raw value.
+    aren't tracked.
     """
     return _SECRET_SOURCES.get(env_var)
 
@@ -142,10 +140,6 @@ def _sanitize_env_file_if_needed(path: Path) -> None:
     This produces mangled values — e.g. a bot token duplicated 8×
     (see #8908).
 
-    Also strips embedded null bytes which crash ``os.environ[k] = v``
-    with ``ValueError: embedded null byte`` — typically introduced by
-    copy-pasting API keys from terminals or rich-text editors.
-
     We delegate to ``hermes_cli.config._sanitize_env_lines`` which
     already knows all valid Hermes env-var names and can split
     concatenated lines correctly.
@@ -161,11 +155,7 @@ def _sanitize_env_file_if_needed(path: Path) -> None:
     try:
         with open(path, **read_kw) as f:
             original = f.readlines()
-        # Strip null bytes before _sanitize_env_lines so they never
-        # reach python-dotenv (which passes them to os.environ and
-        # crashes with ValueError).
-        stripped = [line.replace("\x00", "") for line in original]
-        sanitized = _sanitize_env_lines(stripped)
+        sanitized = _sanitize_env_lines(original)
         if sanitized != original:
             import tempfile
             fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
@@ -254,8 +244,6 @@ def _apply_external_secret_sources(home_path: Path) -> None:
         override_existing=bool(bw_cfg.get("override_existing", False)),
         cache_ttl_seconds=float(bw_cfg.get("cache_ttl_seconds", 300)),
         auto_install=bool(bw_cfg.get("auto_install", True)),
-        server_url=str(bw_cfg.get("server_url", "") or "").strip(),
-        home_path=home_path,
     )
 
     if result.applied:

hermes_cli/fallback_cmd.py

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import copy
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
-from hermes_cli.fallback_config import get_fallback_chain
-
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Helpers
@@ -32,11 +30,20 @@ def _read_chain(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Return the normalized fallback chain as a list of dicts.
 
     Accepts both the new list format (``fallback_providers``) and the legacy
-    ``fallback_model`` format. When both are present, the effective chain is
-    merged with ``fallback_providers`` entries kept first. The returned list is
-    always a fresh copy — callers can mutate without touching the config dict.
+    single-dict format (``fallback_model``).  The returned list is always a
+    fresh copy — callers can mutate without touching the config dict.
     """
-    return get_fallback_chain(config)
+    chain = config.get("fallback_providers") or []
+    if isinstance(chain, list):
+        result = [dict(e) for e in chain if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("provider") and e.get("model")]
+        if result:
+            return result
+    legacy = config.get("fallback_model")
+    if isinstance(legacy, dict) and legacy.get("provider") and legacy.get("model"):
+        return [dict(legacy)]
+    if isinstance(legacy, list):
+        return [dict(e) for e in legacy if isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("provider") and e.get("model")]
+    return []
 
 
 def _write_chain(config: Dict[str, Any], chain: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> None: